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INTRODUCTION
Payday loans are extremely high-interest, short-term loans
offered to cash-strapped consumers. Some of the problems with
payday loans can be illustrated succinctly by the experience of
one payday loan customer, Leticia Ortega.' Realizing that her
next payday was two weeks away, Ortega worried about how
she was going to get enough cash to pay overdue telephone and
electric bills.2 Then Ortega, a cashier in San Antonio, Texas,
spotted an advertisement by National Money Service in a local
weekly newspaper. 3 National Money Service charged her a $90
4
interest fee for a $300 loan, due by her next payday.
Calculated on an annual percentage rate (APR) basis, this fee
amounts to an APR of 780%. 5 When the loan's due date
arrived, Ortega did not have sufficient cash to repay the entire
loan.6 Consequently, for almost a year, National Money Service

1. Ortega is a typical payday loan customer. For further explanation as
to why she is considered a typical payday loan customer, see discussion infra

Part I.B.
2. Adam Geller, Payday May Day: Short-Term Lenders Under Fire,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2001, at B1,available at 2001 WL 2995313.

3.

Id.

4.

Id.

5. The court in Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d
1375, 1379 n.3 (S.D. Ga. 2000) set forth the formula for calculating an APR.
Based on a fifty-two week year with "R" representing the APR, "1" the finance
charge, "2" the term (weeks) of the loan, and "P"the loan principle: (Rx P/52)
T = L Applying this formula to Ortega's loan yields the following calculation
and result: 1. (Rx $300 / 52) 2 = $90. 2. ($300R /52) 2 = $90. 3. 5.77R x 2 =
$90. 4. 11.54R = $90. 5. R = $90 /11.54. 6. R = 7.80. Accordingly, Ortega's
loan carried an APR of 780%.
6.

Geller, supra note 2.
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debited Ortega's bank account every two weeks in the amount
of $90 as interest to "roll over" the loan (i.e., extend the due
date). 7 Because none of the $90 interest payments counted as
principal, Ortega still owed National Money Service $300 even
though she had paid $1800 in interest charges. 8 Subsequently,
Ortega filed a complaint against National Money Service with
the state and learned that Texas usury law restricts lending
charges. 9 Because it had partnered with a bank located in
Delaware, however, National Money Service claimed it was not
subject to Texas usury law but could instead issue payday loans
charging the maximum interest rate allowed under Delaware
law, the bank's home state. 10 This lawsuit is still pending.
Ortega's experience with National Money Service brings to
light three of the major criticisms lodged against the payday
loan industry."1 First, because payday lenders charge fees
constituting extremely high-interest rates, these lenders are
modern-day loan sharks. 12 Second, because the payday loan
business model requires payment of the loan in full and does
not allow partial payments or renewal fees to reduce the

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Under Texas's consumer loan law, a lender can charge up to
$15.60 for a fourteen-day loan of $300. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.605(c)
(West 2002) (containing an exhibit that "provides examples of the maximum
authorized rates for loans made under Texas Finance Code"). The lender
cannot renew or roll over a loan if doing so results in charges exceeding that
maximum permitted fee. See id. § 1.605(f)(1).
10. Geller, supra note 2. The Delaware bank is the County Bank of
Rehoboth Beach. Id.
11. The Community Financial Services Association of America, a payday
lending industry trade group, operates a website that responds to these
criticisms at http://www.cfsa.net/pressreleases/bestpractices-pr.html.
12. See Jean Ann Fox, What Does It Take to Be a Loan Shark in 1998? A
Report on the Payday Loan Industry, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION 1998, at 987, 990 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. B-1047, 1998) (comparing salary lenders, who were
considered loan sharks at the beginning of the twentieth century, with payday
lenders), available at WL 772 PLI/Comm 987; Lisa Blaylock Moss, Note,
Modern Day Loan Sharking: Deferred Presentment Transactions & the Need
for Regulation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1725, 1725 (2000) ("[Mlodern day 'loan sharks'
are making short-term loans at usurious interest rates to consumers under the
guise of various 'deferred presentment transactions."'); Press Release,
Consumer Federation of America, Payday Lenders Charge Exorbitant Interest
Rates to Cash-Strapped Consumers (Nov. 10, 1998), at http://www.consumer
fed.org/loansharkpr.pdf.
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principal, payday lenders trap consumers in a vicious cycle of
indebtedness. 13 Third, payday lenders are partnering with
national banks in order to take advantage of a loophole in
federal banking law that allows them to charge rates in excess
14
of state law.
Disguising payday loans, threatening criminal prosecution,
and collecting excessive damages are among the other major
complaints lodged against the industry. To evade compliance
with state usury limits and federal and state disclosure
requirements, payday lenders in some localities disguise the
payday loan transaction with a layer of subterfuge such as
selling advertisements to people who only need cash. 15 For
example, a customer pays a lender a $33 fee for a $100 cash
loan and promises to repay that amount in two weeks in return
for the $100 and the opportunity to place an advertisement
such as "Go Cowboys" in a paper circulated only to the lender's
customers.16 Once a customer obtains a loan and has difficulty
repaying it, many payday lenders intimidate customers by
threatening to have them prosecuted for the crime of passing
bad checks because they lacked sufficient funds in their bank
accounts to cover the checks.17 Many payday lenders are going
beyond threats and are filing complaints with prosecuting
attorneys or are having customers arrested. 8 Moreover, in
civil lawsuits against their customers, some payday lenders
take advantage of state statutes designed to compensate
victims of bad-check crimes to collect treble damages plus court
costs and attorney's fees.' 9 In response to complaints about the
foregoing practices, payday lenders contend that these cited

13. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
14. See Barbara A. Rehm, Tanoue Seeks to Halt 'Renting' of Charters to
Payday Loan Firms, AM. BANKER, June 14, 2000, at 4 ("Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. Chairman Donna Tanoue . .. urged Congress to crack down
on banks that are so eager for fee income they 'rent' their charters to payday
loan companies."), available at 2000 WL 3362278; see also discussion infra

Part III.B.2.
15. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.a.
16. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer
FinancialServices Marketplace: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge
to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C.
L. REV. 589, 604 (2000).
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.d.
18. See id.

19.

See infra Part III.B.2.a.
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practices are rare and are perpetrated by only a small minority
of lenders.
While this Article does not conclude that every payday
lender is predatory, it establishes that a large number of
payday lenders engage in predatory practices. A predatory
lender is one who, for personal profit, takes advantage of
another by unfair, albeit technically legal, means. 20 In this
Article, payday lenders are labeled predators because they reap
generous profits 2' by taking advantage of consumers through
means that are not only grossly unfair but, in many cases, also
entirely unlawful. This conclusion is based on the results of a
survey conducted by the author as well as investigations
performed by state regulators and consumer advocacy groups.
The survey conducted focused on payday lenders in Ohio (Ohio
Survey) and is unique in that it is the first where surveyors
actually obtained payday loans and attempted to rescind them.
Contrary to the industry's contention, the Ohio Survey

20. See Hilary B. Miller, Payday Loans and Predatory Lending, in
CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 2001, at 113, 127-28 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1242, 2001)
(discussing what some consumer groups consider to be predatory loans by
using several criteria, including high costs), available at WL 1242 PLI/Corp
113; John Rao, Fair Housing: Predatory Loan Practices, in 1 CIL RIGHTS
SECTION, at 349 (ATLA Annual Convention Reference Materials, July 2001)
(defining predatory lending as the "practice of extending credit on unfair
terms"), available at WL 1 Ann. 2001 ATLA-CLE 349.
21. See, e.g., Kari Lydersen, Payday Profiteers:Payday Lenders Target the
Working Poor, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2001, at 9 (stating that First
Cash Financial Services, Inc., reported a 54% increase in profits during the
first six months of 2001), available at 2001 WL 15520552; Teresa Dixon
Murray, Quick Cash with a Catch, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 23, 2001,
at G1 (stating that the largest payday lenders reported "at least a 50 percent
increase in revenues in the first half of 2001"), available at 2001 WL
20551086; Compl., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ace Payday Plus, LLC, No. 1-0214 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 19, 2002) (asserting
20858-Civ.-Ungaro-Benages
various violations of securities laws by Ace, the largest check-cashing company
that offers payday loans, and stating that Ace's estimated earnings from its
payday loan operations to yield "an average of up to 360% profit per year" and
its check cashing operations to yield "up to 720% per year"),
Payday lenders
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17422.htm.
must be earning generous profits because they are trying to attract financial
investors by promising a 20% return on their investment. See, e.g., SEC
Brings Emergency Enforcement Action Against Florida Check Cashing
Business and Affiliates, SEC NEWS DIG., (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Washington, D.C.) Mar. 20, 2002, availableat 2002 WL 10534114. For further
discussion, see infra note 367 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates widespread noncompliance with consumer
protection laws and the industry's own self-regulatory
guidelines. The totality of results of the Ohio Survey and other
investigations clearly exposes the payday loan industry as
predatory.
While this Article discusses unlawful payday
lending practices, other technically legal practices discussed
herein frustrate the purposes of state and federal consumer
protection laws even though the practices might be
characterized as merely shrewd business conduct necessarily
attendant to capitalism. These technically legal practices exist
within loopholes that generate both excessive profits for payday
lenders and adverse consumer effects entirely unintended by
responsible legislative bodies.
As a result, this Article
concludes the payday loan industry needs to be federally
regulated.
Part I of this Article explains the characteristics of a
typical payday loan transaction and the characteristics of
consumers in need of payday loans. 22
It provides the
background information necessary to appreciate why payday
lending practices evoke strong condemnation from consumer
protection advocates and concerned lawmakers. By refuting
the frequent industry assertion that payday loans are merely
services provided to consumers, Part I further establishes that
payday loans are a form of consumer credit. 23 The credit label
is highly important. Because payday loans constitute a form of
credit, borrowers should be afforded legal protections
comparable to those available to users of traditional forms of
24
consumer credit.
Part II of this Article describes the unfair and unlawful
lending practices permeating the payday loan industry and
analyzes how they violate various laws. 25 Using the results of
the Ohio Survey and other studies, Part II details the
exorbitant interest charges payday lenders have managed to
collect from their borrowers. It further describes the unlawful
means employed by payday lenders to mislead consumers about

22. See discussion infra Part I.A.
23. See discussion infra Part I.B.
24. Middle- and upper-class Americans are not subject to these abusive
collection practices when they default on credit card debts. Payday loan
customers should receive comparable protection.
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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the cost of credit, thereby enticing them into a loan transaction.
Part II also examines common egregious practices following the
consummation of the loan. These practices include "rollover"
terms that trap consumers like Ortega in a permanent cycle of
debt and collection practices that subject defaulting borrowers
to both punitive sanctions through the imposition of treble
damages and criminal sanctions through bad-check
prosecutions.
Part III of this Article explains how the payday lending
industry has managed to thrive despite the egregious
treatment of its borrowers. 26 This section first explores
demographic data demonstrating that payday loan customers
are particularly susceptible to oppressive loan terms and
collection practices because they lack access to traditional
forms of credit. Part III further describes how payday lenders
exploit ambiguities in state law and federal banking law to
take full advantage of their customers' lack of financial options.
Part III highlights the recent trend among payday lenders to
use "rent-a-bank" partnerships with traditional banks to
27
charge fees higher than those allowed by state law.
Part IV argues for a comprehensive system of federal

26. See discussion infra Part III.B.
27. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. Payday lenders are aggressively
seeking banks for partnership arrangements because, under federal banking
law, a payday lender may charge interest at the maximum rate allowed by a
bank's home state, instead of being limited by a lower rate permitted in the
state where the customer resides. Id. This practice, known as "rent-a-bank,"
is the basis for National Money's claim that it did not violate Texas's fee
limitation of $15.60 or rollover limitations when it collected $1800 in fees on a
$300 loan to Ortega. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Part I
debunks the payday lenders' claim that federal law preempts state usury law
to the extent that the payday lender, rather than the bank, has the
preponderant economic role in the payday lending operation. Federal banking
regulators have warned banks about partnering with payday lenders and do
not support rent-a-bank because of concerns over consumer protection issues
and banking safety and soundness risks. Press Release, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and Office of Thrift Supervision, Agencies Urge
Banks and Thrifts to Evaluate Risks with Vendors Engaged in Practices
Viewed as Abusive to Customers (Nov. 27, 2000) (indicating that OCC and
OTS "alerted national banks and federal thrifts that the agencies have
significant safety and soundness, compliance and consumer protection
concerns with banks and thrifts entering into contractual arrangements with
vendors to fund so-called 'title loans' and 'payday loans'"), available at 2000
WL 1740418, at *1. For further discussion, see infra notes 526-30 and
accompanying text.
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regulations to protect consumers from the rampant
overreaching that is common in today's payday loan
transactions. 28 This Article concludes with recommendations
for a payday lending statute that protects consumers from
predatory payday lending practices and that enables consumers
to exit the subprime lending market, while protecting the
29
legitimate interests of payday lenders.
I. THE NATURE OF PAYDAY LENDING
Payday lenders are central figures in the fringe banking
industry, which has arisen to serve consumers with low-tomoderate incomes. 30 In the book Fringe Banking: CheckCashing Outlets, Pawnshops, and the Poor, Professor John P.
Caskey first described the nationwide proliferation of fringe
banks, companies that offer credit products to consumers
excluded from mainstream banking services.
Because of
widespread bank branch closings in poor and minority
neighborhoods, these consumers lack access to traditional
forms of credit. 31 Only a small number of check-cashing outlets
issued payday loans when Professor Caskey wrote Fringe
Banking.32 He stated, however, that if check-cashing outlets

28. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the ineffectiveness of existing state law
and positing that Congress needs to set minimum consumer protections).

While banning payday loans is an option, it is not a viable option given the
consumer demand for the loans and the aggressive lobbying efforts of payday
lenders.
29. See infra notes 719-62 and accompanying text.
30.

Melissa Allison, Regulators Leave Locations up to Banks, CHI. TRIB.,

Nov. 25, 2001, § 5, at 1. Lending volume is the primary factor dictating the
number of bank branches in a given area. Id. This reality results in fewer
bank branches in low-income and minority neighborhoods and more payday
loan companies since payday loan companies typically cost less to operate and
generate more income than a typical bank branch. Id.
31.

See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS,

PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 6-7, 70-71, 90-97 (1994); Michael A. Stegman,
Banking the Unbanked: Untapped Market Opportunities for North Carolina's
Financial Institutions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 28 (2001) ("The core of this
'fringe banking' industry, as it is commonly referred to by consumer advocates,
is a national network of check cashing centers and payday lenders ....
).
32. CASKEY, supra note 31, at 59. In his book, Professor Caskey describes
'salary lenders," the forerunners of today's payday lenders. See id. at 31-32.
In a typical arrangement, an unlicensed lender would make a loan by
"purchasing" a worker's next paycheck at a discount. Id. Salary lenders
claimed they were not lending but were purchasing property. Id. at 30, 32.
Many states adopted small loan laws to regulate this practice. Id.

2002]

PAYDAY LOANS

regularly issued payday loans, a strong case would exist "for
fairly extensive regulations and monitoring" of check-cashing
outlets. 33 While Professor Caskey's 1994 book did not elaborate
on the point, this Article explains why he was correct to make
that assertion. To appreciate why payday lending practices
deserve federal regulatory supervision, one must first
understand how a typical payday loan transaction operates,
and, second, how these transactions qualify as a form of
consumer credit rather than merely a contract for checkcashing services. In this regard, section A provides a general
description of the common loan terms and a brief description of
typical payday loan borrowers. Section B then explores the
considerable authority that firmly establishes payday loans as
a form of consumer credit.

A. WHAT ARE PAYDAY LOANS AND WHO USES THEM?
Payday loans are known by various names, including
payday advances, deferred deposit loans, and cash advance
loans. 34 To apply for a loan, a consumer usually needs to
present a driver's license, pay stub, bank statement, telephone
bill, and checkbook. 35 Payday lenders advertise that consumers
can obtain, in minutes, payday loans without hassles or credit
checks. 36 Assuming a consumer qualifies for a payday loan, a

33. Id. at 124 n.11.
34. Open-End Credit, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Mar. 31, 2000) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (indicating that payday loans "may also be known as
'cash advance loans,' 'check advance loans,' 'postdated check loans,' 'delayed
deposit checks,' or 'deferred deposit checks'); Fox, supra note 12, at 989
(indicating that small, short-term consumer loans "go by a variety of names:
'payday loans,' 'cash advance loans,' 'check advance loans,' 'post-dated check
loans' or 'delayed deposit check loans").
35. This list of documents is based on the Ohio Survey results. See also
Fox, supra note 12, at 989 (noting that "recent pay stubs, bank statements,
photo identification, car registration, several months' telephone bills and
utility bills" are the typically required documents); Dewanna Lofton, Is It
Legalized Loan Sharking, or Help for Those with Nowhere Else to Go?, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis), Sept. 3, 2000, at DS1 ("Most [payday lenders] require that
borrowers bring a driver's license or state-issued photo ID, a recent pay stub,
telephone bill, bank statement and checkbook with pre-printed checks."),
available at 2000 WL 24146185.
36. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 606 ("[It is handy, quick, and
hassle-free; there are no obstacles such as bad credit records."); Daniel A.
Edelman, Payday Loans: Big Interest Rates and Little Regulation, 11 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 174, 174 (1999) (indicating that the lack of a credit check is
a feature that "makes these loans attractive to those who have, or think they
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nontraditional lender 37 makes a small cash advance (ranging
from $50 to $1000) to the consumer in exchange for the
consumer's post-dated personal check written for the amount of
the loan plus a fee. 38 Instead of taking a post-dated check,
some lenders require the consumer to authorize a debit to the
consumer's bank account when the loan is due. 39 Because the
lender holds the check until the consumer's next payday, the
usual term of the loan is up to two weeks. 40 The lender then
attempts to cash the check unless the customer repays the loan
in full and reclaims the post-dated check, pays a fee to "roll
over" or extend the loan's due date for another two weeks, or, in
states that prohibit rollovers, refinances the loan by paying a
41
fee.
Assuming the customer cannot repay the loan by its due
date and must roll over the loan, the customer pays a fee
usually equal to the initial borrowing fee, 42 further increasing
have, bad credit").
As revealed in the Ohio Survey, contrary to their
representations, most lenders conduct a credit check using Tele-Track, a credit
reporting agency for risky borrowers.
See infra notes 306-08 and
accompanying text.
37. Besides companies that only issue payday loans, check-cashing
outlets, retail stores, and pawn shops are also offering the loans. Fox, supra
note 12, at 989. In the Ohio Survey, a liquor store, Great Western Beverage,
offered payday loans. As indicated in the introduction, traditional banks are
now in the payday loan business.
38. Smith v. Check-N-Go, Inc., 200 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 1999) ("A
'payday loan' is a short-term loan that is to be repaid on the borrower's next
payday."); Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 600-01.
39. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 601 ("Some transactions use
delayed automatic debit agreements instead of checks. Deposit of the check or
automatic debit is deferred for an agreed-upon time, which may be tied to the
next payday (even if only a matter of days), or for a scheduled period of time
up to a month.").
40. Fox, supra note 12, at 990. Some lenders can shorten loan terms to
maximize costs by taking advantage of state statutes allowing loan terms of
up to one full month. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 603-04 (explaining
how lenders who would make $20 off a loan fee on a $100 loan payable in one
month can make twice that if the loan term were for two weeks and the
borrower rolled it over and noting that "[t]his may help explain why two weeks
is the most common term for payday loans").
41. Fox, supra note 12, at 990 ("[Tlhe consumer can either redeem the
check with cash or a money order, permit the check to be deposited, or renew
the loan by paying another fee"); see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at
601 ("To avoid appearing to roll over the debt, the lender may ask you to take
out a 'new loan,' in which case you pay the $15 fee, but write another check for
$115."). The last two options are virtually indistinguishable; the distinction
made here merely clarifies the later discussion, see infra Part II.B.l.a,
regarding the inadequacy of statutes that attempt to prohibit rollovers.
42. See Paul Gores, Payday Lenders Tout New Study, MILWAUKEE J. &
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the cost of the loan. If the customer signs a debit authorization
agreement, the payday lender automatically withdraws the
43
rollover/refinance charge from the customer's bank account.
No matter how the lender characterizes or collects the fee, the
fee does not count towards the original principal, and the
consumer, therefore, remains indebted until he or she pays the
entire original loan in a single payment.44 In other words,
lenders do not accept partial payments, which explains why
Ortega still owed $300 even though she paid National Money
Service $1800 in rollover fees.4 5 The rollover practice will be
addressed later in Part II.B.1. Given such payment terms, one
may wonder what type of consumer chooses payday loans.
While borrowing against future income represents a
common practice in America, payday lenders serve a unique
class of consumers lacking sufficient income to cover financial
needs. 46 Part III discusses these consumers in depth. For now,
realize that payday loan customers, like many Americans,
possess limited incomes and no savings, but they are a distinct
subset of the populous because they lack access to traditional
forms of credit. 47 Turned down for credit or owning maxed-out
credit cards, they also have no homes and thus cannot get an
equity line of credit to cover expenses. 48 Many have damaged
credit histories for any number of reasons, including a previous
bankruptcy filing. 49 These consumers can turn to nonbanks
that stand ready to meet their need for short-term credit. As
explained below, it is clear these consumers approach payday

SENTINEL, May 8, 2001, at D1, available at 2001 WL 9354775.
43. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 601. Recall Leticia Ortega who

had her bank account debited $90 every two weeks for almost a year by
National Money Service in order to roll over the loan. See supra notes 1-10
and accompanying text.
44. Kathleen E. Keest, Stone Soup: Exploring the Boundaries Between
Subprime Lending and Predatory Lending, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL
SERVICES LITIGATION 2001, at 1107, 1115, (PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Course, Handbook Series B-1241, 2001) ("Since the fees are flat fees, and the
loans are nonamortizing, the fees pile on and on, while the principal remains
untouched."), available at WL 1241 PLI/Corp 1107.
45. Geller, supra note 2.
46. See, e.g., Shaun Schafer, Lenders Thrive on Debt Cycles, TULSA

WORLD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 1 (quoting a payday loan customer who stated that
she could trace the eight payday loans that she had obtained back to shortly
after her fifteen-year marriage ended), available at 2002 WL 7106735.
47. See infra notes 537-47 and accompanying text.

48.

See infra notes 538-46 and accompanying text.

49.

See infra note 540 and accompanying text.
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lenders seeking extensions of credit.50 Ample legal authority
buttresses this conclusion.
B. PAYDAY LOANS: ORDINARY CHECK-CASHING SERVICES OR
LENDING MONEY?

Originally earning most of their income by charging
"unbanked"51 consumers fees to cash checks, check-cashing
companies started to expand their operations in the early 1990s
by issuing payday loans to consumers who had bank accounts
with relatively low balances. 52 When charged with lending
without a license and evading usury laws, check-cashers
initially denied that they were issuing loans. 53 Consider the
following example of a typical payday loan transaction.
Assume Mary, who needs $100 until her next payday, visits a
nearby check-cashing store. After Mary produces proper
documentation, the check-casher gives Mary $100, takes from

50. See infra Part I.B.
51. The "unbanked" are consumers who do not use regular bank accounts
to pay bills or to handle other personal financial matters. See CASKEY, supra
note 31, at 84-90.
A large number of unbanked individuals receive
governmental benefits, such as welfare and social security checks. Joseph A.
Smith, Jr., Savings for the Poor: The Hidden Benefits of Electronic Banking, 5
N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 4 (2001) (stating that the "universe of unbanked
Americans, both recipients and nonrecipients of federal benefits, represents
one third of all minority households").
52. See Jarret C. Oeltjen, Florida Pawnbroking: An Industry in
Transition, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 995, 1002-03 (1996) (discussing new
pawnshop services, including "advancing money on personal checks under the
guise of check cashing"); Amy Pyle, Consumer Groups Attack "PaydayLoan"
Business, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at Al (stating that check-cashers began
issuing payday loans in order to replace lost profits arising from federal laws
mandating that government checks (e.g., welfare or social security checks) be
electronically deposited), available at 1999 WL 2128989; Moss, supra note 12,
at 3 (inferring that the market for payday loans are consumers who have
small checking account balances).
53. See, e.g., Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997)
(conveying a payday lender's argument "that it was not charging interest but
only service fees for cashing checks"); Keest, supra note 44, at 1116-17 ("[Tjhe
industry took the position these [payday loan transactions] were not loans,
and therefore not subject to state licensing laws, state credit laws, nor Truth
in Lending disclosure requirements."); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Time and
Money: One State's Regulation of Check-Based Loans, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 973, 978 (2000); Jeff Gelles, The PhiladelphiaInquirer Consumer Watch
Column, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 14, 2001 (stating that some lenders were
"drawing up a contract that says a consumer is 'leasing' the money, not
borrowing it"), 2001 WL 30265902.
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her a postdated check for $115 (or for $100, if she pays the $15
fee in cash), and requires her to sign a contract obligating her
to repay the loan in two weeks. It seems incredible that a
check-casher would contend that transactions like the one in
which Mary engaged in are not loans. 54 Payday loans could be
characterized as a sham transaction; that is, a transaction
meant to disguise the lending of money without a license and
lending at an unlawful rate of interest. 55 Once regulators
began enforcing the laws against payday lenders, some lenders
began complying with state and federal law. Other lenders
began adding a new feature to the transaction; they claimed
they were leasing appliances or selling merchandise or services.
As explained below, payday lenders have been issuing and
continue to issue loans, using a variety of artifices. 56 As a
result, a plethora of federal and state laws regulating consumer
credit transactions apply to payday lenders. 57 .
1.

Payday Loans Are Covered by the Truth in Lending Act

The most significant law that payday lenders violate is the
federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA).5 8 Passed in 1968 as Title
I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, TILA is the
"cornerstone of consumer credit legislation." 59 In Mourning v.

54. See, e.g., CASKEY, supra note 31, at 30 ("Such an agreement is
obviously a short-term consumer loan, but some check-cashers claim that it is
merely a delayed check-cashing transaction and should not fall under the laws
governing consumer loans."); Schmedemann, supra note 53, at 978 ("The
check-based loan industry [in Kentucky] maintained that the transactions
were not, from a legal standpoint, loans, and the fees charged were not
interest."); Helen Huntley, Tallahassee, Fla.-Based Payday Loan Firm Loses
Fight in Court, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at 1 (indicating the
general counsel for the comptroller's position that "[i]f the transaction
continues beyond the one payment, it's a loan, not a one-time check cashing
thing"), available at 2000 WL 10327014.
55. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 604-05 (indicating that
payday loans appeared illegally in the 1980s). Illegal lenders, those operating
without a license, can be found all over the country. See, e.g., Jill Taylor,
Check-CasherArrested over Interest Rates, PALM BEACH POST, May 22, 1999,
at D2, available at 1999 WL 17583992.
56. See infra Part I.B.2.
57. See, e.g., infra Part I.B.1 (TILA); infra note 139 (several state
statutes).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2000).
59. James P. Nehf, Effective Regulation of Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 751, 758 (1991). Some state laws incorporate some provisions of
TILA in their unfair and deceptive trade practices statutes, which are
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Family PublicationsService, the United States Supreme Court
noted that Congress, after years of study and debate, concluded
that consumers were "ignorant of the nature of their credit
obligation and of the costs of deferring payment." 60 To remedy
such ignorance, Congress enacted TILA for the purpose of
"assur[ing] a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit."'6' Primarily a credit disclosure statute, TILA does not
generally regulate what terms a creditor must offer, but
whatever they are, be uniformly
requires that those terms,
62
disclosed to the consumer.
TILA's language supports the conclusion that payday
lenders are subject to TILA's disclosure requirements because
64
they are creditors that regularly 63 issue "consumer credit."
patterned after the Federal Trade Commission Act. See generally 2 RALPH C.
CLONTZ, JR., TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL: TEXT AND FORMS % 10.17, 10-102

(rev. ed. 2001) (stating that "many states have what is called the 'Little FTC
Act', patterned after the Federal Trade Commission Act").
60. 411 U.S. 356, 363 (1973). The Court also stated,
Because of the divergent, and at times fraudulent, practices by which
consumers were informed of the terms of the credit extended to them,
many consumers were prevented from shopping for the best terms
available and, at times, were prompted to assume liabilities they
could not meet. Joseph Barr, then Under Secretary of the Treasury,
noted in testifying before a Senate subcommittee that such blind
economic activity is inconsistent with the efficient functioning of a
free economic system such as ours, whose ability to provide desired
material at the lowest cost is dependent on the asserted preferences
and informed choices of consumers.
Id. at 363-64 (footnote omitted).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
62.

See DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER

LAW 419 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that TILA is not a usury statute because
"nowhere in the statute are rates set").
63. Under the plain language of TILA, companies that offer payday loans
are subject to TILA's disclosure requirements. TILA requires "creditors," see
15 U.S.C. § 1602, to disclose the cost of credit as a dollar amount (referred to
as the "finance charge" under § 1605(a)) and as an APR, see id. § 1606(a). A
creditor is one who "regularly extends consumer credit." 12 C.F.R. §
Regulation Z clarifies that one regularly extends
226.2(a)(17) (2002).
consumer credit if one does so more than twenty-five times a year or more
than five times a year for transactions secured by a dwelling, or when one
extends a single credit that would be classified as a "high cost" mortgage
transaction by Regulation Z. Id. § 226.2(a)(17) n.3. Payday lenders meet the
second part of the definition because they require consumers to make their
post-dated checks payable to the lenders, and the written contracts provide
the same. The first part of the definition requires that the creditor regularly
extend consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge. Payday lenders
easily meet this definition because thousands of them issue at least 100 loans
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per month, and the industry is predicted to issue about 180 million loans in
the year 2002, grossing a profit of $45 billion. Jean Ann Fox & Edmund
Mierzwinski, Rent-A-Bank: How Banks Help Payday Lenders Evade State
Consumer Protections, the 2001 Payday Lender Survey and Report, (CFA &
State Public Interest Research Groups), at http://www.uspirg.org/
reports/rentabank/paydayreportnovl3.pdf, at 4 (Nov. 2001) (noting that
"12,000 to 14,000 stores make 100 or more loans per month"); John Reosti, As
Others Retreat, Delaware Bank Cashes in on Payday Lending, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 16, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 26573247. In addition to meeting
the regularity requirement, payday lenders offer loans that are subject to a
finance charge because the loans carry a service charge. Examples of charges
that qualify as a finance charge include a "[s]ervice or carrying charge." See
15 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
64. Payday loans are "consumer credit" transactions. "Credit" is the
"right to defer payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its payment." 12
C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14). Based on the plain language of the statute and
Regulation Z, payday lenders are extending credit because they give the
consumer the right to defer repayment of the money received until her next
payday. An extension of credit qualifies as "consumer credit" when the
creditor extends the credit to a natural person who uses the loan proceeds
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Id. § 226.2(a)(12).
Payday lenders extend consumer credit because they allow the cash to be used
to cover personal financial problems. One can easily conclude this is true by
simply looking at any payday lender's brochure, advertisement, or website.
This is especially true given the inclination of the courts to liberally construe
TILA. Begala v. PNC Bank, 163 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 1998) ("We have
repeatedly stated that TILA is a remedial statute and, therefore, should be
given a broad, liberal construction in favor of the consumer."); Fairley v.
Turan-Foley Imps., Inc., 65 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Consistent with its
purpose, [TILA] is meant to be construed liberally in favor of the consumer.");
Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting a liberal
construction for TILA). Payday lenders advertise how the consumer can use
the payday loan to cover personal matters such as paying utility bills, and the
lenders do not ask why the loan is needed. For example, Check$mart's
website contains the following advertisement:
At Check$mart we will pay up to $500 against your personal check!
So you can get that cash you need today for:
* Bills (utilities, credit cards, medical, etc....)
* Grocery Shopping
* Car Repairs
"Rent or Mortgage
" Car or Home Repairs
"Clothing
"Vacation
* Emergencies
Check$mart never asks you to explain the reason why you need the
cash.
Check$mart website, at http://www.checksmart.com (last visited Aug. 16,
2001); see also Check into Cash website, at http://www.checkintocash.com/
how_it_works.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2001) ("Check into Cash is perfect for
times when your budget is stretched by unexpected expenses. Such as ... car
repairs, medical expenses, home emergencies, or maybe you're just trying to
get in on a great sale.").
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Despite TILA's plain language, payday lenders initially
contended that they were not extending consumer credit but
were merely providing check-cashing services and, therefore,
were not subject to TILA. 65
With one exception, courts
addressing the issue have held that payday loans are
extensions of credit under TILA. 66 In Hamilton v. York, the
court deemed that these "check-cashing" services were "nothing
more than interest bearing loans," and found it difficult "to
imagine how charges for exchanging money today for more
money at a later date could be classified as anything but
interest on a loan."

67

Congress authorized the Federal Reserve Board to issue
regulations implementing TILA. 6 8 In 2000, the Federal
Reserve Board revised its Official Staff Commentary to
Regulation Z to clarify that payday loans constitute "credit" for

65. Professor Deborah A. Schmedemann explains the distinction between
check cashing and payday loans as follows:
Check cashing typically involves a check written by an employer or
government welfare fund to the customer; [payday] loans involve a
check written by the borrower to the lender. Check cashers present
the checks they receive for payment; in the typical [payday] loan, the
lender intends not to present the check to the borrower's bank. Check
cashing does not entail an ongoing obligation on the part of the
customer; [payday] loans do.
Finally, the fees paid differ
significantly: a single fee of, say, ten percent for standard checkcashing transactions versus an on-going fee at an annual rate of over
500%.
Schmedemann, supra note 53, at 976 (footnote omitted).
66. See, e.g., Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1382 (S.D. Ga. 2000); Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing, 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048
(M.D. Tenn. 1999); In re Brigance, 219 B.R. 486, 493 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1998), affd sub nom., Cash in a Flash v. Brown, 229 B.R. 739 (W.D. Tenn.
1999), also affd, 234 B.R. 401 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); Hamilton v. York, 987 F.
Supp. 953, 957 (E.D. Ky. 1997); White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 496,
497 (Ky. 1999); Commonwealth v. Bar D Fin. Servs., 32 Va. Cir. 429, 430 (Va.
Cir. Ct. 1994). But see Clement v. Amscot Corp. 176 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1301
(M.D. Fla. 2001) (refusing to retroactively apply the Official Staff
Commentary, which indicates that TILA and Regulation Z apply to payday
loans).
67. Hamilton, 987 F. Supp. at 956 & n.4. In Hamilton, the payday lender
referred to the payday loans as deferred presentment transactions. Id. at 955.
Payday lenders who fail to comply with TILA's disclosure requirements are
liable for actual and statutory damages and attorney's fees. Brown v. Payday
Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
820 (2000).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(d) (2000).
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purposes of TILA. 69 If a fee .charged in connection with a
payday loan meets the definition of a "finance charge" under
TILA, the Official
Staff Commentary
ignores the
0
characterization of the fee under state law.
Moreover,
"[p]ersons that regularly extend payday loans and otherwise
meet the definition of [a] creditor ...are required ...to provide
disclosures to consumers consistent with the requirements of
Regulation Z."71
Because courts treat the Official Staff

69. Open-End Credit, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129 (Mar. 31, 2000) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). The new comment appears at Reg. Z § 226.2(a)(14)-2.
Id. at 17,130. Congress gave authority to the Federal Reserve Board to issue
regulations implementing TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(d). Accordingly, the
Federal Reserve Board promulgated Regulation Z, which prescribes the form,
content, and timing of the disclosures required by the TILA. See 12 C.F.R. §§
226.1-.33 (2001). The Federal Reserve Board has also issued official
commentary on Regulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2002). The requirements of
Regulation Z are deemed requirements of TILA. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(y); London
v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1322 (S.D. Fla.
2001) ("[Als is fully apparent from the text of § 1602(y) of TILA, Congress
intended that those regulations, which subsequently were promulgated as
Regulation Z, would be authoritative respecting the implementation of TILA's
disclosure provisions."). Unless a provision of Regulation Z contradicts TILA,
courts accept as authoritative the Federal Reserve Board's regulatory
implementation of TILA as well as its interpretation of its own Regulation Z.
Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 (1981) (citing Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) and stating, "[A]bsent some
obvious repugnance to [TILA], the Board's regulation implementing [TILA]
should be accepted by the Courts, as should the Board's interpretation of its
own regulation."); Milhollin, 444 U.S. at 566 n.9 (noting that Congress has
conferred "special status upon official staff interpretations" of Regulation Z).
70. See Open End Credit, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,129.
71. Id. at 17,130. The full comment reads as follows:
Payday loans; deferred presentment. Credit includes a transaction in
which a cash advance is made to a consumer in exchange for the
consumer's personal check, or in exchange for the consumer's
authorization to debit the consumer's deposit account, and where the
parties agree either that the check will not be cashed or deposited, or
that the consumer's deposit account will not be debited, until a
designated future date. This type of transaction is often referred to as
a "payday loan" or "payday advance" or "deferred presentment loan."
A fee charged in connection with such a transaction may be a finance
charge for purposes of § 226.4, regardless of how the fee is
characterized under state law. Where the fee charged constitutes a
finance charge under § 226.4 and the person advancing funds
regularly extends consumer credit, that person is a creditor and is
required to provide disclosures consistent with the requirements of
Regulation Z.
Id. at 17,131. The Federal Reserve Board's commentary accords with several
states that regulate payday lending and already require lenders to provide
TILA disclosures. Id.
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Commentaries as law, 72 payday lenders must comply with the
73
disclosure requirements of TILA.
2. Disguising Payday Loans Through Sham Transactions
To skirt TILA's disclosure requirements, some payday
lenders cloak the payday loan transaction with alternative
lending schemes. 74 Critics claim that, besides violating TILA,
these lenders violate state laws by not complying with state
usury limits, by failing to obtain licenses to issue consumer
loans, by failing to pay state and local taxes, and by failing to
comply with state credit disclosure requirements. 75 Following a
description of popular alternative lending transactions, this
section analyzes whether these transactions are "loans" or
"credit" transactions subject to federal and state laws.
a. LeasingAppliances or Selling Goods and Services
One popular scheme is the sale-leaseback transaction.7 6 In
this exchange, the lender "buys" a consumer's household
appliance and then leases it back to the consumer for a rental
fee until the consumer can repurchase it. 77 The appliance,
however, is never actually delivered to the lender. 78 Instead,

72.
73.
74.
75.

Valencia, 452 U.S. at 219; WHALEY, supra note 62, at 420.
See Open-End Credit, 65 Fed. Reg. at 17,129.
See supra notes 76-101 and accompanying text.
Juan B. Elizondo, Jr., Legislator Connected to Loan Bill Lobbying,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 18, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 4579576;
Lt. Col. Michael E. Smith, Payday Loans: The High Cost of BorrowingAgainst
Your Paycheck, ARMY LAW, Feb. 2001, at 24.
76. Robert Elder, Jr., Battle over Small Loans Turns Into Big Production,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1999.
77. Ruth Cardella, WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING: PAYDAY LOANS DISGUISE
ILLEGAL LENDING, CONSUMER'S UNION, at 3, www.consumer.org/pdf/payday
loans.pdf (Feb. 1999). One lender, ACE Cash Express, for example,
circumvents a Maryland statute regulating unsecured loans by drafting loan
agreements to include the taking of a security interest in the borrower's
appliance. E-mail from Gary Peller, Professor, Georgetown Law Center, to
Creola Johnson, Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law (Aug. 28, 2002, 11:16:00 EST) (on file with author).
78. Cardella, supra note 77, at 3 (stating that the appliance "never leaves
the borrower's home."). The customer supposedly gives the lender the serial
number etched on the appliance that is being leased in the sale-leaseback
agreement. Carlos Guerra, 'Not Loans' are Really Bilking Poor Texans, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Mar. 1, 2001, at B1 (stating that lenders offering
payday loans often require a check and the serial numbers of two of the
borrower's appliances), available at 2001 WL 13519310.

2002]

PAYDAY LOANS

the lender gives the consumer cash and takes only a post-dated
check from the consumer as security. 79 Even though saleleaseback companies claim they are not lenders, they advertise
along with traditional lenders in the loan section of local yellow
pages.80
In a 2001 survey of payday lenders in Texas,
Consumers Union found sale-leaseback lenders charging
consumers rental rates as low as $18.40 and as high as $64.94
for a two-week loan of $100.81 Moreover, Consumers Union
found that fourteen out of the twenty-one companies surveyed
offered sale-leaseback services and ten out of those fourteen
specifically claimed the service was "not a loan."8 2 The average
fee for the sale-leaseback service was $33 (or an effective APR
83
of 832%) for a $100 two-week loan.
The Texas Committee on Economic Development's
Subcommittee on Consumer Credit Laws recently investigated
companies offering sale-leaseback loans and concluded that
these companies "embrace the subterfuge of renaming the loan
transaction in order to avoid regulatory oversight."84 If the
customer is unable to repay the loan, the companies do not take
85
the property but only accept payment of a lease renewal fee.
As with regular payday loans, some customers of sale-leaseback
86
companies find themselves caught in a vicious cycle of debt.
In addition to offering sale-leaseback services, some
payday lenders operate "cash catalog sale" companies. This
type of scheme has surfaced in several states, including
By
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, and Texas. 87

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Guerra, supra note 78, at B1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tim Morstad, Sale-Leaseback Lenders Defy Regulation, CONSUMERS
UNION, Feb. 2001, at 4. It should be noted that sale-leaseback transactions
are not limited to appliances. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 598 n.38
(discussing sale-leaseback schemes involving automobiles and homes).
85. Cardella, supra note 77, at 3.
86. For example, one customer filed a complaint with Texas's Office of
Consumer Credit Commissioner stating that, after he "sold" his VCR and
television to more than one sale-leaseback company, he paid, over a fivemonth period, in excess of $3797 to repay eight loans totaling $1853. Id. at 3.
87. Patricia Dedrick, Montgomerian Attempts to Join Suit to Regain Fees,
MONTGOMERY ADvERTISER, Jan. 11, 1999, at B6, 1999 WL 10343501; Firms
Accused of Duping Sailors, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 6, 1996, at B2, 1996 WL
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advertising in the loan section of the yellow pages, 88 and by
operating under names such as Instant Cash Catalog Sales8 9
and Money Express Catalog Sales Inc., 90 catalog sale companies
do not try to hide their status as payday lenders. Catalog sale
companies require a borrower to purchase catalog certificates
in order to obtain a loan. 9 1 In exchange for cash, the borrower
writes a check for the amount of the loan plus the cost of the
catalog certificates. 92 For example, the borrower writes a $130
check for a $100 loan, with the additional $30 supposedly in
consideration for the certificates. When the loan becomes due,
the catalog company cashes the check and gives the borrower
the certificates. 93 In theory, the borrower may then use the
certificates to purchase merchandise from the company's
catalog. 94 In Cashback Catalog Sales v. Price, however, the
court noted that the certificates at issue could only be used to
purchase items from a mail-order catalog that was never given
95
to the consumer.
Additionally, like cash-back catalog companies that issue
potentially worthless certificates, some payday lenders have
created cash-back advertisement companies that print useless
advertisements. 96 Consumers needing cash can find the
nearest cash-back advertisement company in the loan section of
the yellow pages 97 and go there to borrow $100 by purchasing
12615522; see Cashback Catalog Sales, Inc. v. Price, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375,
1376 (S.D. Ga. 2000); Cardella, supra note 77, at 2 (finding that four of
twenty-seven Texas companies surveyed sell catalog certificates in connection
with payday loans); State of Nevada, Check Cashing/Deferred Deposit, at
http://fid.state.nv.us/check-cashing.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002) [hereinafter
Nevada Licensees] (indicating that lenders licensed to operate in Nevada have
names like Money Express Catalog Sales, Inc. and Cashback Catalog of

Nevada, Inc.).
88. Cashback Catalog Sales, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 ("Cashback
maintains an advertisement in the local yellow pages under the subject
heading 'Loans."').
89. Cardella, supra note 77, at 2.
90. Nevada Licensees, supra note 87.

91. Cardella, supra note 77, at 2.
92.

Smith, supra note 51, at 29 n.13.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Cashback CatalogSales, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
96. Cardella, supra note 77, at 3; JEAN ANN Fox, CONSUMER FED'N OF
AM., SAFE HARBOR FOR USURY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PAYDAY LENDING
2 (Sept. 1999), at http://www.consumerfed.orglbackpage/payday2.html.
97. For a discussion of a lawsuit pending against one payday lender
offering cashback advertisements, see Payday Lending Class Action Certified
in Texas, 10 CONS. BANKR. NEWS 14 (2000), 10 No. 5 CBN (LRP) 14 (citing

20021

PAYDAY LOANS

an advertisement for publication and paying a $33
advertisement fee.9 8 Usually, the consumer has nothing to
advertise; however, companies insist upon the purchase of an
advertisement before distributing any cash. These ads are then
placed in a publication distributed by the lender to its
customers.9 9 The consumer must also issue a check as security
for repayment of the loan.10 0 If the consumer is unable to repay
the loan when due, the consumer must renew the loan by
purchasing another ad and paying an additional fee.' 0 1
b. Sham TransactionsAre Usurious Extensions of Credit
Arguably, the disguised payday loan companies are simply
selling a service or product and, therefore, their transactions
are distinguishable from regular payday loans. In fact, when
the Federal Reserve Board revised the term "credit" to include
payday loans, 0 2 some advocates feared that the proposed
comment would be limited to transactions thus labeled.10 3 The
Board made clear, however, that "[t]ransactions in which the
parties agree to defer payment of a debt are 'credit'
10 4
transactions regardless of the label used to describe them."
Therefore, offering a service or product in conjunction with a
payday loan should not prevent the transaction from being
defined as a consumer credit transaction. 0 5
In Cashback Catalog Sales, the defendant, Cashback,
argued that it had not extended credit for purposes of TILA
when it took a customer's $130 post-dated check-$100 for the
loan and $30 for the catalog certificates. 0 6 Denying Cashback's
motion for summary judgment, the court held that a reasonable
trier of fact could find that Cashback extended "credit" when it
Henry v. Cash Today, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 566 (S.D. Tex. 2000)).
98.

Cardella, supra note 77, at 3.

99.

Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 604.

100.
101.

Cardella, supra note 77, at 4.
Id.

102. See Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14) (2002).
103. Truth in Lending, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,130 (Mar. 31, 2000) (interpreting
payday loans).
104. Id.
105. Conditioning the extension of credit on a consumer's purchase of an
unwanted item or service has long been held to be clear evidence of a lender's

intent to evade usury laws. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 59 N.W.2d 276, 277
(Mich. 1953) (concluding that conditioning the receipt of a loan on the

purchase of unwanted vitamins was an attempt to secure interest rates higher
than those allowed by the law).
106.

Cashback CatalogSales, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
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promised not to cash the post-dated check until the customer's
next payday, assessed a "finance charge" when it required the
post-dated check to include the cost of the catalog certificates,
and operated as a "creditor" when it regularly had customers
07
make the post-dated checks payable to Cashback.
Consequently, upon meeting the relevant statutory definitions,
a cashback catalog company is subject to TILA's disclosure

requirements. 108
In addition to being subject to TILA, cashback catalog
companies are subject to state usury laws. 10 9 In Cashback
Catalog Sales, the court found that a loan existed because
Cashback agreed to hold the customer's check until his next
payday and the customer had an obligation to repay the money
received. 110 Cashback argued that the catalog certificates given
to the customer did not constitute interest. The plaintiff
countered that the $30 certificates constituted a finance charge
amounting to an APR of 780% for a $100 two-week loan; I"'
Georgia, home to Cashback's operations, caps the legal interest
rate for loans less than $3000 at 16% per year. 1 2 Agreeing
with the plaintiff, the court explained that substance must
prevail over form. 1 3 The court concluded that the certificates

107. Id. at 1381-82.
108. Id. at 1381.
109. To establish a usury claim under Georgia law, a plaintiff needs to
prove four elements:
(1) a loan or forbearance of money, either express or implied; (2) an
understanding that the principal must be repaid; (3) an agreement to pay in
return for such loan or forbearance a greater profit than is authorized by law;
and (4) that the contract was made with an intent to violate the law.
Id. at 1379. To establish a violation of Florida usury laws,
a borrower must establish the following elements by clear and
satisfactory evidence: (1) a loan, express or implied; (2) an
understanding between the parties that the money lent shall be
repaid; (3) that a greater rate of interest than is allowed by law was
paid or agreed to be paid; and (4) the corrupt intent of the lender to
exact more than the legal rate of interest.
In re Omni Capital Group v. Stein, 157 B.R. 712, 717 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
But cf. Vartel Mfg. Co. v. Acetylene Oxygen Co., 990 S.W.2d 486, 491 (Tex.
App. 1999) (indicating that under Texas law, a loan of money, an absolute
obligation to repay the principal, and a greater charge than allowed by law for
the use of the money are the essential elements of a usurious transaction).
110. Cashback CatalogSales, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
111. Id. at 1379.
112. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(2) (1997).
113. Cashback CatalogSales, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. The Court
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constituted usurious interest, noting the lack of an order form
or any material about actually ordering merchandise. 14 The
court further stated that "check cashing" appeared to be the
main purpose of the contract and questioned whether the
catalog certificates would ever be redeemed.' 15
The holding in Cashback Catalog Sales should not be
confined to payday loan transactions involving catalog
certificates. The holding should apply to similarly disguised
payday loan transactions. Take for instance, payday loan
transactions involving the "leasing" of an appliance or "selling"
of an advertisement." t6 Companies that engage in these
transactions act much like regular payday lenders. First, they
advertise their business in the loan section of yellow pages.
Second, they take post-dated checks from their customers.
Third, they distribute cash immediately to their customers.
Fourth, they agree not to cash their customers' checks for twoweeks. Finally, they demand fees that amount to triple-digit
interest rates for their services or merchandise.
Payday loans exceed interest rate caps in states lacking
laws regulating payday lending as well as those states
regulating the industry because disguised payday loans carry
triple-digit APRs. Two facts support this conclusion. First,
17
disguised payday loans may carry an APR of 792% or more,'
but state usury laws typically limit APRs to double-digit
interest rates. 1 8 Second, while twenty-two states and the
explained,
No disguise of language can avail for covering up usury, or glossing

over an usurious contract. The theory that a contract will be usurious
or not according to the kind of paper-bag it is put up in, or according
to the more or less ingenious phrases made use of in negotiating it, is
altogether erroneous. The law intends that a search for usury shall
penetrate to the substance.
Id. (quoting Pope v. Marshall, 4 S.E. 116, 118 (Ga. 1887)).
114. Id. at 1380.

115. Id. Although the court does not expressly say so, "check cashing" can
refer to payday loans. See Schmedemann, supra note 53, at 974 (suggesting
that the term "check cashing" is commonly used to describe payday loans).
116. See supra notes 76-86, 96-101 and accompanying text.

117. Cardella, supra note 77, at 2, 5. In a 1999 survey of twenty-seven
regular and disguised payday lenders in Texas, Consumers Union found that
for every $100 cash advanced per loan period (fourteen or fifteen days),
nineteen lenders charged fees of at least $33, six lenders charged $30, and two
lenders charged under $30. Id. at 5. Based on these fees, twenty-five of the

twenty-seven companies are lending money over a fourteen-day or fifteen-day
period at APRs of approximately 792%. Id.
118. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 7-4-2(a)(2) (1997) (indicating that the
maximum interest rate is 16% per year for loans of less than $3000); IND.
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District of Columbia regulate payday lending and allow tripledigit interest rates, 119 only one of these states allows fees
amounting to an APR in excess of 792%, and the majority
require that APRs remain below 469%.120
Given the outrageous APRs of payday lending schemes,
lawmakers should not rely on judicial decisions alone to
determine if future schemes 12 1 are covered by consumer
protection laws. 122 The burden on the judicial system is already
enormous. 123
Therefore, efficiency dictates that state
lawmakers enact statutory provisions that broadly define
"loans" or "credit" and thereby strip payday lenders of any legal

CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(i) (Michie 1996) (indicating that the maximum
interest is 36% per year for loans of $300 or less).

119. Cardella, supra note 77, at 2, 5.
120. See Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 27-29; Miller, supra note 20,
at 121-22.
121. Payday lenders continue to fabricate new schemes to evade the law.
E-mail from Jean Ann Fox, Director of Consumer Protection, Consumer
Federation of America, to Creola Johnson, Assistant Professor of Law, The
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Oct. 1, 2001, 10:36 EST)
(describing an installment loan program being offered by Americash to
consumers in Chicago) (on file with author).
122. Courts may fail to properly interpret or liberally construe a state
consumer protection statute, and, as a result, leave a consumer without a
viable cause of action under state law. For example, in King v. Cashland,Inc.,
the plaintiff asserted an unfair and deceptive act claim against a payday
lender under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA), OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (Anderson 2002). No. 18208, 2000 Ohio Ct. App.
LEXIS 3943, at *3, 10 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2000). As with every consumer
protection statute, from which certain entities are exempt, the OCSPA does
not regulate transactions with a "dealer in intangibles," which includes an
entity in the business of lending money. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01(A),
5725.01(B). In Cashland,the court held that the defendant, Cashland, was a
dealer in intangibles as defined by Ohio law. 2000 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 3943,
at *12. The court merely noted, but did not directly address, the fact that the
Ohio payday lending statute expressly gives a consumer a cause of action
under the OCSPA if the payday lender violates section 1315.41 of the payday
lending statute. Id. at *13 n.5; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.41, -.44.
Due to the express reference, the court should have concluded that the Ohio
Legislature stripped the payday lender of an exemption defense under the
OCSPA. See Helman v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 743 N.E.2d 484, 494 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000) ("[I]t is settled that specific statutory provisions prevail over conflicting
general provisions unless the legislature's intent that the general prevail is
clear.").
123. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency,
and the New Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 273, 332 n.283 (1996) (stating that "state courts are even more
overloaded than their federal counterparts" because "[sitate courts handle 52
times the caseload with only 15 times the judges").
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24
defense for their disguised payday loans.1
In summary, payday lending superficially appears
grounded on a straightforward and seemingly innocuous
concept. Consumers sometimes need extra cash to get by for a
week or two, and check-cashers have stepped in to meet this
demand. They do so by simply agreeing to hold onto the
customer's personal check until the customer's next payday. In
exchange, the borrower agrees to pay a fee larger than the
125
typical check-cashing fee associated with a check of that size.
As evident by the rapid growth of the payday loan industry,
26
these fees have translated into generous profits.1
Accordingly, it is not surprising that payday lenders have
resisted disclosing the APRs of their loans. As the next section
demonstrates, the APRs on payday loans far exceed those
allowed for any other form of personal consumer credit.
Payday lenders, therefore, possess a strong economic incentive
to avoid disclosing their finance charges in a way that allows
consumers to compare the cost of one credit transaction to
another. The industry's creativity in characterizing payday
loans as anything but credit extensions stems directly from this
incentive. Unfortunately, the industry's quest to protect its
profits extends beyond merely engaging in sham transactions.
Part II reveals the industry's desire to protect its profits
extends far beyond legal and ethical boundaries.

II. CRITICISMS OF THE PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY
The sham transactions discussed above represent practices
employed by payday lenders to deceive regulators and evade
consumer protection laws. This section identifies payday
lending practices that deceive and exploit consumers by means
that are quintessentially unfair to consumers and also often
illegal. The practices include charging fees amounting to
triple-digit APRs, distorting information relevant to assessing
the cost of credit, charging high fees to roll over payday loans,
refusing to honor representations that consumers have the

124. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion about the necessity of
comprehensive legislation to deal with predatory payday lending practices.
125. See Schmedemann, supra note 53, at 976 (explaining the differences
between check cashing and payday lending).
126. See supra note 21 (discussing the payday loan industry's high
profitability).
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right to rescind at no cost, seeking treble damages from
customers in default, and threatening delinquent customers
with criminal prosecution. Section A analyzes unfair and
unlawful payday loan practices occurring before or during
contract formation. Section B continues this analysis with a
focus on payday loan practices occurring post contract
formation.
A. UNFAIR AND UNLAWFUL PRACTICES BEFORE OR AT
CONTRACT FORMATION

As explained below, the results of various studies show
that payday lenders charge enormous fees, sometimes in
violation of state law. 27 This practice, coupled with other
practices such as seeking treble damages and criminal
prosecution, 128 leads many critics to conclude that payday
lenders are nothing more than loan sharks or predatory lenders
The Ohio Survey
exploiting vulnerable consumers. 129
conducted by the author confirms these conclusions. The
survey results reveal that the majority of lenders surveyed
mislead consumers about the cost of payday loans.
1. The Cost of Payday Lending: Triple-Digit Interest Rates
Customers who obtain payday loans pay fees amounting to
effective APRs usually totaling several hundred percent.130 For

127.

See infra Part II.A.1.

128. See infra Part II.B.2.
129. See, e.g., Marcy Gordon, High-InterestLender Regs Nixed, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 2, 2000 (quoting Minnesota Senator Paul Wellstone, a Democrat,
who stated that payday lenders are "unscrupulous loan sharks"), available at
2000 WL 12387086; Gwyneth K. Shaw, Lobbyists Push for Tougher Loan Bill,
SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 4, 2000, at 10B (quoting a Florida
politician who stated that he would wait another year to attack payday
lending rather than "legitimize loan-sharking in this state"), available at 2000
WL 5657043; Kevin Valine, Quick Cash at a Price, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
May 15, 2000, at 12 (stating that Florida Legal Services will fight to protect
consumers from predatory payday lenders), available at 2000 WL 16699392;
Wheat Urges Response to 'Predatory'Lenders, CREDIT UNION J., Feb. 14, 2000,
at 14 (describing a board member of a national credit union organization who
urged credit unions to help tighten the reigns on payday lenders because they
are "predatory lenders, financers that provide ready loans at high interest
rates"), available at 2000 WL 18823239.
130. Elizabeth Renuart & Jean Ann Fox, Payday Loans: A High Cost for a
Small Loan in Low-Income and Working Communities, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 589, 589 (2001) ("The typical annual percentage rate is at least 390 and
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example, in a 1999 survey of 230 payday lenders in twenty
states, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) found
lenders making payday loans of $100 to $400 at interest rates
of 390% to 871%. 13 1 In its 2001 survey, the CFA found onethird of the 235 payday lenders surveyed charged an APR
greater than 500% for a fourteen-day, $100 loan. 132 The CFA
reported an average APR of 470% for all states surveyed for the
133
same loan.
Currently, the maximum fee to allowed payday lenders
depends on the state law governing the transaction. Four
states-Idaho, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Wisconsin-134
have no interest rate or usury caps on small loans.
Therefore, a licensed payday lender and the consumer can
135
contract at interest rates that far exceed small loan caps.
The CFA's 2001 survey discovered an average APR of 504% in
136
two states lacking usury limits.
When it surveyed lenders in thirteen states where payday
lending is legal, the CFA uncovered an average APR of 443%.137
As of this writing, twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia expressly authorize payday lending, 38 and the
majority limit the size of the loan and the interest rates or fees
averages close to 500 percent, although advocates and credit code enforcement
agencies have noted rates of 1,300 percent to 7,300 percent.").
131. STATE PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUPS & CONSUMER FED. OF AM.,
SHOW ME THE MONEY! A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS AND REVIEW OF
PAYDAY

LENDER

LOBBYING

IN

STATE

LEGISLATURES

1

(2000),

at

http://www.pirg.org/reports/consumer/payday/showmethemoneyfinal.pdf, (last
visited Aug. 24. 2002) [hereinafter SHOW ME THE MONEY!]. The remaining
states were not surveyed due to an insufficient number of volunteers. See id.
at 1 n.2. Shortening the loan term will raise the APR. Drysdale & Keest,
supra note 16, at 602-03 (discussing Indiana regulators who found a 7300%

APR as a result of a $20 fee on a one-day $100 loan). It should be noted that
payday lenders frequently shorten or sharply limit the term of their loans to
increase the likelihood the borrower will have to pay a rollover fee, thus
skyrocketing both profits and the annual percentage rate. See id. at 603.
132. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 3, 11.
133. Id. Ohio's payday loan rate, according to the CFA's Rent-A-Bank
Payday Lending Report, is 390% APR. Id. at 11, 28; see also infra App., tbl.2
(showing that all lenders charged the same fee).
134. Edelman, supra note 36, at 176 n.24 (listing twelve states, but several
have enacted payday loan statutes since Edelman's article was published).
135.

SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 131, at 4.

136. Id. at 3. The survey covers 235 stores in twenty states and the
District of Columbia. Id. at 2.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id. at 26; see also infra note 139 (providing citations for jurisdictions
in which payday lending is legal).
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that may be charged.139 According to the CFA, these state laws

139. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-1260(F) (Supp. 2001) (limiting fees on deferred
presentment loans to 15% of the face amount of the check); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1789.35(d) (West 1998) (indicating that check cashers may charge a fee not to
exceed 12% of the face value of a check or 15% for a deferred deposit); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (2001) (establishing that the Deferred Deposit Loan Act
permits lenders to charge a finance charge not to exceed 20% of the first $300
plus 7.5% of any amount in excess of $300); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-317(a), 26319(c)(1) (2001) (permitting deferred deposit lenders a 10% fee for cashing a
personal check plus administrative fees up to $5 for checks up to $250, $10 for
checks up to $500, $15 on checks up to $750, and $20 for checks up to $1000);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(6) (West Supp. 2002) (allowing deferred deposit
lenders to charge a fee not to exceed 10% of the face value of the check); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 480F-4(c) (2001) (prohibiting deferred deposit fees in excess of
15% of the face value of the check); IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.9(1) (West 2001)
(capping fees for deferred deposit loans at $15 for the first $100 of the loan and
$10 for every $100 increment thereafter); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-404(1)(c)(i)(iv) (2001) (establishing the following caps on deferred deposit loan fees: for
loans up to $50, $5.50; for loans between $50 and $100, a $5 administrative fee
plus 10% of the face amount of the loan proceeds; for loans between $100 and
$250, a $5 administrative fee plus the greater of $10 or 7% of the loan
proceeds; for loans in excess of $250, a $5 administrative fee plus the greater
of $17.50 or 6% of the loan proceeds); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(2)
(Michie 2002) (prohibiting lenders from charging a fee that exceeds $15 per
$100 on the face amount of the postdated check); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3578.4(A) (West Supp. 2002) (setting the maximum fee for deferred deposit
loans at the lesser of $45 or 16.75% of the face amount of the check); MINN.
STAT. § 47.60 (2)(1)-(4)(a) (2000) (allowing small loan lenders to charge $5.50
for loans up to $50, 10% of the loan proceeds plus $5 for loans between $50
and $100, 7% of the loan proceeds plus $5 for loans up to $250, and 6% of the
loan proceeds plus $5 for loans up to $350); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-67-519(4)
(Supp. 2001) (permitting deferred deposit fees up to 18% of the face amount of
the check); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-722(2) (2001) (setting maximum deferred
deposit loan fees at 25% of the principal loan amount); NEB. REV. STAT. § 45918 (1998) (limiting delayed deposit service fees to $15 per $100 or pro rata of
the face amount of the check); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(2) (Supp. 2001)
(limiting deferred deposit fees to 20% of the amount paid to the maker of the
check); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.39(B), 1315.40(A) (Anderson 2002)
(permitting interest charges calculated at 5% of the principal per month or
fraction thereof along with loan origination fees up to $5 per $50 of the loan
amount); S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-39-180(E) (West Supp. 2000) (adopting a 15%
cap on deferred presentment loan fees); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-4-65, 66
(Michie 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (allowing
deferred presentment lenders to charge the lesser of $30 or $15% of the face
amount of the check); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.605(c) (West 2002) (indicating
that payday loans are subject to pricing formulas found in Tex. Fin. Code §§
342.251-258); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-444-6.1 to -471 (Michie 2002) (setting
forth Virginia's Payday Loan Act); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 31.45.073(2) (West
Supp. 2002) (limiting small loan fees to 15% of the principal loan amount);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-14-363(a) (Michie 2001) (prohibiting post-dated check
finance charges that exceed the greater of $30 or 20% per month of the
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stem from pro-industry bills.140 Consequently, it should not be
surprising that some states that have legalized payday lending
have no maximum fee limitations.' 4 ' Of the states that limit
fees and loan amounts, fees for payday loans range from as low
1 43
as $5.50 on a $50 loan14 2 to as high as $120 on a $1000 loan.
On the high end are Montana and Wyoming, which cap
allowable effective APRs at 650% and 780%, respectively. '44
limit allowable
On the low end are Oklahoma and Texas, which
1 45
effective APRs to 240% and 309%, respectively.
Currently, laws in nineteen states, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands either mandate small-loan interest caps or make
payday loans technically illegal because such loans violate
double-digit APR limits.' 46 The CFA's 2001 survey found an
principal balance). Five other states-Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, and
Utah-have legislation addressing payday lending, but do not expressly limit
the fees that may be charged. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 38, §§ 110.300,
110.370 (2002) (setting forth definitions and lending limits); MO. REV. STAT. §
408.500 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604.180 (Michie 2001) (setting forth
prohibited acts regarding deferred deposits); OR. ADMIN. R. § 441-730-0010
(2001) (setting forth definitions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-105 (Supp. 2002)
(setting forth the requirements for deferred deposit loans); S.B. 884, 91st Gen.
Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002) (setting forth three new penalty provisions
relating to restrictions on payday loans with penalties in the pending bill
meant to repeal section 408.500).
140. SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 131, at 3.
141. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 27-29 (indicating that Illinois,
Nevada, Oregon, and Utah have no maximum fee limitations).
142. MINN. STAT. § 47.60(2)(a)(1) (allowing small loan lenders to charge
$5.50 for loans up to $50).
143. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-319(c)(1).
144. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 28-29.
145. Id.
146. For a full list of the jurisdictions that prohibit payday lending due to
small interest loan rate caps, usury laws, or specific prohibitions for check
cashers, see id. at 25. In Alabama, loans are currently permitted at a rate of
16.67% of the face amount of a check under the terms of a consent order in a
case pending between the Alabama Banking Department and the Alabama
Check Cashers Association. Ala. Check Cashers Ass'n v. State Banking Dep't,
No. 98-1555 (Cir. Ct. Ala. Oct. 9, 1998) (on file with Montgomery County
Circuit Court). For a discussion of Arkansas and North Carolina law, see
See also ALASKA STAT. § 06.20.230(a) (Michie 2000)
infra note 148.
(prohibiting lenders from charging interest at a rate greater than 3% per
month on loans of less than $850); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-563(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2002) (permitting lenders to charge a fee of $17 per $100 loaned
when the period of the loan is one year with a proportional fee for a longer or
shorter term); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-14(1)-(2) (Supp. 2002) (permitting lenders
to charge a fee of 10% a year on the face amount of the contract plus a fee of
8% on the first $600 under Georgia's Industrial Loan Act); IND. CODE ANN. §
24-4.5-3-508(1)-(2)(b) (Michie 1996) (allowing lenders to charge 36% per year
on loans less than $300, 21% per year on loans $301-$1000, 15% on loans in

30
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average APR of 606% in six states prohibiting payday loans
through their usury limits. 147 Until recently, Arkansas and
North Carolina permitted payday loans, but such loans were
148
made illegal by judicial opinion or legislative inaction.
The above laws and opinions are being ignored by payday
lenders offering "services" that are really disguised payday
loans 149 or by lenders partnering with banks (i.e., through
rent-a-bank partnerships) to take advantage of a loophole in
150
federal banking law.
excess of $1000, or 21% on the unpaid balance, whichever is greater); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-401(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2001) (setting forth a
consumer loan structure with a 30% finance charge on unpaid balances up to
$700, a 21% finance charge on unpaid balances between $700 and $2000, and
a 15% finance charge on upaid balances in excess of $2000 or 18% per year on
the unpaid balances, whichever is greater); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §
12-102 (2000) (permitting lenders to charge interest at 6% per year); MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 209, § 26.06(1)(a) (2002) (permitting lenders to charge interest
at 23% per year plus a loan administration fee of $20 for loans not in excess of
$3000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 493.13(1), 445.1854(1) (West Supp. 2002)
(providing that lenders may charge interest at a rate not to exceed 25% per
year); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21 to :19(a)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (forbidding
interest rates in excess of 30% for noncorporations); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40
(McKinney 2002) (subjecting payday lenders to a 25% APR criminal usury
cap); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-508B(a)-(d) (West Supp. 2002) (permitting
lenders to charge 20% on loans up to $29.99, 10% plus $3.00 per month for
loans of $29.99-$35, 10% plus $3.50 for loans of $35-$70, and 10% plus $4.00
for loans of $70-$101.97); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201 (West 1999)
(establishing the maximum lawful interest rate at 6% a year); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 19-14.2-8(1)-(3) (1998) (providing that lenders may charge 3% a month on
loans up to $300, 2.5% a month on loans from $300-$800, and 2% a month on
loans of $800-$5000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 47-6-5(a) (Michie 1999) (allowing
lenders to charge a rate of $6 per $100 for a year, and proportionately for a
greater or lesser sum).
147. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 3. According to Fox, these loans
were made by scofflaw lenders or rent-a-bank lenders (i.e., payday loan
companies in partnership with national banks) that attract customers through
direct mailing or ads in the yellow pages. Id. at 10.
148. The Arkansas legislature authorized payday lending. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 23-52-104(c)(1)(B), (c)(2) (Michie 1987) (permitting lenders to charge a
fee not to exceed 10% of the face amount of the personal check plus $10). The
Arkansas Supreme Court held this legislation unconstitutional because the
Arkansas Constitution requires lawmakers to "prohibit usury." Luebbers v.
Money Store, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Ark. 2001). North Carolina allowed its
payday loan statute to expire.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-281(d) (2001)
(establishing July 31, 2001 as the expiration date on a payday lending statute
that permitted lenders to charge a fee not to exceed 15% of the face value of a
check). North Carolina's legislature learned about the ills of payday lending
from a broad-based coalition of consumer advocacy, senior citizen, and civil
rights groups. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 9.
149. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
150. See discussion infra Part III. Even though at the time of the CFA's
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Payday lenders may circumvent state usury law by
partnering with banks located in states that allow higher APR
One surmises, then, that where such
rate charges. 5 '
partnerships exist, the bank resides in a state with more
favorable (i.e., higher allowable) interest rate maximums than
the state in which the payday lender is located. 152 For instance,
Advance America charges an APR of 390% in several states
where it is operating without a partnership with a national
bank, but in Virginia, where such a partnership exists,
Advance America charges an APR of 442% (thus evading
Virginia's usury limit of 36%). 153 The foregoing data establish
that lenders charge triple-digit interest rates regardless of the
state law governing the jurisdiction where the consumers are
located. Because many payday lenders charge fees amounting
to triple-digit-interest rates irrespective of state law, it appears
that these lenders are violating state law and not complying
to limit its fees to
with the industry's purported commitment
54
those allowed by state and federal law.1
Rent-A-Bank Payday Lending Report Virginia restricted payday lending, VA.
CODE ANN. § 6.1-272.1 (Michie 1999) (permitting lenders under the Consumer
Finance Act to charge interest at a rate not to exceed 36% per year) (amended
2002), payday loans were being offered by lenders who had partnered with
national banks. Keest, supra note 44, at 1118 n.19.
151. See infra Part III.B.2.
152. See Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 11-12.
153. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-272.1 (Michie 2001) (prohibiting lenders from
charging interest rates greater than 36% on loans up to $2500).
154. See also CMTY. FIN. SERVS. AsS'N OF AM., BEST PRACTICES FOR THE
PAYDAY ADVANCE INDUSTRY, at http://www.cfsa.net/pressreleases/best
practices.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]. For
further discussion of the industry's self-identified best practices, see supra
notes 228-48 and accompanying text. The Ohio Survey discovered a glaring
failure to comply with state law limiting the maximum charge for dishonored
checks; this failure establishes noncompliance with the industry's "best
practice" prohibition of fees not authorized by state law. When asked what the
charge would be for a bounced check, 91% of the lenders stated they would
charge the customer an amount greater than $20. See infra App., tbl.2; see
also SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 131, at 6 (stating that over 70% of
payday lenders in the survey averaged a charge of over $22 for bounced
checks). One charged $22.25, two charged $22.40, nine charged $25, two
charged $26, one charged $27, one charged $28, and four charged $30. See
infra App., tbl.2. Under Ohio law, a lender may collect,
[ciheck collection charges not exceeding an amount equal to twenty
dollars plus any amount passed on from other financial institutions
for each check . . . returned or dishonored for any reason, provided
that the terms and conditions upon which check collection charges will
be charged to the borrower are set forth in the written loan contract
described in division (A)(4) of section 1315.39 of the Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1315.40(B) (Anderson 2002) (emphasis added). While
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2. Ohio Survey Shows Lenders Fail to Provide Basic
Information
A recent survey conducted by the author reveals that
consumers learn about the triple-digit interest rates charged by
payday lenders only after signing the payday loan contract.
This phenomenon results because payday lenders hide basic
information. In doing so, these lenders violate mandatory
disclosure requirements.1 55 In the summer of 2001, the author
conducted the Ohio Survey, in which she surveyed payday
businesses located in Franklin County, Ohio. The survey
revealed the following lender practices: refusing to provide
customers with basic written information about the payday
loan transaction, giving consumers false or misleading
information about the cost of credit, failing to advertise the cost
of credit using APRs, refusing to supply customers with written
disclosures prior to contract consummation, claiming no credit
check would be conducted but doing so anyway without
obtaining consumer consent, including clauses in their loan
156
documents that appear to be illegal or unconscionable,
91% of the lenders surveyed quoted a returned-check fee greater than $20, the
majority of them had no contract provisions disclosing such fees. See infra
App., tbl.2. As a result, if such fees were actually assessed, they were in
excess of state law. Two lenders had loan applications that provided, "Any
check returned carries a 10% or $30 surcharge, whichever is greater." See Ace
Check Express Check Cashing Agreement (on file with author); Kentucky
Check Exchange Disclosure Statement (on file with author). Clearly, this
provision seeks to charge more than the $20 allowed by state law, but the
contracts contained no provisions about NSF fees or statements regarding
passage to the customer of fees charged by the lender's bank. Consequently,
these charges were unlawful.
155. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing TILA's
disclosure requirement).
156. See infra note 169 (describing the display of a weapon in the payday
lender's store); infra notes 425-28 and accompanying text (discussing
documents in which payday lenders claim the ability to collect damages not
authorized by state law). Many of the clauses contained in the loan documents
will not be discussed in depth. Noteworthy is the fact that the majority
(twelve of twenty-two) of payday lenders' documents have clauses reflecting
the borrower's promise that the borrower was not currently in bankruptcy and
had no intention to file bankruptcy. See Collected Payday Loan Applications
and Contracts from the Ohio Survey (on file with author). Moreover, in the
event the borrower defaults on the payday loan, the majority (twelve of
twenty-two) of payday lenders' documents have clauses giving the lender the
right to electronically debit the borrower's bank account for unpaid amounts.
Id. There is a split in authority as to whether these clauses violate the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), which states that "[n]o person may...
condition the extension of credit to a consumer on such consumer's repayment
by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers." 15 U.S.C. § 1693k(1)
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representing that consumers have the right to rescind the
contract at no cost, allowing consumers to roll over payday
loans in violation of state law, representing to consumers that
the lenders have the ability to collect treble damages from
defaulting consumers, and intimidating consumers with the
threat of physical violence and criminal prosecution. 157 This
section of the Article analyzes the numerous violations of state
and federal law uncovered in the Ohio Survey that occurred at
the contract formation level. Scant case law exists in the
payday loan context to support the author's analysis. The
lenders' activities, however, should be construed as violations
based on a plain meaning statutory construction and based on
the purpose of applicable law.
Outlining the author's methodology in conducting the Ohio
Survey before discussing the specific findings of the Ohio
Survey and violations of applicable law will provide context.
The Ohio Survey investigated payday lending stores located in
Franklin County, Ohio, which at the time of the survey had
twenty-two payday lenders with eighty-three stores. 5 8 The
majority (95%) of the stores are located in Columbus, the
fifteenth largest city in the United States, 159 and the remaining
stores are located in suburbs surrounding Columbus. Because
some of the results of the Ohio Survey accord with national

(2000). An "electronic funds transfer" is defined as "any transfer of funds,
other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or similar paper
instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic
instrument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize
a financial institution to debit or credit an account." Id. § 1693(a)(6).
Arguably, payday lenders do not violate the EFTA even though they have loan
agreements that require "authorization of an electronic funds transfer as a
condition of credit." Mitchem v. Paycheck Advance Express, Inc., No. 99 C
1858, 2000 WL 419993, at *1 (N.D. III. Apr. 14, 2000) (holding that because
payday loans are originated by check, they are not covered by EFTA). But see
Mitchem v. GFG Loan Co., Nos. 99 C 1866, 99 C 3075, 99 C 3158, 99 C 3665,
99 C 3981, 2000 WL 294119, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2000) (denying a payday
lender's motion to dismiss an EFTA claim on the grounds that the payday loan
transaction was originated by a note and not a check).
157. See infra App., tbls.1-4; see also Smith v. Check-N-Go, Inc., 200 F.3d
511, 516 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating that a "circle around the due date.., does
not turn a model form into a violation of law" which says that the finance
charge and APR must be more conspicuous than any other disclosure).
158. FIN. INSTS. DIV., OHIO DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER FINANCE
LICENSE INFORMATION

(2001) (on file with author).

159. Lornet Turnbull, Statistically, Columbus Falls Right in the Middle,
COLUMBUS DIS., Apr. 15, 2001, at Al (citing the 2000 census), available at
2001 WL 17869290.
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surveys' 60 and because the majority of the nation's largest
payday lenders were represented in the Ohio Survey,' 6' the
results of the Ohio Survey would likely be found in a survey
conducted on a national level. 62 The author, along with
research assistants, posing as potential customers, contacted
(by telephone and in person) one store location for each of the
twenty-two payday lenders in Franklin County and made sure
locations from each geographic region of the county were
represented in the survey. 163 The Ohio Survey tested the

160. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (comparing the Ohio
Survey with other surveys). Some payday lending practices are brought to
light for the first time in this Article. See infra App., tbls.1-4.
161. Although the budget for the Ohio Survey was not large enough to fund
a nationwide survey, the majority of the nation's largest payday lenders have
stores in Franklin County, Ohio. The Ohio Survey included a payday outlet
from each of the following companies: Advance America, likely the nation's
largest payday lender, see Geller, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that Advance
America is based in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and has 1300 stores),
available at 2001 WL 2995203; Ace Cash Express, Inc., the second largest
payday lender having 1178 stores in thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia, see Ace Cash Express website, at http://www.acecashexpress.com
(last visited Aug. 24, 2002) (indicating that the Texas-based company has
"more than 1,221 stores consisting of 999 company-owned stores and 179
franchised stores in thirty-four states and the District of Columbia"); Check
into Cash, a Tennessee-based company with over 600 stores operating in
eighteen states, see Check into Cash website, at http://www.checkintocash.
com/locations.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2001) (indicating that Check into
Cash's headquarters are in Cleveland, Tennessee); Check 'n Go, a chain of the
Ohio-based payday lender CNG Financial Corp., which operates about 700
Check 'n Go stores nationwide, see David Wichner, Payday Loans Can Trap
Unwary in Debt, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Aug. 18, 2000, at Al, availableat 2000 WL
10247029; National Cash Advance, a growing payday lender with over 500
locations
nationwide,
see
National
Cash
Advance
website,
at
http://www.national cashadvance.comnValues.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2001);
and First American Cash Advance, a payday lender operating 350 stores in
ten states, see George Hohmann, Arrival of Money-Lending Business Has State
Officials Wary, CHARLESTON GAZE1TE & DAILY MAIL, July 25, 2001, at PIA
(quoting the manager of a new First American Cash Advance branch in West
Virginia, who stated, "We are a marketing agent for the First National Bank
in Brookings, S.D."), availableat 2001 WL 6680437.
162. SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 131, at 5-6. Surely, payday lenders
in Ohio, a Midwestern state, cannot represent the worst. Yet the violations
discovered in Ohio should alarm state lawmakers and put them on notice that
the practices may be far worse in states known for higher incidents of
unscrupulous activities.
163. In addition to the stores listed above, see supra note 161, the following
stores were surveyed as part of the Ohio Survey: Ace Check Express, Cash
Advance, Affordable Advance, Always Payday, Cashland, Cash to Go Advance
Loan, Checkland, Check$mart, Columbus Checkcashers, Express Payroll
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industry's compliance with state and federal laws and
compliance with the industry's best practice list.164 Data were
collected during the following lending stages: information
gathering, contract consummation, and contract rescission.
The Ohio Survey did not test for legal violations after a
customer's default. 165 The Appendix shows the results of the
Ohio Survey and enumerates, among other things, which
payday lenders refused to provide information and which failed
to make required disclosures.
The reader may be surprised to discover that the surveyors
could not obtain basic written information about payday loans
from the majority of lenders studied. While creditors generally
have no legal obligation to give potential customers brochures
or applications, 73% of the payday lenders surveyed during the
information-gathering stage did not have brochures about
payday loans available for potential customers to peruse and
77% refused to allow the surveyor to have a copy of the
application to take home and review.1 66 Many simply stated,
"I'll tell you all you need to know." 167 Of those who refused to
Advance, EZ Cash Advance, First Check Cash and Advance, Great Western
Beverage Center, Hilltop Pawnshop, Kentucky Check Exchange Inc., National
Check Cashers, and Quick Cash U.S.A.
164. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154; infra App., tbls.1-4 (listing the
categories tested).
165. Obviously, the author did not want the research assistants to risk
ruining or damaging their credit histories by defaulting on payday loans.
166. See infra App., tbl.1.
167. The author cannot provide an accurate count of how many lenders
made this statement. The explanation for the lack of an accurate account
follows. During the information gathering stage, three student research
assistants contacted each store location surveyed. Each surveyor used a
written form supplied by the Consumer Federation of America because this
stage of the Ohio Survey was part of the CFA's national survey. The author
instructed the surveyors to obtain as many answers as possible to the survey
questions over the telephone before visiting the store locations. This strategy
was employed so that the payday loan clerks would not be suspicious of the
surveyors' motives and refuse to talk to them. Sometimes the surveyors called
the store more than once and disguised their voices in order to obtain answers.
The surveyors were not wired with any audio or video recording equipment.
To avoid appearing suspicious, the author instructed the surveyors to finish
the survey forms after leaving the stores. Instead of a survey form, the
surveyors usually had a blank piece of paper to write down some of the
information provided to them by the store clerk. The idea was for them to act
naturally, like a reasonably intelligent customer would. After the surveyors
returned from visiting the store locations, the author debriefed the surveyors
about their experiences and reviewed the completed survey forms with them.
The completed survey forms contain a wealth of information. Many of the
comments made by the store clerks to the surveyors and many of the
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provide an application, a few became belligerent and made
statements such as "it's against company policy" 168 or "it's
illegal for you to take the application out of the store." 69 Even
after contract consummation, only 18% of the payday lenders
gave the customer a copy of his or her signed application. 170
Obtaining a copy of the payday loan application is important
because most of them contain contractual obligations that one
may not remember unless one has a photographic memory. 17 1
In summary, by refusing to provide basic written information
to potential customers, the payday lender fits the profile of a
predatory lender even though it has no legal obligation to
provide such information. 172 Telling a potential customer, "I'll
surveyors' observations are not reflected in the survey forms, but the author
wrote down information provided orally by the surveyors during their
debriefing and that information is mentioned where relevant in this Article.
168. See supra note 167. The author has personally visited at least five
payday loan stores and knows how difficult it is to obtain an application. To
obtain some of the applications, the author and the surveyors had to pretend
to apply for a loan and then claim to have forgotten something needed to
obtain the loan. The author and the surveyors then concealed the application
as we departed the store.
169. Many of these payday loans stores have security guards on site to
prevent someone from violating store policy. In one store, shockingly, two
research assistants saw an AK47 gun lying in plain view behind the teller's
window. Imagine a store clerk wielding a weapon to prevent a consumer from
exiting the store with a copy of the application! In another store, the clerk
became suspicious of one of two research assistants that were in the store.
The clerk, a male, began to approach the research assistant, who happened to
be female, to physically remove her from the store. The other research
assistant, a male, stopped the clerk from accosting the female.
170. See infra App., tbl.3.
171. See EZ Cash Advance Payday Loan Application (on file with author).
On the back of its application is a "HOLDING AGREEMENT," which contains
several provisions including the following:
In the event the Customer does not honor this agreement, the check
or checks will be turned over to a check collection agency, and/or legal
action will be taken to recover the amount due under the bad check
law which states you may have to pay the amount of the check(s)...
[iun addition to the following amounts:
1. Collection costs, including attorney fees which will be set by the
court.
2. One hundred dollars or two times the face amount of the check,
whichever is more by award of the court.
Id. at 2. This provision is not in the loan contract signed by the consumer. See
id. The application instructs the customer to complete the application in
pencil but write his signature in ink. Id. at 1-2.
172. If the reader has, in recent years, attempted to purchase items such as
a car or home, the reader will recall that realtors, lenders, and automobile
dealers provide at least some basic written information to buyers-sometimes,
too much information to absorb. Comparing these businesses to payday
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tell you all you need to know," more likely means, "I'll tell you
what I want you to know."
a.

Lenders Violate TILA's DisclosureRules

Lending practices that attempt to limit the consumer's
knowledge about payday loans frustrate the purpose of TILA.
Its purpose is to "assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms
so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed
use of credit." 73 The Ohio Survey demonstrates that the
majority of payday lending practices frustrate the express
purpose of TILA and fail to comply with the industry's own
74
pledge to adhere to the requirements of TILA. 1

i. Lenders Fail to Disclose the Cost of Credit
TILA does not mandate that a creditor orally supply
information regarding the cost of credit; however, if the creditor
chooses to respond to a consumer's oral inquiry about the cost
175
If
of credit, the creditor must give the consumer the APR.
lenders, the author finds very suspicious the payday lending practice of
providing no or very little written information. Except for payday loan
transactions, a plethora of unbiased information about common consumer
transactions may be easily obtained from other sources. See, e.g., Millie
Bingham, Brochure Lists Ohio Consumer Law, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9,
2001, at 2C, available at 2001 WL 3836416; C.R. Roberts, Business Briefly:
Better Business Bureau Offers Credit Advice to Students, MORNING NEWS
TRIB. (Tacoma), Oct. 3, 2001, at D1 (telling parents and students where to
easily find brochures on "understanding credit, buying a first car and renting
a first apartment"), availableat 2001 WL 3997273.
173. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
174. See infra App., tbls.1-4.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1665a; 12 C.F.R. § 226.26(b) (2002) ("In an oral response to
a consumer's inquiry about the cost of closed-end credit, only the annual
percentage rate shall be stated, except that a simple annual rate or periodic
rate also may be stated if it is applied to an unpaid balance."); Regulation Z,
Official Staff Interpretations, § 226.26 ("The restrictions of §226.26 apply only
if the creditor chooses to respond orally to the consumer's request for credit
cost information."). A consumer is likely to give more weight to a payday
lender's oral disclosures, even when false or misleading, than to a written APR
disclosure because the statements will be vivid in comparison to a written
disclosure. See, e.g., Richard E. Nisbett et al., PopularInduction: Information
Is Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 101, 113-15 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982);
RICHARD E.

NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE:

STRATEGIES AND

SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 62 (1980) ("Vividness is defined as the

emotional interest of information, the concreteness and imaginability of
information, and the sensory, spatial, and temporal proximity of
information."); Eugene Borgida & Richard E. Nisbett, The Differential Impact
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the APR cannot be determined in advance, the creditor may
state an APR for a sample transaction. 176 As explained in Part
I.B.1 of this Article, the Federal Reserve Board, on March 31,
2000, finalized commentary to TILA which makes it clear that
177
payday loans equal credit transactions covered by TILA.
Therefore, payday lenders in the Ohio Survey should have
adhered to TILA's disclosure requirements when they chose to
respond to the consumer's oral request. Yet in the Ohio Survey
conducted during the summer of 2001, members of the industry
failed to comply with a number of TILA's requirements,
78
including providing correct responses to oral inquiries.
When Ohio payday lenders were asked during the
information-gathering stage to state the APR for a $100 loan,
179
only 32% of the payday lenders surveyed disclosed the APR.
Ohio law allows a maximum fee of $7.50 per every $50
borrowed.180 Therefore, the maximum finance charge for a
$100 loan would be $15.00, which amounts to an APR of 391%
for a two-week loan. Incredibly, 32% of the payday lenders
surveyed denied that there was an APR associated with the
loan while 18% claimed they did not know the APR.181
Roughly, 14% stated that the $15 finance charge was the APR,
ofAbstract vs. Concrete Information on Decisions, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.

258, 264-67 (1977) (conducting a study that found that vivid, unreliable
information in the form of face-to-face comments had more impact on a college
student's course selection decision than much more statistically reliable
information in the form of course evaluations); Chris Guthrie, Framing
Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 202-03
(2000); Jeff Sovern, Toward a Theory of Warranties in Sales of New Homes:
Housing the Implied Warranty Advocates, Law and Economics Mavens, and
Consumer Psychologists Under One Roof, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 13, 25-44.

176.

12 C.F.R. § 226.26(b) (2002).

177.

Regulation Z, Official Staff Commentary, § 226.2(2)(a)(14)-2 (2002), as

amended 65 Fed. Reg. 17129, 17130-17131 (Mar. 31, 2000).
178.
179.
180.

See infra App., tbls.2-3.
See infra App., tbl.2.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.39(B), 1315.40(A) (Anderson 2002)

(indicating that lenders may charge interest at a rate of 5% per $50 in
principal plus an origination fee of $5, thus totaling $7.50 per $50 lent).
181.

See infra App., tbl.2.

In the Ohio Survey, the customer's question

regarding the APR came after the customer had already asked the lender
what the fee was for the loan.

Because the lenders had already chosen to

orally disclose the cost of credit stated in terms of the finance charge, the
lenders had an obligation to then orally provide the APR. See 12 C.F.R. §
226.26(b) (2002) ("In an oral response to a consumer's inquiry about the cost of
closed-end credit, only the annual percentage rate shall be stated, except that a

simple annual rate or periodic rate also may be stated if it is applied to an
unpaid balance." (emphasis added)). Therefore, responding "I don't know" did
not excuse the lenders from complying with Regulation Z.
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and one of the twenty-two lenders answered evasively: "That
doesn't count because you don't have the money for a whole
year." 182 The results of the Ohio Survey resemble those in the
CFA's 2001 Rent-A-Bank Payday Lending Report, where only
21% of payday lenders in twenty-six states verbally disclosed
an APR in response to a customer's inquiry. 83 In the CFA's
2000 Show Me the Money report, only 37% of payday lenders
quoted even nominally correct APRs when asked by customers
84
over the telephone.
To comply with TILA, payday lenders could have easily
found out the APR by simply putting the appropriate figures
into their computer programs. 185 Several facts support this
conclusion. First, each payday lender in the Ohio Survey
charged the maximum fee allowed by state law and lent money
in specified increments.186 Therefore, the lenders had a finite,
manageable number of possible transactions for which to
determine the APR. 187 Several other lenders issued loans in
$50 increments only. 8 8 Moreover, given that most lenders
claim not to perform credit checks on the borrowers, 8 9 the
lenders would have no reason to adjust the preset APRs
following the initial credit application. Finally, because most of
the lenders posted fee schedules for loans of various
denominations, 90 the APRs could have easily been posted along
with the finance charge fees. Payday lenders contend that
having to disclose the APR is misleading,' 9 ' but TILA mandates

182.
183.

See infra App., tbl.2.
Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 13.

184.
185.

SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 131, at 6.
Surveyors observed clerks entering information

contained

in

applications. The clerks did no calculations; the software calculated the APRs.
186. See infra App., tbl.2 (listing the fees charged by the lenders surveyed);
see, e.g., Check $mart's Deferred Deposit, Early Deposit Clause and Disclosure

Agreement (containing a table showing loan amounts in $50 increments) (on
file with author).
187.

In fact, two payday lenders in the survey required loan amounts to be

in $100 increments so that they could use their preprinted forms to make
required disclosures.

188. See EZ Cash Advance Payday Loan Application, at 2 (on file with
author).
189. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
190. See infra App., tbl.1.
191.

See, e.g., Anita Weier, Bill Caps Payday Loan Interest, CAP. TIMES

(Madison), Oct. 1, 2001, at Al (quoting a payday lending executive as saying
that disclosing the cost of credit as an APR is misleading because the loan
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that lenders disclose the cost of credit using an APR so that
consumers can do comparison shopping. 192 A consumer who
has a basic understanding of APRs and who has the option of
obtaining a cash advance using a credit card will readily
recognize that the APR for a payday loan is astronomically
higher than the APR charged for a credit card's cash
advance. 193 By giving evasive answers and denying the
existence of or claiming lack of knowledge about the APR, the
payday lenders in the Ohio Survey not only failed to comply
with TILA, but frustrated its primary purpose of providing
consumers with information relevant to making an informed
194
decision.
ii. Lenders Fail to Provide the APR
In addition to violating the disclosure requirements for oral
inquiries, the majority of the Ohio payday lenders violated
TILA's advertising requirements. As stated previously, in the
businesses surveyed, most lenders (nineteen out of twenty-two)
had some type of fee schedule (posted on either a sign on the
wall or on a placard on the teller's window); 195 yet 84% (sixteen
out of nineteen) had fee schedules that failed to disclose the
APR for each loan amount. 196 TILA provides that if a creditor
advertises the finance charge, the cost of credit must
be stated
"as an annual percentage rate, (using that term)."' 97
period is only until the borrower's payday, usually two weeks, not for a year),
2001 WL 25527100.
192. See discussion supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
193. Michele Chandler, Payday Loan Services Thrive in Florida as
Economy Slows, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, May 15, 2001, at *8
(comparing a 20% APR on a credit card cash advance with a 390% APR on a
payday loan), available at 2001 WL 20966017.
194. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
195. See infra App., tbl.1. The following three lenders had fee schedules

that contained the APR for each loan amount: Check Into Cash, Advance
America Cash Advance Center, and National Cash Advance. See Collected
Payday Loan Documents from the Ohio Survey (on file with author).
196. See infra App., tbl.1. Only three of the Ohio lenders posted APRs
along with the fees. In the national survey, only 22% posted APRs. Fox &
Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 13.
197. Section 226.24(b) of Regulation Z provides,
Advertisement of rate of finance charge. If an advertisement states a
rate of finance charge, it shall state the rate as an "annual percentage
rate," using that term. If the annual percentage rate may be
increased after consummation, the advertisement shall state that
fact. The advertisement shall not state any other rate, except that a
simple annual rate or periodic rate that is applied to an unpaid

balance

may be

stated

in conjunction

with, but

not

more

20021

PAYDAY LOANS

To prove a violation of this provision, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) would have to show that the fee schedules
198
are advertisements and that the fees are finance charges.
TILA's Regulation Z defines an advertisement as "a commercial
message in any medium that promotes, directly or indirectly, a
credit transaction."' 99 According to the Federal Reserve
Board's Official Staff Commentary, a message includes "visual,
oral or in print media." 200 A few payday loan outlets surveyed
had placards that consisted of nothing more than the words
"loan fees" followed by, "$50=$57.50, $100=$115,
$500=$575."201
Two lenders had signs that provided the
origination fee and the interest on the principal (for example,
$5.00 origination fee, $2.50 interest on $50).202 Some of the
stores had signs or placards containing three columns exactly
20 3
like or similar to the following:
Amount You
Amount of
Want Back
Fee Total
Your Check
$50
$7.50
$57.50
$100
$15.00
$115.00
$500
$75.00
$575.00
All of the aforementioned fee-schedule formats constitute
advertisements because they are commercial messages-visual
media-that promote directly or indirectly the payday loan, a
conspicuously than, the annual percentage rate.
12 C.F.R. § 226.24(b) (2002); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1664 (2000). Section
226.24(c) states that if the advertisement sets forth certain terms, including
the finance charge, the advertisement must also disclose the amount or
percentage of the down payment, the terms of repayment, and the APR. 12
C.F.R. § 226.24(c).
198. The Federal Trade Commission has enforcement authority in the
event of a TILA violation by a creditor under its jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. §§
45(b), 1607(c). Unfortunately, a consumer does not have a private cause of
action for violations of TILA's advertisement requirements for consumer
credit. See Smeyres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 820 F.2d 782, 783 (6th Cir. 1987).
199. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(2).
200. See F.R.B., Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z, Cmt. 2(a)(2)-1.
201. See supra note 195.
202. Photograph of First American Cash Advances's poster, Oct. 10, 2001
(on file with author).
203. Photograph of Check$mart's poster, Oct. 10, 2001 (on file with
author). Kentucky Check Exchange's three columns were, "CHECK TO
CUSTOMER," "FEE," and "CHECK TO KY CHECK EXCHANGE."
Photograph of Kentucky Check Exchange's fee table (on file with author);
Kentucky Check Exchange website, at http://www.checkex.com/feeschedule
_oh.html (displaying a fee schedule that is substantially similar to the one
observed in the store).
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credit transaction. 204
TILA's advertising provision applies to the advertisement
of a finance charge, which is "the cost of consumer credit as a
dollar amount."20 5 A finance charge "includes any charge
payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a
condition of the extension of credit. '20 6 No matter which feeschedule format a payday lender uses, the posted fees represent
"finance charges" because they are the cost of the payday loans
stated in dollar amounts. All but three of the payday lenders
studied failed to post the APRs along with their finance
charges, thus violating TILA. 207 One obvious reason why most
of the payday lenders did not post the APR is that they do not
want the consumer to realize the true cost of the loan.
Disclosing the cost of credit as $15.00 does not appear to be a
costly deal in comparison to an APR of 391% for a $100 loan.
Fear of losing business, however, is not an excuse for failing to
comply with the advertising requirements of TILA.
iii. Lenders Refuse to Provide Disclosures Prior to
Contracting
Besides making truthful advertisements, payday lenders
have a duty to make TILA disclosures available in writing to
the consumer prior to actual contract consummation. 208 As

204. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text (establishing that
payday loans are credit transactions). The case against two of the stores using
the three-column format is even stronger because of the explanatory
paragraphs typed above the fee schedules. For example, Check$mart had the
following paragraph:
Check$mart has revised the payroll advance program to benefit you,
the valued customer. All payroll advances will only be done in $50.00
increments. The following chart has been designed to help you
determine the correct check amount. Please ask your friendly
Check$mart teller at what level you should write your check.
Photograph of Check$mart's poster, Oct. 10, 2001 (on file with author).
205. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).
206. Id.
207. See infra App., tbl.2.
208. Consummation of a credit transaction occurs when the consumer signs
the contract. Spearman v. Tom Wood Pontiac-GMC, Inc., No. IP 00-1340-CT/G, 2001 WL 987849, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 30, 2001) (rejecting the defendant's
contention that a contract is not consummated until both parties have signed),
vacated, 2001 WL 1712506 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2001); Compton v. Altavista
Motors, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (W.D. Va. 2000) (stating that the credit
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previously established, creditors must disclose to consumers
the cost of credit as a dollar amount-the finance charge-and
as an APR. 20 9 The timing of these disclosures is critically
important if the purposes of TILA are to be fulfilled. TILA's
section 226.17(a) of Regulation Z provides that "[tihe creditor
shall make the disclosures required by this subpart clearly and
conspicuously in writing, in a form that the consumer may
keep."2 10 Section 226.17(b) subsequently provides that "[t]he
make disclosures before the consummation of the
creditor shall2 11
transaction.,
In Polk v. Crown Auto, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffconsumer that the defendant-car dealer violated the timing
disclosure requirements of TILA when it did not give the
disclosures in a form that the plaintiff could keep until a few
2 12
minutes after he had signed a contract purchasing a truck.
Prior to consummating the purchase transaction, the car dealer
explained the credit terms to the consumer but did not disclose
the terms in written form until after both parties had signed
the contract and the consumer was given a copy of it.213 The
defendant wanted the court to adopt an interpretation that the
creditor had complied with TILA so long as it had, before
consummation, made the disclosures in some form, including
orally, and had later given the consumer a copy of the
disclosures in writing. 2 14 The court disagreed based on a plain
meaning and legislative intent interpretation:
[O]n balance, we believe that the plain meaning of the regulation
must be understood to be that written disclosure in the form specified
in subpart (a) must be provided to the consumer at the time specified
in subpart (b). That is, Crown Auto was required to make the
disclosures to Polk in writing, in a form that he could keep, before
consummation of the transaction.
Not only are we satisfied that this is the plain meaning of the

provision, but this interpretation comports with Congress' intent to
require "meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms

transaction was consummated once the buyer signed the contract).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3)-(4) (2000); see also supra notes 64, 173, 175, 197
and accompanying text.

210. 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a) (emphasis added).
211. Id. § 226.17(b) (emphasis added).
212. 221 F.3d 691, 692 (4th Cir .2000).
213. Id. at 691.
214.

Id. at 692.
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21 5

The Polk decision has been hotly debated. Some believe it was
incorrectly decided. 216 Despite protest, the Federal Reserve
Board has declined to modify or overrule section 226.17 of
Regulation Z.217 Moreover, Polk has been followed by several
2 18
courts.
The Ohio Survey reveals an industry-wide practice of
refusing to provide consumers with a written copy of the
required disclosures prior to contract consummation.
Admittedly, every payday lender disclosed the APR in the
written contract. 2 19 But when the research assistants asked
the loan clerks to allow them to take the contracts and review
them prior to signing, 77% (seventeen of twenty-two) of the
payday loan clerks surveyed would not allow the consumer to
take the contract. 220 Some clerks even held onto the corner of
the written contract while the research assistants were
reviewing it prior to signing. Such an act would be insufficient
for TILA purposes because "courts that have considered the

215. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a)).
216. Thomas D. Domonoske, New Issues in Consumer Credit Litigation:
Truth in Lending Act Disclosures and Polk v. Crown Auto, and the Problem of
a Conditional Credit Sale of a Car, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION 2001, at 497, 503 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. B-1241, 2001) (stating that attorneys unhappy with the
decision have asked the Federal Reserve Board to qualify or overrule the
relevant regulation); Elizabeth C. Yen et al., Truth in Lending in the Year
2000, 56 BUS. LAW. 1089, 1108 (2001) (discussing how the "ramifications of
the Polk decision are troublesome").
217. Domonoske, supra note 216, at 503.
218. Spearman, 2001 WL 987849, at *3; Brugger v. Kia, No. 01-C-1860,
2001 WL 845472, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2001); Crowe v. Dodge, No. 00-C8131, 2001 WL 811655, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 2001) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim that defendant failed to comply with TILA's
timing-of-disclosure requirements); Walters v. First State Bank, 134 F. Supp.
2d 778, 781 (W.D. Va. 2001) ("[T]he Fourth Circuit made it clear that a
creditor must provide the TILA disclosures in writing, in a form that the
consumer may keep, before consummation of the credit transaction."); Holley
v. Gurnee Volkswagen & Oldsmobile, Inc., No. 00-C-5316, 2001 WL 243191, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2001) (citing Polk and stating the "regulation means what
it says"); Compton v. Altavista Motors, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (W.D.
Va. 2000); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 321, 337 (W.D.
Mich. 2000) ("[The plain language of 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a)(1), when read
together with 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(b), requires delivery of a copy of the required
disclosures to a consumer before consummation of the transaction.").
219. See infra App., tbl.3.
220. See infra App., tbl.3.
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issue have uniformly concluded that merely showing the
consumer the disclosures in a contract before he or she signs
the contract is insufficient; the consumer must be given a copy
of the disclosures before signing the contract." 22 1 Additionally,
TILA does not require the consumer to request the written
disclosures before execution; the creditor bears the burden of
providing the disclosures prior to contract consummation. 222
TILA "reflects a transition in congressional policy from a
philosophy of 'Let the buyer beware' to one of 'Let the seller
disclose.'" 223 Consequently, the Ohio payday lenders' practice of
contemporaneously providing written disclosures at the time of
224
contract consummation violates TILA.
iv. Lenders Violate Their Own "Best Practice" of
Complying with TILA
The Ohio Survey uncovered three TILA violations: failure
to provide the APR in response to oral inquiries about the cost
of the loan, 225 failure to provide the APR in payday loan
advertisements, 226 and failure to provide the consumer with
written disclosures prior to contract consummation. 227 Despite
the lack of an economic incentive for TILA compliance, payday
lenders purport a commitment to complying with the law and
affording consumers some level of protection. In a strategic
move to combat further regulation, the Community Financial
Services Association of America (CFSA), the newly-formed
trade association for the industry, 228 announced in 2000 a list of
ten best practices that its members should follow. 229 Shortly

221.

Spearman, 2001 WL 987849, at *4.

222. Id. at *5 ("It would be contrary to the purpose of TILA to impose a
duty on the consumer to obtain the required disclosures.").
223. Mourning v. Family Publ'n Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973), cited
in Spearman, 2001 WL 987849, at *5.
224. See Spearman, 2001 WL 987849 at *5 ("Contemporaneous disclosure.

.does not comply with Regulation Z's requirement that the disclosure be
before consummation of the transaction.").
225.

See supra Part II.A.2.a.i.

226. See supra Part II.A.2.a.ii.
227.
228.

See supra Part II.A.2.a.iii.
CFSA website, at http://www.cfsa.net/pressreleases/bestpractices-

pr.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002) (indicating that CFSA was formed in 1999).
229. See Rehm, supra note 14, at 4; see also Steve Jordon, Payday-Loan
Trade Group Develops Industry Practice Standards, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB.
BUS. NEWS (Omaha), Apr. 12, 2000, at *8 (indicating that there are forty-eight
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thereafter, the list was amended and an eleventh best practice
was added to "reflect CFSA's responsiveness to the emerging
concerns of policy makers as well as our commitment to
providing substantive consumer protections and ensuring the
230
long-term success of the industry."
Specifically, the CFSA professes a commitment to "comply
with the disclosure requirements of the State in which the
payday advance office is located and with Federal disclosure
231
requirements including the Federal Truth in Lending Act."
When asked to state the APR for a $100 loan in the Ohio
Survey, however, 68% of the payday lenders violated TILA by
failing to disclose the APR.232 Yet, a consumer in desperate
need of a payday loan is not likely to ask for the APR of the
loan. Moreover, a consumer who later complains about the lack
of disclosure will have great difficulty proving at trial the
content of any oral recitation by the lender of a different
APR. 233 Consequently, payday lenders lack any incentive to
comply with TILA's requirement for a response to oral APR
inquiries or to comply with the best practice of full disclosure.
In addition to lacking an incentive to comply with TILA's
disclosure requirements for oral inquiries, a majority of payday
lenders have no incentive to comply with TILA's advertising
requirements. When it first announced its best practices list,
the industry pledged to comply with TILA as a guide for
truthful advertising. 234 Only 16% (three out of nineteen) of the
lenders surveyed, however, posted fee schedules stating the
CFSA members with a total of CFSA 6000 payday loan stores nationwide),
available at 2000 WL 19315696. For the complete list of the CFSA's best
practices, see BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
230. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.

231. Id.
232. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
233. Proving a violation will be easy if the conversation was recorded and
video-taped.
See Sovern, supra note 175, at 78 n.259 ("[Slignificant

enforcement problems exist with oral disclosures. Unless some means is found
for spot-checking conversations, efforts to enforce invariably come down to

credibility judgments about whether fact-finders believe the consumer, who
claims no disclosure was provided, or the seller, who claims it was.").
234.

Jordon, supra note 229 (indicating that CFSA members pledge that

"[aidvertising will not be false, misleading or deceptive, using the federal
Truth In Lending Act" as a guide).

Brochures obtained in the Ohio Survey

also confirm this fact. See Collected Payday Loan Documents from the Ohio
Survey (on file with author). Notably, the industry's website currently makes
no reference to TILA.

BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.

Removal of this

reference to TILA, however, does not remove payday loan transactions from
TILA's coverage. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
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APR for each loan amount. The most obvious reason for this
noncompliance is that the lenders do not want the consumer to
Continued
realize the amount of the finance charges.
noncompliance with TILA's advertising requirements remains
likely because payday lenders fear losing business if their
advertisements disclose the APR. Further, no private right of
action exists for a creditor's violation of TILA's advertising
requirements 235 and the FTC does not have the resources to
Thus, no economic
pursue the numerous violators. 236
incentives exist to spur payday lenders to advertise truthfully.
As with TILA's advertising requirements, current laws fail
to motivate payday lenders to comply with TILA's timing-ofdisclosure requirements. As discussed earlier, a majority (77%)
of the Ohio lenders surveyed refused to provide the customer
with a copy of the contract containing TILA disclosures prior to
contract-consummation. 237 This widespread practice is consistent with a larger industry pattern of keeping the consumers
238
uninformed

about

the

true

cost

of

payday

loans.

Consequently, consumers cannot obtain full disclosure about

235. WHALEY, supra note 62, at 488 ("[T]here is no private right of action
in favor of consumers injured by the violation of TIL advertising rules . . . ."); 2
CLONTZ, JR., supra note 59, ITl 10.17, 10.116 (stating that "no [civil] liability
exists for credit advertising violations"). Creditors are instead subject to
administrative actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission. WHALEY,
supra note 62, at 488; Gene A. Marsh, The HardSell in Consumer Credit:How
the Folks in Marketing Can Put You in Court, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
295, 296 (1998).
236. As Professor Whaley observes, "[Tihe amount of credit advertising is
large and the resources of the FTC are meager; the upshot is that you can
open the morning newspaper, glance at billboards, and turn or the radio or TV
and hear violation after violation of the advertising rules." WHALEY, supra
note 62, at 488; see also Johnson v. TeleCash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264, 266 (D.
Del. 1999) (discussing the importance of not enforcing arbitration clauses in
order to encourage class actions under TILA "because of the apparent
inadequacy of the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement resources and
because of a continuing problem of minimum compliance with [TILA] on the
part of creditors"), rev'd sub nom., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d
366, 371-78 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc.,
531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
237. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
238. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.a (explaining that the Ohio Survey
discovered that a majority of payday lenders do not make written pamphlets
available about payday loans, and that the majority violate TILA by failing to
disclose the APR at both the information-gathering and contractSeveral days, and sometimes weeks, transpired
consummation stages).
between information-gathering and contract-consummation.
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the cost of credit until the contract is consummated.
Consumers brave enough to sue lenders for TILA violations
face difficulty obtaining lawyers and receiving a compensatory
award because of a growing trend among payday lenders of
including contract provisions mandating that all claims against
the lenders be arbitrated and, in some instances, preventing
the consumer from filing class action suits. 239 Nine of the
twenty-two payday lender contracts obtained in the Ohio
Survey contained arbitration clauses. 240
Of those nine

239. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d at 366 (upholding
an arbitration clause in payday loan contract); Gretchen Schuldt, Payday Loan
Suit Certifies Class Action, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec. 14, 2000, at B3
(indicating that McKenzie Check Advance of Wisconsin began including
arbitration clauses in its loan agreements after a lawsuit was filed against it
in 1998), available at 2000 WL 26101516. If these clauses are upheld,
consumers will be deprived of the ability to bring class actions. Johnson v. W.
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d at 371-78 (reversing a district court's refusal to
enforce arbitration clause in payday loan contract); Alan S. Kaplinsky,
Arbitrationand Class Actions-A Contradictionin Terms, SF81 ALI-ABA 173,
186 (2001) ("[Tlhe inability of a plaintiff to pursue relief on behalf of a class in
a case challenging the legality of a relatively modest payday loan agreement is
likely to have a significant practical effect on the ability of a consumer to
obtain relief authorized by federal statutes .

. . ."),

available at WL SF81 ALI-

ABA 173. Class actions are the only real way for consumers to enforce their
TILA rights and to deter violaters:
[Tihere is not much incentive in the Act for individuals to pursue
alleged Truth-in-Lending violations. The costs of litigation against a
financial institution can be enormous, actual damages are difficult to
prove and the statutory recovery is low. It is in most individuals'
interests, however, and in the public interest that lending institutions
comply with the Act and be found responsible to consumer borrowers
if they do not comply. Were it not for the class action, many borrowers
likely would not pursue their rights in court.
Hughes v. Cardinal Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 97 F.R.D. 653, 655-56 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (emphasis added); see also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 532 F.2d 10, 15
(7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing the importance of class actions under TILA "to
prevent violators of the Act from limiting recovery to a few individuals where
actual, wide-spread [sic] noncompliance is found to exist") (quoting Haynes v.
Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974)). Fortunately
for consumers, some courts have refused to enforce arbitration clauses in
payday loan contracts. See, e.g., Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v.
Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361, 366-67 (Ark. 2000) (holding that an arbitration
clause lacks mutuality because only the consumer had an obligation to
arbitrate all claims against lender); Hayes v. County Bank, 713 N.Y.S.2d 267,
270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (denying enforcement of an arbitration clause
because it would prevent class action relief, relying in part on the district
court's decision in Johnson v. Tele-Cash that was subsequently reversed).
240. The Ohio Survey found arbitration clauses in contracts from Advance
America, Check Into Cash, Check 'n Go, Check$mart, Express Payroll
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contracts, five included clauses waiving the consumer's ability
to file class actions, three included clauses shifting the
arbitration fees to the consumer in the event the lender
prevails, three contained clauses allowing the arbitrator to
decide who should bear the costs of arbitration, and four
granted the arbitrator authority to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. 24 1 Given the payday lenders' pattern of
noncompliance with several TILA requirements and their
inclusion of the arbitration clauses, 242 payday lenders lack an
economic incentive to adhere to TILA's timing-of-disclosure
requirements.
b. Lender Deception: The Customer's PurportedRight to
Rescind at No Cost
The Ohio payday lenders add to their predatory image by
falsely representing that consumers have the option to rescind
payday loans. CFSA members claim that they will follow the
best practice of allowing a customer to rescind a payday loan at
no cost if rescission is sought by the close of the business day
following the initial transaction. 243 Many payday lenders
display posters at their outlets that indicate they are members
of the CFSA and list all of the best practices, including the
practice of permitting cost-free rescissions. 244 The Ohio Survey
tested compliance with this best practice and discovered only
50% of the CFSA members authorized a cost-free rescission
245
when the customer requested one.
Advance, National Cash Advance, Columbus Check Cashers, First American
Cash Advance, and Kentucky Check Exchange, Inc. See Collected Payday
Loan Documents from the Ohio Survey (on file with author).
241. The following payday lenders had boilerplate language precluding
borrowers from serving as representatives or members of a class of claimants
in any suits filed against the lenders: Advance America, Check Into Cash,
National Cash Advance, First American Cash Advance, and Kentucky Check
Exchange, Inc.
242. State efforts to protect consumers from odious arbitration clauses
have been struck down under the Supremacy Clause as violating the Federal
Arbitration Act. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
(1996) (holding that the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act was to ensure
that arbitration agreements were placed on grounds similar to enforceable
contracts and that a Montana state law requiring arbitration clauses to give
special notice violated the act because the special notice provision did not
apply to contracts generally).
243. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154, at 1.
244. See infra App., tbls.3-4.
245. See infra App., tbls.3-4. Fourteen out of the twenty-two (64%) lenders
surveyed are members of CFSA. See infra App., tbl.4. ACE was the only non-

50
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Falsely representing that consumers can make cost-free
rescissions constitutes a deceptive act in violation of federal
and state laws aimed at preventing deceptive acts. Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) authorizes the
FTC to regulate conduct which prohibits "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce. 2 46 Under the FTC
2 47 and
Act, "commerce" means a company's course of business,
248
therefore would include payday loan businesses.
The FTC possesses "considerable latitude" in determining
what constitutes an unfair or deceptive act. 249 The FTC's 1983
Policy Statement on Deception defines a deceptive practice as
"a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead
the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment. ' 250
Representing that cost-free
CFSA member that allowed the customer. to make a cost-free rescission. See
infra App., tbls.3-4
246. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
247. See id. § 44.
248. Certain entities, such as banks, savings and loan associations, and
credit institutions, are exempt from the FTC's jurisdiction. See id. §§ 45(a)(2),
46(b). Payday lenders, however, do not meet the definitions of the lending
institutions exempted from the FTC's jurisdiction. See id. §§ 57a(f)(1), (3)
(indicating that the Federal Reserve Board has jurisdiction over unfair and
deceptive acts committed by banks, savings and loan associations, and credit
institutions). "The exclusion of banks from the FTC's jurisdiction appears to
have been motivated by the fact that banks were already subject to extensive
federal administrative controls." United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 336 n.11 (1963) (construing T.C. Hurst & Son v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 268
F. 874, 877 (E.D. Va. 1920)). Consequently, the FTC has jurisdiction over
payday lenders. For a discussion of an FTC lawsuit against payday lenders,
see infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
249. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965)
("[Tihe Commission's judgment is to be given great weight by reviewing
courts."); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices
Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1320-21 (2001) (discussing several
reasons why "the FTC has considerable latitude in determining whether
particular conduct violates the FTC Act"); Candace Lance Oxendale,
Comment, The FTC and Deceptive Trade Practices:A Reasonable Standard?,
35 EMORY L.J. 683, 685 (1986) ("[Tlhe appellate courts, mindful of the
presumed expertise of the Commissioners in the field of trade regulation, have
applied a very deferential standard of review to FTC determinations."). The
Supreme Court has afforded the FTC considerable latitude in fashioning
appropriate remedies because of its expertise and has held that FTC's
determinations will not be disturbed unless "the remedy selected has no
reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist." Jacob Siegel Co.
v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946).
250. Letter from James C. Miller, Chairman of the FTC, to John D.
Dingell, Chairman, H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, (Oct. 14, 1983),
cited in In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 175 (1984). The Policy
Statement standard was formally ratified by the Commission in March 1984.
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rescissions can be made likely misleads reasonable consumers
to their detriment because they might erroneously believe they
can back out of a payday loan if they later decide it was not the
right solution for dealing with their financial crisis and
because the consumers who are not permitted to rescind will be
unable to recover the fee.
251
In the FTC's first action against payday lenders,
Consumer Money Markets, Inc., Continental Direct Services,
Inc., and several other connected entities falsely represented
that consumers would receive a credit line, including cash
advance privileges, of thousands of dollars if they paid a
membership fee ranging from $149 to $169.252 After paying the
fees, consumers discovered that they could only use the credit
line to buy items from Consumer Money's catalog or to obtain
payday loans at interest rates of up to 360%.253 The FTC
alleged that this scheme amounted to deceptive acts 254
or
practices in violation of section 5(a) of the FTC Act.
Although this case settled, the allegations suggest that, like
Consumer Money, half of the payday lenders in the Ohio
Survey engage in deceptive acts by falsely representing that
they allow consumers to make cost-free rescissions of payday
loans.

255

Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 164-65. A misleading representation includes
a "failure to perform promised services." Id. at 175.
251. Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to Dolores S. Smith,
Director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Feb 20, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/02/
tilay2krpt.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).
252. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Las Vegas Firm Settles
FTC Charges It Misled Consumers Through Credit Line and Cash Advance
Offers, (Sept. 6, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/cmmlh.htm (last visited
Oct. 16, 2002).
253. Id.
254. Compl., FTC et al. v. Consumer Money Markets, Inc. et al. (D. Nev.)
13, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/cmmcmp.pdf, 13 (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
In a settlement agreement, Consumer Money and the related entities agreed
to disgorge $350,000 that they received from customers and to forgive an
additional $1.6 million in outstanding debts. Id.
255. Arguably, the Consumer Money case is distinguishable because the
deception there went to the heart of the transaction. An act can be deceptive
even when tangentially related to the main transaction. Recently, the FTC
has aggressively used its authority to bring charges of unfair and deceptive
trade practices against companies who fail to comply with the terms of their
own Internet privacy policies.
See, e.g., First Am. Compl., FTC v.
ToySmart.com (D. Mass. 2000) (No. 00-11341-RGS) (alleging that the company
disclosed, sold, or offered for sale personal customer information despite a
privacy policy representing the confidentiality of information supplied),
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Payday lenders might maintain that a mere failure to
perform a contractual promise gives rise only to a breach-ofcontract claim, not a deceptive act claim under state or federal
law. 256 If the actor had no intention of performing when the
promise was made, however, that failure to perform is a
deceptive act, 257 and intent not to perform may be inferred from
258
the circumstances, including the actor's subsequent conduct.
In Mapp v. Toyota World, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant committed an unfair and deceptive act under
Georgia law when the defendant led her to believe that she
could rescind an agreement to purchase an automobile. 259 In
ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the court stated that "the jury
could reasonably find that defendant induced plaintiff to
purchase the Ford Escort by promising her that she could
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/ (July 21, 2002). Toysmart's website stated that
"[p]ersonal information voluntarily submitted by visitors .. .is never shared
with a third party." (showing Toysmart's privacy policy). However, after
announcing it would cease operations, Toysmart attempted to sell this
information. First Am. Compl., Toysmart.com, (No. 00-11341-RGS). The
customer list included information obtained from children who entered a
contest at Toysmart's website by supplying their names, ages, and e-mail
addresses. Id. The FTC alleged that Toysmart committed a deceptive act by
representing that customer information would never be sold but later
soliciting bids for its assets, including its customer information. Id. If a
company's false representation regarding the confidentiality of consumer
information is a deceptive act, certainly a payday lender's false representation
regarding the ability of customers to rescind payday loans is a deceptive act.
The latter deception results in a pecuniary loss to the customer. Toysmart
later consented to a FTC order that prohibited the sale of Toysmart's personal
customer information except to a family-oriented website that was willing to
purchase the entire Toysmart business and agree to the terms of the order.
Stipulated Consent Agreement, Ex. 1, Toysmart.com (No. 00-11-11341-RGS),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07. The fate of the list was finally determined when
the bankruptcy judge approved Walt Disney Co.'s $50,000 offer to purchase
and destroy it. Greg Sandoval, Judge OKs Destruction of Toysmart List,
CNET

NEWS.COM,

Jan

31,

2001,

at

http://news.com.com/2100-1017-

251893.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
256. At common law, "[a] promise to do something in the future is
actionable fraud 'only when made with the intention, design and purpose of
deceiving, and with no intention of performing the act' at the time the promise
was made." Perez v. Alcoa Fujikura, Ltd., 969 F. Supp. 991, 1009 (W.D. Tex.
1997) (quoting Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex.
1986)).
257. See Mapp v. Toyota World, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 297, 300 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986) (explaining that if a promisor has no intention of fulfilling a promise
when it was made, such behavior is evidence of fraud, and that proof of fraud
constitutes a violation of the statute prohibiting deceptive acts).
258. Perez, 969 F. Supp. at 1009.
259. Toyota World, 344 S.E.2d at 299.
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return the car if she was not satisfied with it and that
defendant had no intention of allowing plaintiff to return the
car when this promise was made." 260 The court found that the
plaintiff showed more than a breach of promise but "a
fraudulent scheme, i.e., a contract induced by the defendant's
promise to allow rescission of the contract by plaintiff, which
26 1
promise defendant never intended to keep."
Similarly, the court in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC,
held that a creditor's practice of breaching form contracts
constitutes an unfair trade practice under the FTC Act. 262 In
that case, Orkin, an exterminator, entered into "lifetime"
contracts with over 200,000 customers to provide them
extermination services at annual fixed rates. 263 Over the years,
however, Orkin decided that these fixed-rate contracts
264
jeopardized its profitability and unilaterally raised the rates.
In upholding the FTC's decision that Orkin committed an
unfair trade practice, the court rejected Orkin's argument that
Orkin merely breached a contract provision and held that
Orkin's practice represented a breach of over 200,000
contracts. 265 The court found that whether or not Orkin
intended to deceive its customers was irrelevant because a
practice in violation of the FTC Act "may be unfair without
266
being deceptive."
Like Orkin, many of the lenders in the Ohio Survey
represent that consumers have the right to rescind the payday
loan deal but refuse to allow them to do so. 267 This is an unfair
practice in violation of the FTC Act, and a deceptive practice if,
in reality, payday lenders have no intention of allowing
rescissions. Therefore, such a representation should constitute
an unfair or deceptive act under federal and state law.
Currently, payday lenders have no incentive to refrain
from falsely representing the ability of customers to rescind.
Until the Ohio Survey, no one knew about the large percentage

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 301 (emphasis omitted).
849 F.2d 1354, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1355-56.
See id. at 1357-58.
Id. at 1366-68.
Id. at 1367.
See infra App., tbl.4.
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of noncompliance with the best practice of allowing cost-free
rescissions. 268 Moreover, except for Colorado and North
Dakota, no state or federal law requires payday lenders to
permit cost-free rescissions. 269 Consequently, except in those
states, payday lenders are not breaking any express law when
denying rescissions. While CFSA members are ostensibly
committed to following the best practice of permitting cost-free
rescissions, no economic incentive exists for payday lenders to
follow this practice because permitting rescissions limits the
payday lenders' ability to generate significant revenue from
consumers who get caught in the cycle of indebtedness.
Given that half of the CFSA members in the Ohio Survey
did not allow cost-free rescissions and given that they failed to
comply with other laws previously discussed, 270 the industry's
best practice commitment may just be a smoke screen designed
to convince legislators that the industry does not need
additional regulation. Like the Ohio Survey, other surveys of
the industry show that payday lenders do not disclose the cost
of credit. 27 1 Accordingly, the refusal to make required

268. Although several articles exist on payday lending, they do not discuss
payday lenders' noncompliance with the best practice of allowing cost-free
rescissions. See, e.g., Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16; Miller, supra note 20;
Scott Andrew Schaaf, Note, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the
Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339 (2001).
269. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-106(2) (2001) ("A consumer shall have

the right to rescind the deferred deposit loan on or before 5 p.m. the next
business day following the loan transaction."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(6)
(Supp. 2000) (stating that "the maker may rescind the transaction by the close
of the following business day at no cost"). Colorado law also requires the
following notice to be included in the contract: "YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO
RESCIND THIS TRANSACTION BY 5 P.M. THE NEXT BUSINESS DAY
FOLLOWING THIS TRANSACTION." COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-107.
270.
271.

See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2.a.
See, e.g., Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 1 (revealing in a 2001

survey that only 21% of payday lenders orally disclosed the APR in response to
customer's inquiry); SHOW ME THE MONEY!, supra note 131, at 6 (revealing
that in a 2000 survey only 37% (85 of 230) of lenders quoted nominally correct

APRs when asked by customers over the telephone). A 2001 Colorado study
found that 70% of payday lenders in Colorado do not disclose the cost of these
loans on applications or information materials although nondisclosure may not
be illegal. EMILY HOOPES, COLO. PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, SMALL
LOANs-BIG $MONEY$: A SURVEY OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN COLORADO AND
REVIEW OF THE COLORADO DEFERRED DEPOSIT LOAN ACT OF 2000, at 8, at
http://www.copirg.org/consumer/payday/report4l8-01.pdf (Apr. 2001). The

Colorado study also found that 94% of the lenders surveyed failed to
conspicuously post fees in accordance with state law. Id. at 8.
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disclosures reflects a nationwide practice. While payday loan
customers may be able to effectively challenge these precontract payday lending practices under a plethora of state and
federal consumer protection laws, many states' laws fail to
adequately protect consumers from post-consummation
practices that can be characterized as nothing less than
unconscionable.
B. EGREGIOUS PRACTICES POST-CONSUMMATION
This section differs from the previous one in that it
analyzes
payday
lending
practices
occurring
postconsummation. These practices may result in the greatest
harm to the consumer. At contract formation, a predatory
payday lender takes the first bite at the customer's wallet.
After contract consummation, however, the lender may devour
the customer's money through the use of rollovers (the
collection of fees to extend the loan's due date), and through the
use of unfair collection practices (including the collection of
treble damages).
1. The Debt Treadmill: Rollovers
Recognizing that some consumers become payday loan
customers even though they should not, members of the CFSA
purport to adopt the best practices of limiting rollovers and
encouraging consumer responsibility so that consumers will use
payday loans only as a solution to a short-term financial
crisis. 272 In states that expressly prohibit rollovers, industry
members purport to disallow rollovers; in the remaining states,
members purport to limit rollovers to the lesser of four or the
state law limitation. 273 A casual observer may think the
payday loan industry should be commended for recognizing
that payday loans are not right for consumers in the throes of
long-term debt problems. But consider again the case of Leticia
Ortega who obtained a $300 loan from National Money

272.

BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.

To achieve these best practices,

members are supposed to implement policies and procedures that inform
consumers that payday loans are intended to serve as a short-term cash flow
solution, not as a tool for managing long-term financial problems.
273. Id. In states that prohibit rollovers, members are not allowed to use
them. Id. In states that permit them, members are not to allow customers to
roll over a payday loan more than four times. Id.
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Service. 274 Assuming National Money Service is a CFSA
member, it should have informed Ms. Ortega that the payday
loan should only be used to cover a short-term financial crisis
and should have limited her to only four rollovers. Rather than
taking $90 from her bank account every two weeks for almost
year, National Money Service should have extracted from Ms.
Ortega $450 (the initial $90 loan fee plus $360 in rollover fees),
not $1800.
This section scrutinizes the rollover practice and
demonstrates how payday lenders earn generous revenues even
when being "kind" enough to limit rollovers. 275 It also explains
why payday lenders have no real incentive to foster consumer
responsibility or limit rollovers in the absence of state law.
First, state laws currently fail to address all the various forms
rollovers may take. Second, repeat business constitutes a
major component of the industry's revenue. Consequently,
states limiting or prohibiting rollovers should amend their
statutes to encompass the various rollover manifestations and
thereby hold the industry to its purported commitment of
encouraging consumer responsibility and limiting rollovers.
a. Rollovers Defined
Many, if not most, payday loan customers lack sufficient
funds to pay off the entire indebtedness by the loan's due date
and therefore have to roll over the loan. 276 A "rollover"
normally means a customer's payment of a fee to extend the
payday loan's due date for another two weeks. 277 Ms. Ortega's
experience represents a straightforward rollover. As explained
later, rollovers should be defined more broadly to encompass
not only the straightforward practice of paying a renewal fee

274.

See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (giving an account of

Leticia Ortega's experience with National Money Service).
275. See Morning Edition: Payday Lenders and the FinancialStrain They
Place on Some Borrowers (National Public Radio broadcast, July 2, 2001)
[hereinafter NPR Broadcast] ("Critics say the real danger is not to those who
borrow every now and then, but those who borrow over and over."), 2001 WL
9328000.
276. See discussion infra Parts II.B.l.b, III.A.
277. See, e.g., James P. Nehf, Consumer Transactions:Movement Toward a
More ProgressiveApproach, 34 IND. L. REV. 599, 609 (2001) ("[Consumers] can
roll over the loan by paying an additional 'loan financing charge', thereby
earning additional time to repay an even larger amount of money.").

20021

PAYDAY LOANS

but also the practice of refinancing a loan by taking out a "new
loan" from the same payday lender to pay off the "old loan" with
the proceeds from the new. 278 An example of a refinancing loan
is when a customer who took out a $115 loan two weeks ago
gives the lender a new postdated check either for $130 (the
original $115 loan plus a $15 fee) or for $100 (if the fee must be
paid in cash). 279 The definition of rollover should also include
borrowing from Peter and paying off Paul, 28 0-that is, taking
out a new loan from a different/second lender to pay off an
outstanding loan previously obtained from the first lender.
b. Many Customers Roll Over Payday Loans
No matter what form a rollover takes, the results are the
same: The customer steps onto the payday loan debt treadmill
by making a stream of interest-only payments without reducing
28 1
the principal and without obtaining additional cash.
Evidence of the debt treadmill may be found in studies
conducted by state regulators and industry analysts. In a 1999
study, the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions found
that the one-time payday loan customer represented the
exception and found customers held an average of thirteen
contracts. 282 Illinois also found that the average payday loan
customer remains a customer for at least six months and pays
2
an average APR of 533%. 83

Illinois's findings about rollovers were similar to findings
made by regulators and industry analysts in other states. In
1999, the Indiana Department of Financial Institutions
reviewed 54,508 payday loans and found that 77% of existing

278. This refinancing is also called "touch and go." Drysdale & Keest,
supra note 16, at 601 ("In a practice called 'touch and go,' lenders may take a
cash 'payoff for the old loan that they immediately reloan with new loan
funds.").
279.
280.
281.

Miller, supra note 20, at 141.
Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 601.
See id.

282. Id. at 608. The study reported, "The high expense of a short term loan
depletes the customer's ability to catch-up, therefore making the customer
'captive' to the lender." ILL. DEPT. OF FIN. INSTS., SHORT-TERM LENDING:
FINAL REPORT 30 (1999), http://www.state.il.us/dfl/ccd/Shorterm.pdf (last

visited Sept. 20, 2002). While it is theoretically possible that this average of
thirteen contracts represents separate loans rather than rollovers, it is highly
unlikely when one compares this average with the data from other states.
283.

Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 602.
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loans were rollovers with the average customer rolling over ten
times. 284 The average loan amount was $165 and the average

APR was

499%.285

In a 2000 survey, the Iowa Division of

Banking found an average of 12.5 loans per year per customer,
an average loan of $239.23, and an average APR of 342.10%.286
Forty-eight percent of the customers held at least twelve loans
in the preceding twelve months, and 11.5% held more than
twenty-five. 287 The Colorado Public Research Interest Group
found that the average APR on a loan in that state was
451.7%,288 and Colorado regulators reported that payday loans
were refinanced "as many as thirteen or more" times.2 89 In
1999, the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner of Banks'
payday lending report indicated that 38.29% of customers
studied transacted business with the same payday lender nine
290
or more times and 14.06% did so nineteen or more times.
Although criticized for underestimating the number of rollers,
the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions analyzed
3678 loans and found in its 2001 survey that the average loan
and APR were $246 and 542%, respectively, and that 63% of
the loans were rolled over once or twice and 38% were rolled
over "more than three times in a row." 29 1 One borrower in the

284. Id. at 608; Linda Lipp, Payday Loan Industry Lashes Back at Indiana
Regulators, Lawsuits, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 5, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 12904003.
285. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 602; Lipp, supra note 284; Ana
Mendieta, Illinois has Nation's Highest Payday Loan Rates, Group Says, CHI.
SUN TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at 24 ("Payday lenders in Illinois are charging the
country's highest rates ... ."), available at 2001 WL 7251574.
286. Keest, supra note 44, at 1114.
287. Id.
288. HOOPES, supra note 271, at 8.
289. REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE REVISION
COMMITTEE AND ACTIONS OF THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
CREDIT 24 (Nov. 30, 1999).
290. See OFFICE OF THE N.C. CAROLINA COMM'R OF BANKS, REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON PAYDAY LENDING 6 tbl.III(F) (2001) [hereinafter
NORTH CAROLINA PAYDAY LENDING REPORT], http://www.banking.state.nc.us/

reports/ccfinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
291. STATE OF WIS. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN
WISCONSIN 6-8 (2001) [hereinafter REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN
WISCONSIN],http://www.wdfi.orgLresources/indexed/site/newsroompress/
payday-loan-may_2001.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001). Wisconsin's average
number of rollovers is considered too low because Wisconsin regulators
excluded borrowers who eventually failed to repay the loan.
Fox &

Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 8.
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Wisconsin survey rolled over a payday loan thirty times in one
year.292 The foregoing data strongly suggests that, although
the frequency of rollovers may vary, the majority of payday
loan customers roll over payday loans. Consequently, despite
the industry's representations, payday loans are not a quick fix
to a problem that can be cured in two weeks-the initial term
of the payday loan.
Besides the data on the frequency of rollovers, insight into
the debt treadmill may be gleaned from several sources. First,
the payday loan business model leads to the treadmill because
it requires two-week terms (even though most payday loan
statutes authorize one-month terms), 293 it prohibits partial
payments (so that the loans are nonamortizing), and it requires
payment of rollover fees to prevent a default. Moreover, recall
the discussion showing that the average payday loan customer
earns only low-to-moderate income and, therefore, does not
have sufficient disposable income to service debt. 294 Further
insight into the dynamics-of-debt treadmill exists in an abilityto-repay chart prepared by Senator Joseph Lieberman's staff
for a 1999 payday lending forum. 295 The chart computes the
amount of income remaining after paying necessary expenses
and uses a two-week payroll period because it is the average
term for a payday loan. 296 Assuming a payday loan customer
earns $1138297 every two weeks and owns an outstanding $168
loan, she will have a deficit of $34 if she pays back the loan in
full on time.2 98 The loan amount derives from data available at

292. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 6.
293.

See Keest, supra note 44, at 1113. Consumer advocates state that the

two-week term is required so the "lender can double the finance charge by the
simple expedient of writing a two-week loan instead of a one-month loan." Id.
294. See supra note 276 and accompanying text; infra notes 526-34.
295. Keest, supra note 44, at 1113. In 1998, the average annual salary for
12.6 million American households was $24,648. EDWARD J. GALLAGLY &
DARLA DERNOVSEK, FAIR DEAL: CREATING CREDIT UNION ALTERNATIVES TO
FRINGE FINANCIAL SERVICES 12 (2000).
296. Keest, supra note 44, at 1113-14.

297.

Bi-weekly income of $1138 is based on industry data showing that the

average income is approximately $35,000. Id. at 1111.

298. The chart reads as follows:
$25,000
Annual Household Income Level
Two-week net paycheck,
$847
(less taxes and retirement)
Essential expenditures (food, housing,
$875
utilities, transportation and healthcare only)

$35,000
$1,138
$1,004
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the time of the forum about the average payday loan amount. 299
If she instead earns $847,300 a more realistic amount, 301 she will
have a deficit of $196 if she pays back the loan in full on
time. 30 2 Observe that, regardless of income, the consumer
cannot repay the loan in full, as required by the contract, and
must roll over or go without essentials in order to pay the loan
by its original due date. When one takes into account the
repayment ability chart, the payday loan business model, the
average income data, and the rollover frequency data, one may
reasonably conclude that the majority of customers will have to
roll over their payday loans.
Note that the rollover data only identify rollovers by
customers using the same lender and do not show those that
use multiple payday lenders-"the 'borrow from Peter to pay
Paul' phenomenon." 30 3 While the Ohio Survey could not
accurately test the extent to which consumers roll over payday
loans using multiple payday lenders, other surveys indicate
that it happens frequently. 30 4 Of the four research assistants
involved in the contract consummation stage of the Ohio
Survey, all obtained at least two loans in less than two
Net paycheck minus essential expenditures
Average payday loan due at end of pay period

$28

$134

$168

$168

$196

$34

Pay period deficit if payday loan is paid
in full on time
Id. at 1114.

299. Id.
300. Income of $847 is based on non-industry data showing that the
average income is approximately $25,000. See id. at 1111. The non-industry
data is more persuasive. See id. at 1111 n.2.
301. See infra notes 526-41 and accompanying text.
The weight of

available data shows the average annual income of payday loan customers is
approximately $25,000. Id.
302. Keest, supra note 44, at 1113.
303. Id. at 1115.
304. A survey of households with less than $30,000 in income "found that
of households using payday lenders, 11% borrowed from one payday outlet to
pay another."

PETER SKILLERN, CMTY. REINVESTMENT ASS'N OF N.C., How

PAYDAY LENDERS MAKE THEIR MONEY 3 (2001), at http://www.cranc.org/payday2.htm; see also Andrew Conte, $230 Debt Can Reach $7K-Plus
Payday Loans Can Be Deep Trap, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 3, 2000 (describing a
Cincinnati man who, unable to pay back a $230 loan obtained from one payday
lender, took out another loan from a second lender and four months later owed
$2,557 to five or more different payday lenders), 2000 WL 3366037; Michael
Squires, TOUGH TIMES: Short-Term Loan Firms Prospering, LAS VEGAS

REV., Dec. 23, 2001 (quoting Michelle Johnson, president of Consumer Credit
Counseling Service, who stated that many customers borrow from one payday
lender to pay off another), 2001 WL 9545052.
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hours. 30 5 Because the majority (twenty out of twenty-two) of
the payday lenders used the services of Tele-Track, a credit
reporting agency for sub-prime borrowers, 30 6 the lenders knew
when a research assistant had at least one outstanding loan.
The use of Tele-Track was a surprising discovery because
payday lenders usually advertise that they do not perform
credit checks. 30 7 In the study, after receiving a loan application
and proper documentation, the payday lenders that subscribed
to Tele-Track contacted Tele-Track by telephone and, based on
the information received, either granted or denied the payday
loan. 30 8 The information that Tele-Track provides to payday

305. The author instructed the research assistants to obtain as many loans
in the shortest time possible to minimize the risk of the payday lenders
becoming suspicious of the surveyors and, consequently, denying them loans.
A store clerk could become suspicious upon carefully reviewing a surveyor's
check stub, which indicates that he or she is a student worker in the law
department of The Ohio State University. One store clerk called to verify that
the research assistant worked for the author, but did not realize she was
calling a professor in a law school. One of the research assistants who worked
for the author during the information gathering stage could not obtain any
loans because he did not have an in-state driver's license or checking account.
Payday lenders were immediately suspicious of him and refused to give him a
loan. Racial stereotyping may have played a factor in their decisions to deny a
loan because this research assistant was an African-American male with a
mid-size afro hairstyle. Four lenders also denied a female surveyor a loan
stating that the reason for the denial was because she had only part-time
income. See Surveyor No. 3's Notes, June 11, 2001 (on file with author).
Gender may have played a factor in their denial decisions because she was the
only female surveyor used in the contract-consummation stage and the other
surveyors did not meet the income criteria (i.e., they did not possess check
stubs showing three months of full time income). Moreover, these lenders
violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by denying credit solely on the
basis that the applicant had part-time income. Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §
202.6(b)(5) (2002) ("A creditor shall not discount or exclude from consideration
the income of an applicant or the spouse of an applicant because of a
prohibited basis or because the income is derived from part-time employment.
306. See infra App., tbl.3. Tele-Track "collect[s] and report[s] information
to and from merchants who interface with high risk consumers daily,
including ... check advance/deferred deposit/payday loan companies." TeleTrack, Company Information, at http://www.teletrack.com/company.html (last
visited Aug. 29, 2002).
307. See, e.g., Payday Loan Cash Advance website, at http://www.paydayloan-cash-advance.com (stating that a customer can obtain a "payday loan
cash advance with no credit check") (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
308. Obviously, the research assistants could not hear exactly what
information Tele-Track provided the lender, but Tele-Track did let the lender
know if the researcher had an outstanding payday loan. None of the payday
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lenders meets the Fair Credit Reporting Act's definition of a
"consumer report" because it aids a payday lender in deciding
whether to extend credit to a consumer for personal use.30 9
Further, Tele-Track's self-description leaves little doubt that it
is a consumer-reporting agency. 310 One lender told a research
assistant that it used Tele-Track to determine if a customer
had any existing loans with that particular lender and to make
sure the customer had not defaulted on any previous payday
31
loans with any lender. i
lenders gave the research assistants the notices required under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2000) (requiring creditors to notify
consumers before taking adverse action); see also id. § 168la(k)(iv) (defining
"adverse action" to include a determination regarding a consumer's
application).
Therefore, these payday lenders violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act requirement that creditors provide consumers with notification
of an adverse action taken against them if the creditor based the action on
information in a consumer report. Id. § 1681m. Section 1681a(d) of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act defines a consumer report as follows:
(1) IN GENERAL.-The term "consumer report" means any written,
oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used
or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility for(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.
Id. § 1681a(d)(1) (footnote omitted).
309. See id. § 1681a(d)(1) (listing in the definition of "consumer reports"
credit information obtained to determine whether a consumer is eligible for
credit to be used for personal use).
310. A "consumer reporting agency" is
any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative
nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice
of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer
reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports.
Id. § 1681a(f).
311. This explanation comports with Tele-Track's website, which states,
Tele-Track provides information to identify if an applicant has a
history of writing uncollectible checks to check advance [i.e., payday
loan] companies, skips on sub-prime finance or rental agreements, or
uses a fraudulent social security number to get check advances
approved.
Tele-Track's unique fraud alert service identifies
applicants who have acquired multiple check advances in the last 14
days or have applied at multiple check advance merchants in the past
30 days.
Tele-Track website, http://www.teletrack.com/checkscreen.html (last visited
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One research assistant obtained a total of nine loans in
three days. 312 Most of the subsequent lenders asked why the
researcher needed another loan so soon after the previous
one. 313 In response, the research assistant gave various
answers such as "The loan I got yesterday wasn't large
enough," "My paycheck wasn't big enough," and "I lost money
gambling last night."314 Even though Tele-Track informed
these lenders about existing payday loans, most granted the
loans. 3 15 With statements such as "It's none of my business,"
some loan clerks ignored signs that a research assistant could
be a consumer in grave financial trouble. 316 As discussed later
in Part II.B.l.e., ignoring these warning signs violates the
industry's purported commitment to encouraging consumer
responsibility. After the ninth loan, the research assistant
went to a tenth lender, but this lender refused to lend him
money. 3 17 The lender told the research assistant that he had
3 18
been "red-flagged" because of his excessive loan activity.
Only two weeks later, the same research assistant obtained two
more loans from different lenders. 3 19 Based on these survey
results, it is clear that a customer can obtain more than one
payday loan from different lenders and that almost all lenders
possess knowledge of the customer's loan activity. Therefore,
lawmakers should expand the definition of rollovers to prevent
Aug. 29, 2002).
312. See supra note 305 (explaining why research assistants obtained so
many loans so quickly).

313. See supra note 167 (explaining that research assistants were not
wired with any audio or video recording equipment and therefore no direct
evidence exists that these statements were made).
314.

See supra note 167 (detailing the

procedures by which survey

information, such as these statements, was recorded).
315.

See supra note 311 (stating that Tele-Track "identifies applicants who

have acquired multiple check advances in the last 14 days or have applied at
multiple check advance merchants in the past 30 days").
316.

See supra note 167 (explaining that research assistants were not

wired with any audio or video recording equipment and therefore no direct
evidence exists that these statements were made).
317. Supra note 167.
318. See supra note 311 (identifying services and information that Tele-

Track provides to lenders through which a loan applicant might be "redflagged").
319.

Apparently, Tele-Track no longer had this research assistant "red-

flagged" because his previous nine loans had cleared Tele-Track's system in
the two-week period.

See supra note 311 (stating that Tele-Track's "fraud

audit services" only notes check advances obtained within the last fourteen
days). Each research assistant repaid each loan no later than the close of
business the day after the loan was obtained.
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consumers from staying on the treadmill of indebtedness by
using multiple lenders to obtain loans.
c. Current State Law Fails to Address the Rollover
Phenomenon
The majority of states that legalize payday lending keep
consumers off the payday loan treadmill by prohibiting or
limiting rollovers through the same lenders or other lenders. 320
Kentucky bans payday lenders from charging a fee to "renew,
roll over, or otherwise consolidate" payday loans.32 1
Additionally, Kentucky imposes a duty on payday lenders to
question potential customers about any outstanding payday
loans and to deny a loan to anyone having an outstanding loan
with another lender. 322 Although Kentucky prohibits rollovers,
it does allow lenders to issue second loans to their own
customers as long as the combination of the loans does not
exceed $500.323 Florida law goes one step further and requires
payday lenders to verify the existence or nonexistence of a
payday loan by accessing the database managed by Florida's
Department of Banking and Finance, which shows all
outstanding payday loans. 324 Some states prohibit rollovers but
do not impose on lenders a duty to inquire so as to prevent

320. In order to analyze the deficiencies in state payday loan statutes, this
Article broadly defines rollovers to include the consumer practice of paying a
fee to extend the loan's due date as well as the practice of refinancing the loan
by using either the same or multiple lenders.
321. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(15) (Michie Supp. 2002).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Subparagraphs (19)(a) and (b) of FLA. STAT. § 560.404 require the
lender to maintain a database and to consult the state's database:
(a) The deferred presentment provider shall maintain a common
database and shall verify whether that deferred presentment provider
or an affiliate has an outstanding deferred presentment transaction
with a particular person or has terminated a transaction with that
person within the previous 24 hours.
(b) The deferred presentment provider shall access the department's
database established pursuant to subsection (23) and shall verify
whether any other deferred presentment provider has an outstanding
deferred presentment transaction with a particular person or has
terminated a transaction with that person within the previous 24
hours. Prior to the time that the department has implemented such a
database, the deferred presentment provider may rely upon the
written verification of the drawer as provided in subsection (20).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(19) (West Supp. 2002).
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consumers from obtaining multiple loans with different
lenders. 325 In these states, a lender can issue consumers up to
two loans so long as they do not exceed the state's aggregate
326
loan amount.

Instead of banning rollovers, the remaining states limit
rollovers, require a warning in the payday loan contract

informing the consumer that rollovers will raise the cost of the
original loan, or both. 327

For example, in Colorado, payday

lenders must include the following statement as a part of a
warning in all contracts: "RENEWING THE DEFERRED
DEPOSIT LOAN RATHER THAN PAYING THE DEBT IN
FULL
WILL
REQUIRE
ADDITIONAL
FINANCE
CHARGES."328 In addition, a lender may allow customers to

roll over a loan only one time and charge customers a rollover
fee equal to the original loan fee. 329 Colorado only permits
"refinancing" if the lender's finance charge is lower than the
330
original loan fee.
Most state statutes prohibiting or limiting rollovers,
however, fail to take into account the determination of payday

lenders to circumvent the law and the capabilities of current

325. For example, Iowa law does not allow payday lenders to,
a. Hold from any one maker more than two checks at any one time.
b. Hold from any one maker a check or checks in an aggregate face
amount of more than five hundred dollars at any one time.
c. Hold or agree to hold a check for more than thirty-one days.
d. Require the maker to receive payment by a method which causes
the maker to pay additional or further fees and charges to the
licensee or another person.
e. Repay, refinance, or otherwise consolidate a postdated check
transaction with the proceeds of another postdated check transaction
made by the same licensee.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 533D.10(1) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
326. See, e.g., id. § 533D.10(1)(a)-(b) (establishing the aggregate amount at
$500).
327. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-105 (2001) (limiting the percentage
lenders may assess in finance charges on deferred deposit loans).
328. See id. § 5-3.1-104.
329. See id. §§ 5-3.1-105, 5-3.1-108(1)-(2); see also Howard Pankratz, Colo.
Suit Targets Big 'Payday'Lender, DENV. POST, July 17, 2001, at Al ("For a 14day $500 loan, a $75 fee can be charged, the equivalent of a 391 percent
annualized percentage rate. Under Colorado law, that loan can be rolled over
once with the lender charging the same fee of $75. After that, the rate drops."),
available at 2001 WL 6757171.
330. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-3.1-108(4), 5-2-201(7) (establishing allowable
loan finance charges).
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technology to aid them in this endeavor. For instance, in Iowa
and other states that prohibit rollovers but allow a customer to
have two loans with the same lender, 33' lenders could claim
technical compliance with the state law prohibition against
rollovers while allowing consumers to continually roll an
existing loan into a new loan as long as the lender does not
exceed the maximum loan amount. 332 This possible end-run
around the rollover prohibition prompted the Iowa Division of
Banking to issue an interpretive bulletin informing lenders
that the prohibition on rollovers means that they cannot issue a
new loan to a consumer until at least one day after payment of
the previous loan. 333 Given that the Iowa Division of Banking
found, in its December 2000 report on payday lenders, that the
average customer had 12.5 loans per year, the effectiveness of
the bulletin is questionable. 334 Unlike Iowa, other states have
not even tried to clarify the interrelationship between statutes
that prohibit rollovers and statutes that allow multiple
outstanding loans. Therefore, payday lenders in these states
may practice rollovers even where it is technically illegal.
In addition to leaving legal loopholes for payday lenders to
exploit, some state statutes do not adequately define the
prohibited conduct. In a complaint filed recently against ACE
Cash Express (ACE), 335 Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar
alleged numerous violations of Colorado's payday lending

331.

See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 533D.10(1)(a)-(b) (2000) (limiting the

number of loans a customer can have with one lender to two checks, not
exceeding $500 in the aggregate).
332. Thus, a lender who two weeks ago took a customer's postdated check
for a $115 loan can take from the consumer today a new postdated check for
$130 (the original $115 loan plus a $15 fee) and still be within the letter of the
law limiting the maximum loan amount (for example, $500). See Drysdale &

Keest, supra note 16, at 608 n.105 (suggesting that there are loopholes in the
Iowa statute prohibiting rollovers (citing LARRY D. KINGERY, IOWA DIV. OF
BANKING, DELAYED DEPOSIT SERVICES LICENSES, INTERPRETIVE BULLETIN 1

(Sept. 15, 1997))).
333. Id. Drysdale and Keest, however, note that even this has not been
entirely successful. Id. at 608.
334. Keest, supra note 44, at 1114; see also Drysdale & Keest, supra note
16, at 608 ("[E]ven [the interpretive bulletin] has not been a complete
success.").

335. Compl., Colorado v. ACE Cash Express Inc., (Colo. Dist. Ct. filed July
13, 2001) (No. 01CV3739) [hereinafter Colorado Complaint], http://www.ago.
state.co.us/UCCC/acecomplaint.pdf.
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law. 336 Colorado accuses ACE of violating section 5-3.1-108(1),
which provides that "[a] deferred deposit loan"337 "shall not be
renewed more than once."338 The payday loan statute does not
define the term "renewed," and the attorney general's
complaint does not describe factually how ACE's renewals take
place. 339
One Colorado resident, Cathee Jones, did not
technically "renew" a $300 loan that she obtained from
Colorado Pay Day Loans Inc., but she wound up "paying back
the loan and immediately taking out a new loan for the same
amount-eight times."340 Consequently, ACE could argue that
whatever it is doing,
it is not bound by Colorado's prohibition
34 1
against renewals.
Compare Colorado to Ohio. In Ohio, a licensed checkcashing business cannot "[m]ake a loan to a borrower if there
exists an outstanding loan between the check-cashing business
and that borrower and if the outstanding loan was made
pursuant to" Ohio's check-cashing loan law. 342 The legislative
history states that the "bill prohibits the 'rolling' of loans, also
referred to as 'flipping' when a loan operator issues a loan to

336. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-101, C.R.S. 2000 (code), and Consumer
Protection Act, §§ 6-1-101, C.R.S. 2000 (CPA).
337. Payday loans go by various names.
See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
338. Colorado Complaint, supra note 335, T 33 ("[Mlany of the loans
renewed
through
ACE
were
renewed
more
than
once."),
http://www.ago.state.co.us/UCCC/acecomplaint.pdf. If the consumer fails to
pay the debt after the renewal, the lender can deposit the consumer's check.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1).

339. See generally Colorado Complaint, supra note 335 (noting allegations
that loans were renewed more than once, but not describing how the loans
were renewed), http://www.ago.state.co.us/UCCC/acecomplaint.pdf.
340. Wayne Heilman, "Payday" Loans Draw Interest/Quick Lenders
Charge 451 Percent in Colorado, GAZETTE (Montreal), Nov. 25, 2001, at BVS1,
available at 2001 WL 27140868.
341. ACE is defending on the basis that the rollover fees, like the original
loan fees, constitute interest and are therefore protected by the preemption
doctrine in federal banking law. Long v. Ace Cash Express, No. 3:00-CV-1306J-25TJL (D. Fla. June 18, 2001) (order granting Plaintiffs motion to remand)
(on file with author); see also OCC Weighs in on Payday Lender Case, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 3, 2001, at 4 [hereinafter OCC Weighs In] (indicating that ACE
claims its "renewals [or rollovers] were made in partnership with Goleta
National Bank of California and that they were permitted by the National
Bank Act"), available at 2001 WL 26574239. It is argued here that
preemption does not apply to rollover fees because they are not included in the
OCC's definition of interest. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
342.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.41(E) (Anderson 2000).
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retire a previous loan made by the same operator to circumvent
the maximum time limit."343 The statute, however, does not
address rolling that takes the form of paying a renewal fee to
extend the life of the loan.344 Also, Ohio and Colorado are
evidently seeking to prevent rollovers, but their statutes
describe the prohibited conduct differently. 345 A clever payday
lender can arrange the transaction in such a way as to
technically fall outside the definition of the applicable statute.
For example, one payday lender in the Ohio Survey stated that
if the customer could not repay a $50 loan by its original due
date, the customer could pay a fee of $2.50 every two days to
keep from defaulting on the loan. This clearly constitutes a
renewal fee but Ohio's statute does not expressly prohibit this
practice. 346 Nevertheless, the lender may have violated Ohio's
check-cashing loan law which limits "interest at a rate of five
per cent per month" 347 and which states that the lender may
not "collect, or receive, directly or indirectly, any additional fees
or charges in connection with a loan, other than fees and
charges permitted."348
Because the legislative history
expresses a legislative intent to prohibit "rolling,"349 the statute
should be amended to expressly prohibit rollovers, which take
the form of paying a renewal fee to extend the loan's due date.
Assuming that a lender's renewal fees violate Ohio's checkcashing loan law, state lawmakers need to amend the statutes
to limit or prohibit rollovers to reach rollovers involving
multiple payday lenders.
Any proper review of state statutes should ask whether
lawmakers in states like Ohio should amend their statutes that
regulate rollovers to prevent a consumer from using multiple
lenders to keep a loan afloat. Support for such a statutory

343. To make changes in the Small Loan Law: Hearingon H.B. 313 Before
House Financial Institutions, 1995 Leg., 121st Sess. (Oh. 1995) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.B. 313] (statement of Rep. Schuler), http://han2.Hannah.com/
htbinlf.comoh_ban_121:HB313.notes (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
344.

OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 1315.40(A).

345. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-6-201 (2000), with OHIO REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1315.41.
346.

OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 1315.41.

347. Id. § 1315.39(B).
348. Id. § 1315.41(C).
349. Hearing on H.B. 313, supra note 343, http://han2.Hannah.com/
htbinlf.com/ohban_121:HB313.notes (last visited Aug. 29, 2002).
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expansion may be found in a state's legislative history. In
Ohio, the legislature expressed an intent to prohibit
rollovers. 350 Implicit in this express intent is the legislature's
recognition that consumers need to be protected from perpetual
indebtedness to payday loan companies. The payday loan
industry's best practices list provides another basis for
regulating rollovers using multiple lenders. 35' The industry
claims to recognize the need to curb perpetual indebtedness in
its best practices list, its response to the concerns of lawmakers
and its "commitment to providing substantive consumer
protections and ensuring the long-term success of the
industry."352 Payday lenders should therefore be required to
comply with a well drafted law that limits or prohibits
rollovers.
d. Rollover Business: Payday Lenders Are Blinded by Dollar
Signs
While the industry claims it is committed to limiting
rollovers and informing consumers of the occasional use of
payday loans for a short-term financial crisis, data show that
repeat transactions generate a majority of a payday lender's
revenue. Data from North Carolina show that during 1999,
22.39% of the roughly 420,000 payday loan customers used a
single company only once or twice while 42.41% of the
customers transacted with the same payday lender nine or
more times and 14.06% did so nineteen or more times. 353 These
420,000 customers generated
2,910,366 payday loan
transactions for only 142 lenders. 354 Using this North Carolina
data, one financial analyst demonstrated that high-frequency
customers generate a disproportionate amount of payday
lending revenue. 355
Customers who used payday loan

350. See supra notes 342-49 and accompanying text.
351. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
352. Community Financial Services Association of America, Community
Financial Services Association Builds on Best Practices for the Payday
Adavance Industry, at http://www.cfsa.net/pressreleases/bestpractices-pr.html
(last visited July 18, 200) (emphasis added).
353.

NORTH CAROLINA PAYDAY LENDING REPORT, supra note 290, at 5, 6

tbl.III(F) (showing 419,601 lenders surveyed), http://www.banking.state.nc.us/
reports/ccfinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
354. Id. at 4.
355. SKILLERN, supra note 304, at 1.
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transactions eighteen or more times comprised only 16% of the
420,000 customers but generated 36% of the payday lending
revenue in North Carolina. 356 In contrast, 13% of the 420,000
customers who used the transaction only one time generated
less than 2% of the revenue. 357 Clearly, one-time users
contribute little to the profitability of the North Carolina
payday loan industry.
The same results probably hold true for the industry at
large, particularly since two very large payday loan companies,
Dollar Financial and ACE, withdrew their memberships from
the CFSA because they did not want to comply with the best
practice standard for rollovers. 358 A few months after Dollar
and ACE withdrew their memberships, Eagle National Bank in
partnership with Dollar Financial and Goleta National Bank in
partnership with ACE announced that they will both require
359
their payday lenders to limit customers to three rollovers.
Critics of the industry assert, however, that payday lenders
may easily circumvent this self-policing measure by "labeling
36 0
rollovers as 'new' loans."
The industry alleges that the risk of default is high and
therefore justifies its exorbitant fees, 361 but because the rollover

356.

Id.

Skillern is the executive director of the Community Reinvestment

Association of North Carolina. Id. Skillern used revenue data supplied by
payday lenders to the North Carolina Banking Commission. Id.; see also
NORTH CAROLINA PAYDAY LENDING REPORT, supra note 290, at 5-6,

http://www.banking.state.nc.us/reports/ccfinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
357.
358.

SKILLERN, supra note 304, at 3.
Rob Blackwell, In Brief Payday Lenders' Group Revises Guidelines,

AM. BANKER, July 19, 2000, at 4 ("Representatives of Dollar, which partners
with $52 million-asset Eagle National Bank of Upper Darby, Pa., said it quit
because of the rollover limitations in states with tougher laws."), available at
2000 WL 3363054; The Boom in Fast Cash Storefront Loans Offer a Quick Fixand a Big Repayment Hit, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at Al ("Soon after

the [CFSA] announcement, both Dollar and ACE pulled out of the group,
citing their desire to continue providing rollover loans."), available at 2000 WL
5563124.
359.

Adam Geller, Payday Lenders Find Ways Around Restrictions, CHI.

TRIB., Mar. 6, 2001, at 9, available at 2001 WL 4048448.
360. Id.
361.

See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Long Way from Payday, S.F. CHRON., June 17,

2001, at C1 (indicating that the owner of a chain of twenty-two check-cashing
and payday loan stores claims his fees are reasonable because of the risk he
assumes, even though by his own admission the payday loan stores are the
most profitable part of his business), available at 2001 WL 3406626. The true
risk of default depends on how one defines default. It appears that the
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practice is part of its business model, the risk of losing capital
decreases over time. The payday loan business model requires
two-week terms even though most payday loan statutes
authorize one-month terms. 362
It also prohibits partial
payments so that the loans are nonamortizing and requires
rollovers so that the customer can keep from totally defaulting
on the loan. 363 Again, consider how this business model works
364
in the example of Leticia Ortega and the thousands like her.
She still owed National Money Service $300 even though she
had paid $1800 in rollover fees, which were deducted from her
bank account every two weeks by National Money Service. Ms.
Ortega's case shows how the lender's risk of losing capital
actually decreases, and how the lender is paid substantially
more than the principal borrowed. 365 For many lenders, the
business model includes a fourth component of threatening and
pursuing criminal prosecution, which dramatically increases
the lender's ability to collect rollover fees. 366 As discussed in
Part II.B.2.d., because many payday lenders threaten
customers with criminal prosecution for writing bad checks and
because it is commonly known that writing a bad check is a
crime, payday lenders have a powerful tool to successfully
intimidate defaulting customers into paying rollover fees.
Consequently, through these two practices, lenders greatly
decrease the risk of losing capital. Finally, the risk of losing
capital cannot be that great when one recognizes that lenders
industry labels default as the customer's inability to repay a loan by the
original due date. If that is how the industry defines default, then the risk of
default is very high because the rollover data show that most customers have
to roll over loans. Given how much money payday lenders make on rollovers,

however, default is more appropriately defined as the lender's inability to
collect the original loan amount and finance charge. That risk appears to be
very low.

362. Keest, supra note 44, at 1113.

Consumer advocates state that the

two-week term is required so the "lender can double the finance charge by the
simple expedient of writing a two-week loan instead of a one-month loan." Id.
363. Id. at 1115.
364. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (describing Ortega's

experience with National Money Service).
365. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 617 n.158.
The authors
continued,
If a [payday loan] consumer pays a $15 fee to renew an $85 loan every
two weeks for four months, she has paid $120 total. The lender has
received enough to repay the principal plus a 217% yield on that four-

month $85 loan, but if the [traditional] borrower defaults, the full
principal is still owed.
Id.; see also SKILLERN, supra note 304, at 3.
366. See infra Part II.B.2.
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like Check 'n Go are advertising that if a national bank
partners with it, the bank may receive a 20% return on
equity.367 Based on the foregoing, one has to doubt the
industry's pledge to limit rollovers.
e.

Consumer Responsibility

Related to the discussion of rollover practices is the concept
of consumer responsibility. On the one hand, prohibiting
rollovers constitutes paternalism and consumers should bear
the responsibility for determining how much debt they are
willing to accept and how they plan to repay it. On the other
hand, the horror stories of huge debts justify such a prohibition
and payday lenders should bear some responsibility given that
368
they make no assessment of a consumer's ability to repay,
and given that the average payday loan customer lacks access
to traditional forms of credit. 369
Without accepting
responsibility for a consumer's actions, the industry pledged to
limit rollovers and announced its commitment to encouraging
consumer responsibility. 370 To achieve the best practice of
encouraging consumer responsibility, the CFSA proposed that
its members implement policies and procedures that inform
consumers of the intended use of payday loans as a short-term
cash-flow solution, not as a tool for managing long-term
37 1
financial problems.
As revealed by the Ohio Survey, however, the industry
practice belies its commitment to inform consumers that
payday loans are intended only as a short-term solution. First,
payday lenders advertise that consumers can obtain, in
minutes, payday loans or credit checks without hassles and
without being asked why the loans are needed. 372 Plus, the

367. The advertisement stated in relevant part,
What Would Your Bank Consider To Be A Good ROE?
Now Double That.
Your company could realize an annual 20+% return on equity through
a strategic alliance with Check 'n Go.
368. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text; infra notes 747-49 and
accompanying text.
369. See infra notes 537-47 and accompanying text.
370. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154, at 1.
371. Id.

372. For example, Check$mart's website contains the following:
At Check$mart we will pay up to $500 against your personal check!
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loan applications obtained in the Ohio Survey only requested
information about income, not expenses. 373 Therefore, the
lender does not typically know the consumer's debt-to-income
ratio and cannot assess the customer's ability to repay.
Through these practices, payday lenders embrace a willful
ignorance of relevant information and, consequently, will not
know whether a consumer inappropriately seeks a payday loan
as a temporary fix for a long-term financial problem. These
practices can hardly be considered the "best practice" of
informing the consumer to use the payday loan as a solution for
a short-term problem.
Second, the Ohio Survey revealed that several payday
lenders offered reward programs for repeat customers. For
example, after issuing a payday loan, Kentucky Check
Exchange gave one research assistant a coupon entitling him to
$5 off his next payday loan. 374 Another payday lender stated
that it awards a free music compact disc after the customer
obtains the fifth payday loan. 375 ACE, America's largest checkcasher issuing payday loans, handed one surveyor a sheet
entitled "ACE PLUS BONUS POINTS."376 Under this reward
So you can get the cash you need today for:
" Bills (utilities, credit cards, medical, etc....)
" Grocery Shopping
" Car Repairs
" Rent or Mortgage
* Home Repairs
" Clothing
" Vacation
" Emergencies
Check$mart never asks you to explain the reason why you need the

cash.
Check$mart website, at http://www.checksmart.com (last visited Aug. 24,
2002); see also Check Into Cash, Inc., How Do I Get Started?, at

http://www.checkintocash.com/howitworks.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2002)
("Check into Cash is perfect for times when your budget is stretched by
unexpected expenses.

Such as . . . car repairs, medical expenses, home

emergencies, or maybe you're just trying to get in on a great sale.").
373. See, e.g., First American/Southern Cash Advance, Membership
Application (requesting information about income and no information about
expenses) (on file with author).
374. The company's name listed on the coupon is "Check Exchange, Inc."
Check Exchange Coupon (on file with author).
375. See supra note 167 (explaining that the surveyors were not wired with
any audio or video recording equipment and therefore no direct evidence exists

that this statement was made).
376.

author).

ACE America's Cash Express, ACE Plus Bonus Points (on file with
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program, a customer receives "2 BONUS POINTS FOR EACH
DOLLAR BORROWED" and 1000 bonus points when a payday
loan is repaid on time.3 77 A customer may receive a reward at
four different levels. 378 Upon obtaining 20,000 points, which is
the highest reward level, the customer is entitled to a ten379
minute prepaid telephone card and "$10 CASH NOW!"
Clearly, this program rewards the habitual payday loan
customer. The program does reward timely repayment, but the
380
consumer may borrow from another lender to pay off ACE.
Third, the practice of up-selling also demonstrates that
payday lenders do not adhere to the best practice of fostering
consumer responsibility. In order to preserve limited research
funds, the Ohio Survey restricted research assistants to
borrowing only $50, yet two payday loan companies made the
research assistants take out $100 loans. 38' Perhaps these
lenders wanted to assure themselves of making at least a $15
revenue on each payday loan transaction. 382 At many of the
payday loan outlets, the clerk tried to persuade the research
assistants to take out the maximum loan amount for which
they were approved. 38 3 While it is a normal business tactic, upselling belies the industry's purported commitment to the best
practice of encouraging consumer responsibility. 384 This is

377. Id.
378. Id.
379.

Id.

380. See supra notes 303-08 and accompanying text (discussing rollovers by
customers using multiple payday lenders-the "borrow from Peter to pay
Paul" phenomenon); supra note 335 and accompanying text (noting that ACE,
along with Dollar Financial, withdrew its membership from CFSA because it
did not want to follow the best practice of limiting rollovers to four times).
381. The loan documents on file with the author show that two loans were
taken out in the amount of $100.
382. A $50 loan would yield $7.50.
383. See supra note 167 (explaining that the surveyors were not wired with
any audio or video recording equipment and therefore no direct evidence exists

that this statement was made).
384. The industry is supposed to implement its best practice of encouraging
consumer responsibility by establishing policies and procedures that inform
consumers of the intended use of payday loans as a short-term cash-flow
solution. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154. Encouraging customers to take
out the maximum loan amount appears to be a type of up-selling practice that
urges customers to misuse the stated purpose of payday loans and may result

in long-term financial problems.

While up-selling is a common practice in

America, it is normally considered a deceptive or predatory practice. See
Deborah Goldstein, Note, Protecting Consumers from Predatory Lenders:
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particularly true given the industry's business practices of
refusing to ask the customer for the purpose of the loan, getting
only partial information about the customer's ability to repay,
38 5
and establishing reward programs for repeat customers.
Finally, the use of Tele-Track demonstrates that payday
lenders are not committed to encouraging consumer
responsibility. As explained previously, the majority (twenty
out of twenty-two) of the payday lenders used the services of
Tele-Track and, therefore, knew when a research assistant had
at least one outstanding loan. 386 Each of the four research
assistants, however, obtained at least two loans in less than
two hours. 387 Even though Tele-Track informed these lenders
about existing payday loans, most granted the loans. 388 When
these lenders granted loans even though they knew about preexisting loans, these lenders were turning a blind eye to a
consumer with potentially major financial problems, 38 9 and
evincing their intention not to follow the best practice of
implementing "procedures to inform consumers of the intended
use of the payday advance service." 390 Not once did a payday
loan clerk advise a research assistant to seek credit counseling
services even though "informing customers of the availability of
credit counseling services" represents a best practice procedure
Defining the Problem and Moving Toward Workable Solutions, 35 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 225, 236 (2000) ("Predatory sales practices such as 'upselling' also
push customers into the most profitable products for the lender."). See
generally Jones v. Stevinson's Golden Ford, 36 P.3d 129, 131, 134-35 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2001) (defining up-selling in the auto repair industry and holding that
the defendant wrongfully terminated its employee who refused to follow his
employers practice of up-selling auto parts); John Roddy, ResidentialMortgage
Litigation: Yield Spread Premium "Upselling" and Mortage Loan Payoff
Charges, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 1997, at 471, 473-80
(PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B4-7118, 1997)
(discussing a federal law's ban on up-selling in residential mortgage
transactions), WL 989 PLI/Corp 471.
385. See supra notes 372-84 and accompanying text.
386. See infra App., tbl.3.
387. See supra note 305 (explaining why the surveyors obtained so many
loans so quickly).

388. See supra notes 305-19 and accompanying text (explaining the use of
Tele-Check and how red-flagging was used to deny one surveyor a loan for a
two-week period).
389. Most of the lenders who knew about a pre-existing loan asked why the
researcher needed another loan so soon after the previous one. In response,
the research assistant gave various answers such as, "The loan I got yesterday
wasn't large enough," "My paycheck wasn't big enough," and "I lost money
gambling last night."
390. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
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that the CFSA endorses. 3 9 1
In summary, in light of the Ohio Survey's results, the
business model of payday lenders, the data about multiple
rollovers, and the vulnerability of payday loan customers,
lawmakers should actualize the industry's ostensible
commitment to encouraging consumer responsibility and
limiting rollovers.
A number of states recognize that
consumers who use payday loan services need to be protected
from perpetual indebtedness and have passed statutes limiting
or prohibiting rollovers.3 92 Nevertheless, most statutes do not
define rollovers broadly enough to cover the various forms they
3 93
take or to cover the use of rollovers with different lenders.
Accordingly, lawmakers need to broadly define rollovers and
either limit or prohibit them. To regulate rollovers using
multiple lenders, lawmakers should look to Kentucky or
Florida for guidance. Kentucky law requires payday lenders to
inquire about outstanding payday loans and to deny loans to
those with outstanding debt.3 94 Florida law requires payday
lenders to access a state-managed database and verify that

391. Id.
392. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-106(n) (Michie 2000) (prohibiting
renewals); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-108(1) (2001) (prohibiting consumers from
renewing loans more than once, and requiring the consumer to pay the debt in
cash or its equivalent after such renewal); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.408(1)(b)
(West Supp. 2002) (stating that the statute bans rollovers); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3578.6(7) (West Supp. 2002) (prohibiting a licensee from renewing or
rolling over a deferred presentment transaction or small loan); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-723(15) (2001) (prohibiting the renewal of a loan with the
proceeds of another loan made to the same consumer); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1308-12(12) (Supp. 2001) (prohibiting lenders from renewing payday loans more
than once); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 54-4-65 (Michie Supp. 2002) (prohibiting
payday lenders from renewing or rolling over loans more than four times).
393. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-52-102 (Michie Supp. 2001) (lacking a
definition of the term "renew"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-102 (lacking a
definition of the term "renewal"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.103 (West 1997)
(lacking a definition of "rollovers"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3578.3 (West
1997) (lacking a definition for the terms "renew" or "rollover"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-202 (2001) (lacking a definition of "renew"); N.D. CENT. CODE §
13-08-01 (Supp. 2001) (lacking a definition of "renew" or "renewal"); S.D.
CODIFIED LAwS § 54-1-1 (Michie 1990) (lacking a definition of "renewal");
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-23-102(5) (Supp. 2002) (defining a "rollover" as the
extension or renewal of the term on a payday loan).
394. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(11) (Michie 2002) (stating that if the
customer has only one outstanding loan in an amount less than $500, the
payday lender may lend the customer an amount that, when combined with
the other loan, does not exceed $500).

2002]

PAYDAY LOANS

customers do not have outstanding debt before issuing the
395
payday loans.
2. Inappropriate Collection Practices
While the payday loan industry's rollover practices alone
merit legislative attention, its collection practices, in some
respects, require more attention because they subject payday
loan customers to horrific collection practices not imposed on
consumers who default on traditional forms of credit. 396 Under
the best practices list adopted by the CFSA, members pledge to
follow appropriate collection practices. 397 Using the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act as a guideline, members pledge to be
fair, lawful, and professional in debt collecting and to avoid
using unlawful threats, harassment, or intimidation. 398
Members also pledge to follow the best practice of not
threatening or seeking criminal action against customers who
fail to repay loans. 399 Yet the Ohio Survey obtained loan
applications containing clauses not germane to traditional
unsecured loans that appear to have the purpose of providing
the lenders with enough information to enable them to harass
consumers who have defaulted on loans. 40 0 For example, one
lender required that the consumer waive any privacy claims
against the lender, 40 1 another lender requested that the
consumer describe her "sex, hair color, eye color, height, and
weight,"40 2 and another lender asked that the consumer provide
the make, model, year, and color of his automobiles. 403

395. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(19)(a)-(b).
396. See infra notes 405-514 and accompanying text.
397. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. The Ohio Survey could not accurately gauge how many applications
contained these types of provisions because the majority (68%) of the payday
lenders would not allow the customer to take a copy of the application. See
infra App., tbl. 1.
401. Cashland Payday Loan Application (on file with author). Cashland's
application states, "I waive any privacy claims against Cashland, Inc." Id.
402. Checkland Payday Loan Application (on file with author). Although
these inquiries may be unnecessary because the same information can be
retrieved from the photocopy of the applicant's driver's license, the payday
lender undoubtedly wants the most current description of the applicant.
403. First Check Cash & Advance Payday Loan Application (on file with
author).
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Complaints of inappropriate collection practices fall into
four areas: harassing customers and their employers and
relatives with vexing telephone calls; threatening violence
against customers unable to repay; collecting excessive
damages from customers; and threatening criminal prosecution
against those who fail to repay.40 4 This section of the Article
limits its discussion to collecting excessive damages and
threatening criminal prosecution because more data is
available about these practices and both result in grave
consequences for defaulting payday loan customers. Data
discussed in this section raise the specter of predatory
collection practices and underscore why federal legislation is
needed to curb such practices.
a. Payday Lenders' Collection of Treble Damages
Payday lenders collect excessive damages in lawsuits
against defaulting customers.40 5 As an example, consider the
fate of one Illinois debtor who defaulted on a payday loan of
$240 ($200 loan, $40 fee). 40 6 The payday lender sued seeking a
total of $1260, which equaled the $240 loan, plus $720 in treble
damages (under the Illinois bad-check law), and $300 in
attorney's fees. 40 7 The practice of collecting treble damages
exists in several states,4 0 8 and has come under particular
40 9
scrutiny in the state of Ohio.
Under Ohio law, a victim of a bad-check crime may collect
$200 or treble damages, whichever is greater, in a lawsuit

404. See, e.g., GALLAGLY & DERNOVSEK, supra note 295 (stating that
payday lending abuses include the "[a]ggresive pursuit of late accounts,
including prosecution under 'bad check' laws and notification of employers").
405. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 612 n.127; John Hendren, More
States Allow Triple-Digit Loan Rates Despite Consumer Complaints,
TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Jan. 10, 1999, 1999 WL 2230035.
406. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 612 n.127.
407. Id.
408. See, e.g., id. at 612 & n.127 (discussing payday lenders in Illinois, and
lawsuits filed by payday lenders in Indiana); see also Conte, supra note 304
(discussing treble damages under Ohio law).
409. See Teresa Dixon Murray, State Law Will Help 'Payday' Debtors,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 2, 2000, at 1C (quoting the director of
consumer protection for the Consumer Federation of America who said that it
"hear[s] more complaints about this from Ohio than from anywhere else."),
2000 WL 5148638.
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against the debtor.4 10 Prior to a 2000 amendment, payday
lenders would take advantage of this law, and defaulting
customers found themselves indebted to payday lenders for
more than three times the original loans. 4 11 In a study
conducted by the Legal Aid Society of Dayton, investigators
discovered 381 lawsuits filed in Dayton Municipal Court by five
payday lenders against payday loan debtors,4 12 and found that
these debtors were liable for judgments averaging $749,
413
comprised of treble damages, 10% interest, and court costs.
Furthermore, most of the lawsuits ended in default judgments,
and in 60% of them, courts issued garnishment orders against
the debtors to ensure collection of the judgments by the payday
lenders. 4 14 In a similar study of lawsuits filed in Hamilton
County Municipal Court, at least twelve payday lenders filed
more than 365 complaints over a four-year period, some of
them seeking treble damages. 41 5
The Cincinnati Post
conducted a random sampling of the lawsuits and discovered
that courts awarded 65% of the payday lenders an average

judgment of

$930.416

Moreover, in 46% of the cases won by

lenders, courts issued garnishment orders against the
4 17
debtors.
CFSA best practice number seven states that the payday
4 18
lender will collect debts in a "fair and lawful manner."
Although collecting treble damages may technically be legal,
the practice of using a victim's compensation statute to collect
treble damages is unfair, especially given that payday lenders
do not conduct a pre-loan assessment of the debtor's ability to
repay,4 1 9 and no alternative means of getting a short-term loan

410. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.61 (Anderson 2001). Other jurisdictions
have similar statutes permitting treble damages. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/17-1a (West Supp. 2002).
411. Randy Ludlow, More Payday Loan Abuses Uncovered, CINCINNATI
POST, Feb. 2, 2000, at Al, 2000 WL 3365938.
412. Id.

413. Id.
414. Id.
415.

Conte, supra note 304.

416. Id.

Contrast this average judgment award with Ohio's $500

maximum loan amount.

2002).
417.
418.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.39(A)(1) (Anderson

Conte, supra note 304.
BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.

419. See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text (discussing deficiencies
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exist for the majority of payday loan customers. 42° Moreover,
payday lenders generate substantial revenue from rollovers. 42 1
Because payday lenders do not assess a customer's ability to
repay, and because they know that the post-dated checks they
receive are not good, 422 payday lenders can hardly be classified
as crime victims entitled to collect treble damages.
b. One State's Attempt to Prohibitthe Collection of Treble
Damages
Recognizing that payday lenders were taking advantage of
the crime victim's compensation statute, the Ohio legislature
amended its payday lending law in 2000 to prevent lenders
from using the statute to collect treble damages. 423 The trade
association for Ohio payday lenders approved of this
amendment, 424 implying that they would encourage their
members to comply with the law. However, the Ohio Survey
uncovered payday loan documents suggesting that payday
lenders may pursue treble damages in cases of default.
Checkland's application cites section 2307.61, the Ohio victim's
compensation statute, and states, "I understandI may be sued
for 3 times the [almount of the check or $200.00 whichever is
greater."425 Express Payroll Advance's loan contract states that
it is a member of the CFSA, cites to the same Ohio statute, and
provides, "You may be sued for 3 times the amount or $200.00
in lenders' assessment procedures).
420. See infra notes 517-46 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
borrowing opportunities available to payday loan customers).
421. See supra notes 365-67 and accompanying text (detailing revenue
data).
422. See supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
deficiency of payday lenders in assessing customer's ability to repay). Because
of the payday loan business model, see supra notes 34-45 and accompanying
text, payday lenders know the customers' checks are drawn on accounts with
insufficient funds.
423.

Ohio law now makes it unlawful for a payday lender to "[ciollect treble

damages pursuant to division (A)(1)(b)(ii) of section 2307.61 of the Revised
Code in connection with any civil action to collect a loan after a default due to
a check, negotiable order of withdrawal, share draft, or other negotiable

instrument that was returned or dishonored for insufficient funds." OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1315.41(D) (Anderson 2001). Section 2307.61(A)(1)(b) allows a
victim of a theft crime to collect $200 or treble damages as liquidated
damages, whichever is greater. The amendment does not limit the rights of

other holders of bad checks to seek treble damages.
424. See Randy Ludlow, Senate Approves Payday Loan Bill, CINCINNATI
POST, Apr. 14, 2000, 2000 WL 3372132.

425.

Checkland Payday Loan Application (on file with author).
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whichever is greater, if the check is returned."426 Another
lender, EZ Cash Advance, may be attempting to skirt the new
law by stating that the customer could be liable for double
damages upon default, even though no Ohio law entitles it to
such damages. 427 Its application contains a holding agreement
stating that the defaulting customer may have to pay "foine
hundred dollars or two times the face amount of the check,
whichever is more by award of the court."428 The Ohio Survey
could not gauge the extent to which Ohio lenders are claiming
the ability to collect treble damages, partly because the
majority of the payday lenders refused to provide copies of the
loan applications signed by the researchers who obtained
loans. 429 Because the Ohio Survey could not test for compliance
with Ohio's prohibition on the collection of treble damages, no
one knows whether these lenders would seek double or treble
damages on defaulted loans, or whether these provisions in the
loan documents are simply false representations designed to
intimidate consumers into timely loan repayment.
Payday lenders who threaten or represent the ability to
collect treble damages under Ohio law breach the industry's
commitment to follow appropriate collection practices set forth
430
in Ohio's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
Ordinarily, payday lenders do their own debt collection work
and are therefore not considered "debt collectors" under the
FDCPA definition. 43 1 Nevertheless, the industry purportedly

426. Express Payroll Advance Payday Loan Contract (on file with author).
427. If it sought double damages, EZ Cash Advance might be in violation of
section 1315.39(B), which limits "interest at a rate of five per cent per month,"
and section 1315.41(C), which states that the lender may not "collect, or
receive, directly or indirectly, any additional fees or charges in connection with
a loan, other than fees and charges permitted by" Ohio's check-cashing loan
law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.39(B)-(C) (Anderson Supp. 2000).
428. EZ Cash Advance Payday Loan Application (on file with author).
429. See infra App., tbl.1; see also supra note 168 (explaining how
applications were obtained even though lenders refused to provide copies of
them).
430. The FDCPA was designed "to eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain
from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers
against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000).
431. See id. § 1692a(6) (stating that FDCPA covers third-party debt
collectors). Note that attorneys for debt collectors engaged in litigation are
subject to the provisions of the FDCPA. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294
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committed to follow the FDCPA, and by implication, the
collection practices it recommends. Under the FDCPA, a debt
collector cannot threaten to take action that could not legally be
taken,432 or use false representations or deceptive means in
433
attempting to collect a debt.
In Edwards v. McCormick, a recent Ohio case analogous to
the issue at hand, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant
made an improper threat in violation of the FDCPA when he
mailed a letter claiming a right of foreclosure under state
law.4 34 The letter provided in relevant part, "This creates a lien
on all real property in which either or both of you have an
interest, and if foreclosed upon may result in the forced sale of
those properties. If you wish to avoid this you must contact
this office to arrange payment of this judgement [sic] .,435 The
court found that the claimed right was prohibited under state
law and highlighted the defendant's admission that he never
436
foreclosed upon the residential property of consumer debtors.
Using the "least sophisticated consumer" standard to judge a
violation of the FDCPA,437 the court found that the defendant
"violated [the FDCPA] in that he threatened [p]laintiffs with an
action which he had no intention of taking, and indeed which
he could not legally take."438 The court also found that the
defendant violated the FDCPA because his letter falsely
represented that it had the right to foreclose on the plaintiffs'
home.439

Like the defendant in Edwards v. McCormick, Ohio

(1995).
432. Prohibited conduct includes "[tihe threat to take any action that
cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken." 15 U.S.C. §

1692(e)(5).
433. Prohibited conduct includes "[t]he use of any false representation or
deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain
information concerning a consumer." Id. § 1692e(10).
434. Edwards v. McCormick, 136 F. Supp. 2d 795, 796 (S.D. Ohio 2001).

435. Id. at 804-05.
436. Id. at 805.
437. The "least sophisticated consumer" standard was adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Transworld
Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992).
438. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 805.
439. Id. (citing Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 25-26
(2d Cir. 1989), which found "a violation of [15 U.S.C.] section 1692e(5) and (10)
[where the] clear import of the language, taken as a whole, [was] that some

type of legal action ha[d] already been or [was] about to be initiated and
[could] be averted from running its course only by payment").
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lenders, such as Checkland and Express Payroll Advance, 440
violate the FDCPA because they incorrectly represent that they
have the right to collect treble damages and that the debtors
may be liable for three times the amount of the payday loan.
Failure to comply with the FDCPA constitutes a failure to
follow the industry's best practices standard and is further
evidence that the industry cannot regulate itself and is in need
of federal regulation. 44 1 Many states allow the collection of
treble damages for payment of debts arising out of bad-check
law violations, 442 but only a few states have passed legislation
to prevent payday lenders from taking advantage of such
443
statutes.
Ohio's New Statute Provides an Inadequate Model
The Ohio legislature should be commended for amending
the law to prohibit payday lenders from taking advantage of a
statute that allows crime victims to collect treble damages, but
this amendment does not address the scope of the problem of

c.

440. Both are members of CFSA and are therefore supposedly committed to
following the FDCPA.
441. As stated earlier, members of CFSA have pledged a commitment to
using the FDCPA as a guideline for fair, lawful, and professional debt
collecting. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
442. See, e.g., Timothy J. Moroney, Review of Selected 1995 California
Legislation, 27 PAC. L.J. 478, 478 (1996) (discussing California law, which
allows a payee to collect treble damages from a person who passes a bad
check).
443. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.41(D) (Anderson 2001)
(banning a payday lender from collecting treble damages under section
2307.61(A)(1)(b)(ii)). Unlike Ohio, Colorado and Tennessee narrowed the
scope of remedies that are available to payday lenders. COLO. REV. STAT. § 53.1-112 (2001) (stating that "the lender shall have the right to exercise all civil
means authorized by law to collect the face value of the instrument; except
that the provisions and remedies of section 13-21-109," which includes treble
damages, are not available to the lender); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(i)
(2000) (stating that payday lenders cannot collect, inter alia, treble damages
or attorney's fees). In contrast to Ohio, Colorado, and Tennessee, a few states
give a payday lender the right to pursue all available civil remedies, which
may include treble damages. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 6-1260(J) (West
Supp. 2001). The Arizona statute states as follows:
If a check is returned to the licensee from a payer financial institution
due to insufficient funds, a closed account or a stop payment order,
the licensee may use all available civil remedies to collect on the
check including the imposition of the dishonored check fee prescribed
in § 44-6852.
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inappropriate collection practices. Section 2307.61(A)(1) of the
Ohio Revised Statutes permits a victim of a bad-check crime to
recover actual damages or liquidated damages amounting to
three times the amount of the check or $200.00, whichever is
greater. 444 The amendment to the payday loan statute
expressly disallows the collection of treble damages but makes
no mention of the $200 liquidated damage. 445 The loan
documents of Checkland and Express Payroll Advance state
that the defaulting customer may be liable for $200.446 If a
customer defaults on a $50 payday loan, a payday lender could
use section 2307.61(A)(1)(b) to collect $200-four times the
original loan. 447 For a $75 loan, the lender could recover
$200-almost three times the original loan. The amendment to
the payday loan statute, therefore, fails to protect customers
who default on small loans from paying excessive (quadruple or

444. Section 2307.61(A)(1)(b) stipulates the property owner's recovery as
follows:
(b) Liquidated damages in whichever of the following amounts is
greater:
i) Two hundred dollars;
(ii) Three times the value of the property at the time it was willfully
damaged or was the subject of a theft offense, irrespective of whether
the property is recovered by way of replevin or otherwise, is destroyed
or otherwise damaged, is modified or otherwise altered, or is resalable
at its full market price. This division does not apply to a check,
negotiable order of withdrawal, share draft, or other negotiable
instrument that was returned or dishonored for insufficient funds by a
financial institution if the check, negotiable order of withdrawal,
share draft, or other negotiable instrument was presented by an
individual borrower to a check-cashing business licensed pursuant to
sections 1315.35 to 1315.44 of the Revised Code for a check-cashing
loan transaction.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.61(A)(1)(b) (emphasis added); Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Proctor, No. 98AP-1103, 1999 WL 394884, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 15, 1999) (holding that a "property owner may elect to recover either
compensatory damages pursuant to [section] 2307.61(A)(1)(a), or liquidated
damages pursuant to [section] 2307.61(A)(1)(b)").
445. Under Ohio law, a payday lender cannot "[c]ollect treble damages
pursuant to division (A)(1)(b)(ii) of section 2307.61 of the Revised Code in
connection with any civil action to collect a loan after a default due to a check,
negotiable order of withdrawal, share draft, or other negotiable instrument
that was returned or dishonored for insufficient funds." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1315.41(D) (Anderson 2002).
446. See supra notes 425-26 and accompanying text.
447. See supra note 444 (stating that section 2307.61(A)(1)(b) allows a
victim of a theft crime to collect the greater of $200 or treble damages as
liquidated damages).
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triple) damages. As explained later, payday lenders are not
victims of bad-check crimes and therefore should not be able to

collect $200 from a person who borrowed

$50.448

One may

argue that a lender would not litigate just to collect an extra
$200. On the contrary, a lender may be highly motivated to
litigate because section 2307.61(A)(2) of the Ohio Revised
Statutes allows the victim of a theft offense to recover
reasonable administrative costs, which may include the cost of
maintaining a civil action and attorney's fees.4 49 Payday
lenders can then continue their practice of seeking
garnishment orders against debtors to ensure collection of their
judgments. 450 Thus, Ohio's amended payday loan statute
leaves a lender with an economic incentive to pursue collection
under section 2307.61(A)(2) and fails to protect certain
customers from paying damages three or more times the
original loan.
The amended payday loan statute also unfairly gives
payday lenders the ability to shift litigation costs onto
defaulting customers and incorrectly assumes that the mere
issuance of a post-dated check to a payday lender is a bad-check
crime. 45 1 One may reasonably conclude that section 2307.61 is
a statute designed to protect victims of "willful" offenses. The
heading to section 2307.61 provides in relevant part, "Property
owner may recover for willful damage or theft."452 One court
interpreting a statute similar to section 2307.61 recognized
that it is "a punitive statute intended to deter the wrongdoer
453
and others from engaging in similar future conduct."

448. See infra notes 491-99 and accompanying text.
449. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.61(A)(2).
450. For further discussion on garnishments in lawsuits to collect payday
loans, see supra notes 414-17 and accompanying text.
451. See infra notes 458-59, 491-99 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying note 460.
452. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.61.
453. Hart Conversions, Inc. v. Pyramid Seating Co., 658 N.E.2d 129, 131
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (interpreting Indiana Code, section 34-4-30-1, and holding
that the right to treble damages under the statute is personal and not
assignable). Section 34-4-30-1, as then interpreted by the court, provided,
If a person suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of I.C. 3543 [bad check law], he may bring a civil action against the person who
caused the loss for:
(1) an amount equal to three (3) times his actual damages;
(2) the costs of the action;
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee.
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Assume a payday lender has filed a lawsuit against an
individual who defaulted on a $50 payday loan. The lender
could rely on section 2307.61 to recover $450-the combination
of $200 as compensatory damages, $50 as court costs, and $200
as attorney's fees. 454 By prohibiting the collection of treble
damages under section 2307.61(A)(1)(b)(ii), but remaining
silent about the statutory language allowing fee-shifting and a
$200 damage award, the Ohio legislature implicitly condones
the fee-shifting and damage award as a fair collection practice.
Payday lenders should not be able to recover anything
under section 2307.61 or other similar statutes because they
are not victims of a willful theft crime; these lenders take a
postdated check from a consumer knowing the check is not
good, and they issue a loan without doing any pre-loan
assessment of the consumer's ability to repay. As discussed in
the next section, Ohio case law makes it clear that a debtor
does not commit the crime of passing a bad check if the payee
takes a post-dated check with knowledge that the debtor has
insufficient funds in her account to cover the check.4 5 5 Because
the Ohio amended payday loan statute does not comport with
judicial precedent, it leaves a loophole for payday lenders to
exploit consumers and therefore should not be followed as the
best model of prohibiting the collection of excessive damages.
d. Payday Lenders Threaten CriminalProsecutionAgainst
Customers
State lawmakers seeking to afford their citizens the
greatest consumer protection not only need to close the loophole
that allows payday lenders to collect excessive damages but
also need to close any loophole that allows lenders to use the
criminal justice system as a collection agency. Because payday
lenders usually issue loans via post-dated checks, 4 56 one should
not be surprised to discover that many payday lenders threaten
customers who fail to timely repay with criminal prosecution
for writing bad checks.4 5 7
Naturally, the threat of
imprisonment embodies a powerful debt collection tactic
Id. at 130 n.1.
454. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.61.
455. See infra notes 478, 491-99 and accompanying text.
456. While payday lenders generally require postdated checks, payday
lending over the Internet is a growing business, and practical realities
preclude Internet lenders from taking post-dated checks.
457. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.d.
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because most people know that writing a bad check is a crime,
and therefore will find a way to repay the loan to avoid going to
jail.458 To curb this abusive collection practice, members of the

CFSA have pledged to follow the best practice of not
threatening or seeking criminal action against customers who
fail to repay loans. 459 No study could adequately test industry
compliance with this best practice because participants would
have to risk going to prison and damaging their credit histories
to test such compliance. Nevertheless, available evidence
shows that payday lenders threaten prosecution across the
nation-even in jurisdictions where governmental attorneys
will not pursue bad-check convictions against payday
borrowers. 460 In other jurisdictions, some prosecutors and
judges unwittingly assist payday lenders in abusing bad-check
statutes because the prosecutors and judges fail461to distinguish
payday loan cases from typical bad-check cases.
While a number of prosecutors do not allow payday loan
debtors to be prosecuted for bad-check crimes, 462 no shortage of

458. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 610; Karen Gross, The Debtor as
Modern Day Peon:A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 165, 191 (1990) ("[Creditors collect] because debtors fear the
consequences of being charged and convicted of a crime. The bad check laws
are criminal laws in name but not in purpose.").
459. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
460. See infra notes 466-71 and accompanying text.
461. Using state courts and criminal laws to facilitate debt collection is not
unique to payday lending. See Philip J. Hendel & Joseph H. Reinhardt,
Inhibiting Post-Petition "Bad Check" Criminal Proceedings Against Debtors:
The Need for Flexing More JudicialMuscle, 89 COM. L.J. 236 (1984); Donald J.
Schutz, Bankruptcy and the Prosecutor: When Creditors Use Criminal Courts
to Collect Debts, FLA. B.J., May 1985, at 11 (stating that creditors "further
collection efforts by threatening criminal prosecution of a debtor" and that
writing bad checks is the most common crime of a debtor).
462. Tracey Bruce, Small-Loan Firms Showing Growth in County, ST.
LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2000 (quoting senior counsel for Missouri's
Division of Finance as stating that while a few prosecutors bring bad-check
charges against customers who default on payday loans, most write a letter on
behalf of the loan company without bringing any action, and some even inform
payday lenders that the prosecutor is not a collection agency), 2000 WL
3548643; Dave Hosick, Some Payday Loans Are Ruled Illegal, EVANSVILLE
COURIER & PRESS (Evansville, Ind.), Jan. 20, 2000 (quoting Vanderburgh
County Superior Court Judge Maurice O'Connor as stating that local judges
have ceased progress on payday loan cases in anticipation of the attorney
general's ruling making payday loans illegal), 2000 WL 11829105; Steve
Jordon, Quick Cash, High Fees: More Are Using Loans to Make It to Next
Payday, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Apr. 9, 2000 (indicating that a Douglas
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stories exists about payday lenders filing criminal complaints
and threatening consumers with criminal prosecution. 463 A
state regulator in Texas discovered that in one year, payday
lenders filed over 13,000 criminal complaints against customers
464
who defaulted on payday loans in one Dallas precinct alone.
In Alabama, a nineteen-year-old working mother had to post
bail to get out of jail after a payday lender had her arrested for
defaulting on a $200 loan carrying a 520% APR. 4 65 In Florida,
a Hispanic woman stated that payday lenders threatened 466
to
have her deported or imprisoned unless she repaid the loan.
In Kentucky, a few borrowers were arrested even though most
judges and prosecutors took the position that payday loan
467
transactions were not subject to bad-check laws.
County, Nebraska prosecutor concluded that post-dated checks are promissory
notes, rather than checks covered by the criminal bad-check statute because
he recognized the difficulty of proving criminal intent when the payee knows
the check is not good), 2000 WL 4360924; Bruce Ross, 650 Percent Interest,
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Apr. 2, 2000 (stating that Santa Fe's chief deputy

district attorney was not aware of any payday loan check cases handled by his
office), 2000 WL 20615658; Larry Rulison, Regulator Says Payday Lenders
Abusing Courts, BALT. BUS. J., July 14, 2000, http://www.bizjournals.com/
baltimore/stories/2000/07/17/newscolumnl.html
(noting that Maryland's
Commissioner of Financial Regulation stated that bad checks originating from
payday loans are not enforceable in court).
463. Jim Leusner, Florida Will Join County in Payday Loan Lawsuit, THE
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 2001 (reporting that the state of Florida joined a

class action lawsuit in which one plaintiff who borrowed money from ACE
alleged that she was threatened with criminal prosecution after her check
bounced), 2001 WL 12166754; Good Morning America: Quick Cash Loan
Outlets Cash Loan Warning (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 1, 1999)
(reporting comments by Jean Ann Fox of the Consumer Federation of America
in which she stated that many consumers report lenders threatening to throw
them in jail), 1999 WL 10493218.
464. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 610.
465. Dean Foust et al., Easy Money: Subprime Lenders Make a Killing
Catering to Poorer Americans, BUS. WK., Apr. 24, 2000 (stating that after a
lender promised to give a woman a few more days to repay the loan, it
deposited the check, which bounced, and then it sent the local sheriff to arrest
her), 2000 WL 7825965; John Hendren, Exorbitant 'Payday Loans' Tide over
the Desperate, Line Lenders' Pockets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1999, 1999 WL
2123661; see also Melissa Wahl, Payday Loans Can Force Workers into Deeper
Debt, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, May 21, 2000 (describing a

Chicago working mother, who paid a payday lender almost $10,000 over two
years and stated that she almost went to jail for defaulting on the loan), 2000
WL 2609149.
466.

Ann Hayes Peterson, Payday Loans, CREDIT UNION MAG., Dec. 1,

2000 (telling the story of a woman who went to eight different payday lenders
and incurred $2,400 in fees before she contacted a local television station's
consumer reporter), 2000 WL 11799761.
467. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 611 n.123. Problems with payday
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In states where lenders know prosecutors do not seek
convictions against payday borrowers, some lenders resort to
underhanded tactics to intimidate consumers to repay loans.
For example, in Ohio, a low-income housekeeper filed a
complaint against First American Ca$h Advance alleging that,
in addition to threatening her with criminal prosecution, the
payday lender sent her a counterfeit complaint containing a
4 68
phony date on which she supposedly had to appear in court.
After losing peace of mind, a night of sleep, and a day of work,
she appeared in court only to discover from the county clerk
that the complaint had never been filed and the court date had
been fabricated.4 69 In Florida, a state regulator shut down one
payday lender who was using counterfeit stationary from the
Martin County Sheriffs Office to threaten defaulting
customers. 470 In Illinois, Nationwide Budget Finance closed
twenty-six stores after settling a lawsuit arising from a
criminal prosecution threat contained in a postcard sent by
471
Nationwide to a payday loan customer.
Normally, a consumer does not commit a crime when he or
she defaults on a loan. Payday loan customers, however, may
be subject to criminal prosecution because states criminalize
lenders seeking to prosecute debtors were significant enough to move the
Kentucky legislature to amend its payday loan statute to require that lenders
post a notice informing customers that they are not subject to criminal
prosecution. Id. at 610-11.
468. Compl. at 4-5, Lille Evans v. Union Mgmt. Co., (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. filed
Oct. 24, 2000) (No. A0006694) (on file with author).
469. Id. at 5-6. Note that the county clerk advised Ms. Evans to hire a
lawyer.
470. Scott Bernard Nelson, Group Assails Payday Lenders, TAMPA TRIB.,
Nov. 11, 1998, 1998 WL 13784457.
471. Martha Neil, Payday Lender to End Operations Here, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Dec. 21, 1999, at 3 (reporting that Nationwide Budget Finance, a St.
Louis-based payday loan company, settled the litigation for over $700,000); see
also Earl Golz, "PaydayLenders" Sued over High Interest Rates, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, May 13, 1999 (indicating that payday lender Cash Today
threatens enlisting the help of local law enforcement to collect debts owed by
customers), 1999 WL 7412336; Helen Huntley, Borrower Sues Area Payday
Loan Firm, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 22, 1999 (describing a Chicago
customer who filed a lawsuit against Florida-based All-State Pay Day Advance
Inc., alleging that after she defaulted, the lender faxed her a letter stating
that she would be prosecuted, and warning customers of possible penalties,
including jail time and fines), 1999 WL 27323640; Steve Jordon, Nebraska
"PaydayLenders" Lure Some Borrowers into Endless Cycle of Debt, KNIGHTRIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Apr. 11, 2000 (quoting Senator David Landis of
Lincoln, Nebraska, as saying that he was informed of a payday lender who
mailed copies of the bad-check criminal statute as part of its collection efforts),
2000 WL 19315278.
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the issuance of a check when the person's account has
insufficient funds to cover the check. 472 For instance, under
Ohio law, "[n]o person, with purpose to defraud, shall issue...
a check or other negotiable instrument, knowing that it will be
dishonored."473 Ohio law presumes that a person knew his or
her check would be dishonored if the person did not make
payment within ten days after receiving notice that the check
had been dishonored. 474 A cursory reading of Ohio law and
similar statutes from other states may lead one to believe that
payday loan customers should simply plead guilty to the crime
of writing bad checks. In the majority of jurisdictions, however,
payday loan customers cannot be convicted for passing bad
checks. In some states, lawmakers have statutorily excluded
post-dated checks from the definition of the bad-check crime. 475
In other states, judicial precedent holds that drawers cannot be
convicted under bad-check criminal statutes if the payee took a
postdated check with an understanding that the check was not
476
then payable from drawer's bank account.
Even though bad-check laws in the majority of states favor
payday loan customers, some lenders use the criminal justice
system as its debt collection agency because prosecutors and
judges either are unaware of judicial precedent or are
unfamiliar with the mechanics of payday loans. This section
analyzes Ohio bad-check law because the author was able to
secure documents revealing that Ohioans who default on

472. Legislation, 44 HARv. L. REV. 451, 453 (1931) (observing that all
states impose criminal liability for writing bad checks, except Vermont).
473. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.11(A) (Anderson 1995).

474. Id. § 2913.11(B)(2). The presumption established under section
2913.11(B) is rebuttable. State v. Powers, No. 92 CA 10, 1993 WL 278456, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
475. See, e.g., 2002 Md. Laws ch. 26, § 2, WL MD LEGIS 26 (2002) (to be
codified at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-101(b)) (amending article 27,
section 140(a), of the Maryland Annotated Code of 1957, but still indicating
that the bad-check statute applies only to a check "that is not postdated at the
time it is issued"); Banderas v. State, 372 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (upholding a state law that precluded criminal prosecution of postdated
checks returned for insufficient funds).
476.

See, e.g., 32 AM. JUR. 2D False Pretenses § 73 (1995) ("A postdated,

worthless check relieves the drawer of responsibility, since the check implies
on its face a present insufficiency of funds .... "); John Perovich, Annotation,
Application of "Bad Check" Statute with Respect to Postdated Checks, 52

A.L.R.3d 464, 483-84 (1973) (summarizing state precedent, which holds that
accepting a postdated check precludes application of bad-check laws).

2002]

PAYDAY LOANS

payday loans have reason to fear prosecution. The Prosecutor's
Division of the Columbus City Attorney's Office operates a
check mediation program for debtors who have a complaint for
passing a bad check filed against them. 477

Some payday

lenders in Columbus use this program. 478 In the notification
letter that the Prosecutor's Division sends to debtors, the
following warning is provided to debtors participating in the
program:
If there is no resolution and the complaint is deemed valid, a criminal
charge of Passing Bad Check(s) may be filed. Once a criminal charge
is filed it cannot be dropped, even if restitution is made. Passing bad
[ciheck(s) is a crime under Columbus City Code Section 2313.11 and
Ohio Revised Code Section 2913.11. A conviction to this charge could
result in a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment and/or a
$1000 fine." 9

The author suggested to the coordinator of the program that
the letters sent to payday loan debtors should state that the
debtor is not subject to criminal prosecution because intent to
The coordinator stated that the
defraud is lacking.4 80
prosecutor wanted the letters to be uniform irrespective of the
The prosecutor's notice letter to payday loan
facts.4 8 '
customers directly contradicts Ohio case law, which holds that
no crime is committed when the payee knows that, at the time
it takes the check, the funds in the debtor's account are
insufficient to cover the check.4 82 Needless to say, the notice

477. See Memorandum from the Check Resolution Program, to All Staff
and All Participating Agencies (Feb. 5, 2001) (on file with author).
478. Telephone Interview with Barbara A. Williams, Coordinator, Bad
Check Program, Columbus City Attorney's Office (June 7, 2001).
479. Letter from Columbus City Attorney's Office to Potential Check Fraud
Defendants (on file with author). Note the author invoked a state "sunshine"
law to obtain a copy.
480. Telephone Interview, supra note 478.
481. See id.
482. Koenig v. State, 167 N.E. 385, 388 (Ohio 1929). In Koenig, the
defendant testified that he had informed the bank employee that he did not
currently have sufficient funds and asked the bank to hold the check for a few
days so he would be able to deposit such funds. Id. The court held that
[ilf the accused advised the Farmers' Bank prior to the issuing of
checks that he did not then have the funds on deposit, or credit
arranged for that would cause the check to be paid on presentation,
then manifestly the bank was not deceived by any misrepresentation,
and the issuing of a check under such conditions would not be a
procurement of the funds of the bank with an intent to defraud, as
stated in the statute.
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letter will breathe life into the words of those payday lenders
who threaten criminal prosecution and cause payday loan
customers who receive the notice letter to fear imprisonment
and resort to any means to pay off the debts. In fact, the Ohio
survey found one loan contract stating, "Borrower understands
that the issuance of such check was a condition of Lender in
making this loan; and that in the event such check is issued in
violation of the [Ohio Revised Code] section 2913.11 (Passing
Bad Checks), Borrower can be held criminally and civilly
483
liable.,
Payday loan debtors in Ohio not only have the threat of
prosecution from state prosecutors looming over their heads,
but, in some counties, they are actually subject to bad-check
prosecution. In Morrow County, payday lenders are registering
criminal complaints against payday loan customers. As an
example, consider the complaint registered by Checkloan with
the Morrow County Prosecuting Attorney's Office against
Joshua Evans, who defaulted on a payday loan evidenced by a
postdated check in the amount of $201.25.484 The state charged
Mr. Evans with passing a bad check in violation of section
2913.11(A) of the Ohio Revised Code. 485 At his initial
appearance, Mr. Evans, who was not represented by counsel,
pled no contest, and the judge entered a guilty finding against
him. 486 For his crime, Mr. Evans was sentenced to serve ten
days in the county jail, and fined $250, in addition to court
Id. at 388. Even though a customer may not have explicitly informed a
payday lender that there were not sufficient funds to cover her post-dated
checks, knowledge or understanding by the payee that the drawer of the check
has insufficient funds negates the intent to defraud. State v. Creachbaum,
263 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970), affd, 276 N.E.2d 240 (Ohio 1971).
In Creachbaum, the defendant (drawer) was check kiting, "a scheme whereby
false credit is obtained by the exchange and passing of worthless checks
between two banks." Id. at 678. At some point, the bank manager became
aware of what the defendant was doing and realized that he really did not
have sufficient funds in either account. Id. at 676. This realization led the
court to hold that "it was within the knowledge of [the payee] that there were
insufficient funds to cover the checks," which "destroyed the intent to
defraud." Id. at 679-80. Therefore, express communication to the payee is not
necessary as long as the facts and circumstances support an understanding or
knowledge that there are insufficient funds. Id. at 679.
483. Checkland Payday Loan Contract (emphasis added) (on file with
author).
484. Compl., State v. Evans, (Ohio County Ct. filed Mar. 9, 2001) (No. 01CRB- 2097) (on file with author).
485. State v. Evans, No. 01-CRB-2097 (Ohio County Ct. Mar. 22, 2001) (no
slip opinion, on file with author).
486. Id.
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costs and the $201.25 judgment against him.4 87 The judge
suspended Mr. Evans's sentence on the condition that Mr.
Evans perform four days of community service, pay $231.25,
and have no similar law violations for twelve months.4 88 Prior
to entering Mr. Evans's plea, the judge explained to Mr. Evans
his rights. 489 Tragically, Mr. Evans did not have a lawyer or a
knowledgeable judge to inform him that Ohio precedent holds
that intent to defraud is necessary and therefore a bad-check
conviction is not sustainable if the payee took the check with
knowledge that the debtor's bank account was insufficient to
490
cover the check.
Fortunately for payday loan customers in other localities,
some judges distinguish payday loan cases from typical badcheck fraud cases and, accordingly, will not treat payday loan
debtors as criminals. In State v. Sparks, the state charged a
payday loan customer with two counts of passing bad checks in
violation of section 2913.11.491 The lender, Ohio Valley Check
Cashing & Loan, required the customer to issue it two checks
in order for her to borrow $500, with a fee of $75 (amounting to
an APR 391%).492 Ohio Valley agreed not to cash the checks
until November 17, 1998, but waited until February 8, 1999, to
attempt to cash them.4 93 By then, the customer had closed her

487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Id.
490.

Id.; see supra note 482 and accompanying text.

491. State v. Sparks, 99 CRB 936-1-2, at 1 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Aug. 26, 1999)
(no slip opinion, on file with author).
492. Id. at 1-2. The lender could have easily required the customer to issue
one check in the amount of $500. The practice of requiring the customer to
issue two checks has been criticized as an attempt by lenders to generate
additional fees. In Bellizan v. Easy Money of Louisiana, Inc., a class of
plaintiffs alleged that payday loan defendants required customers to issue one
check on one date for part of the desired loan amount and then return a few
days later and issue another check for the remaining amount so that

defendant could exact a second set of fees. No. CIV.A.00-2949, 2001 WL
121909, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2001). This alleged practice sustained a cause
of action under the statute that was in force at the time the loans were made,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3577.6(A)(4) (West Supp. 1997) (repealed 1999), and a
current statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3578.6(A)(4) (West Supp. 2002), which
provides that a "[small loan] licensee shall not . . . [dlivide a deferred
presentment transaction or small loan into multiple agreements for the
purpose of obtaining a higher fee or charge." Bellizan, 2001 WL 121909, at *2,
*5 (denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims).
493. Sparks, 99 CRB 936-1-2 at 2.
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bank account. 494 Ohio Valley then sent the customer a certified
letter notifying her that the checks had been dishonored and
demanding that she repay or risk being referred to the
prosecutor. 495 She failed to make payment within ten days
after the notice. 496 The court noted that the statutory
presumption regarding intent to defraud is triggered if the
check is dishonored upon presentment within thirty days after
it is issued or the stated date, whichever is later, and that the
defendant customer failed to pay within ten days after
receiving notice that her check had been dishonored. 497 Relying
on precedent, the court found the intent to defraud lacking
because "Ohio Valley Check Cashing & Loan entered into a
consumer loan agreement with the [d]efendant knowing full
well that she did not have funds in her checking account at the
time [it] loaned her $500."498 The court further explained that

"these matters constitute, at most, a breach of contract upon
which the victim is entitled to civil remedies." 499
Notably, the court in State v. Sparks suggested that Ohio
Valley instructed the customer to write two checks instead of
one so that a prosecutor who favored prosecuting payday loan
customers could be assigned to bad check cases arising from
payday loans:
Defendant was required to tender two checks for repayment of her
loan rather than one. If she had tendered one check the amount
would have exceeded $500.00 which would cause this matter to be
returned to Washington County Prosecutor Michael Spahr for felony
charges. By accepting two checks in an amount less than $500.00
these matters would be considered misdemeanors and referred to the

Marietta City Law Director for prosecution. Apparently, Prosecuting
Attorney Michael Spahr does not feel that this is a criminal offense
and has refused to prosecute these cases.5 °°

The presence of counsel for the customer allowed her to thwart
Ohio Valley's plot to obtain a conviction through the ignorance

494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 3. The court rejected a presumption of intent based on the
defendant's closing of her bank account because Ohio Valley did not present

the checks to the bank until well after the thirty-day time limit. Id.
498.

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).

499. Id. at 5.
500. Id. at 4.
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of a few local attorneys and judges.5 0
Rather than leaving the issue of criminal prosecution of
payday loan customers to prosecutors and judges, several
states ban bad-check prosecution outright 50 2 while others allow
it if a customer's check was dishonored because the customer
closed his or her bank account and/or stopped payment on the
check.50 3 As additional consumer protection, a few states
require lenders to provide certain notices to the consumers.
For example, in Kentucky, payday lenders must post in their
stores a sign with the following words: "No person who enters
into a post-dated check or deferred deposit check transaction
with this business establishment will be prosecuted or
convicted of writing cold checks or of theft by deception under
the provisions of KRS 514.040."504 A few states require the
loan contract to contain a similar notice. 50 5 States recognize
50 6
the need of consumers to obtain unsecured short-term loans,
but realize that consumers must have basic protections from
those payday lenders who have discarded ethics and are driven
by greed. Long ago, the United States progressively did away
with debtors' prisons and adopted the policy that people should
not be criminalized for failure to pay their debts.5 0 7 It decided

501. Compare id., with State v. Evans, 01-CRB-2097 (Ohio County Ct. Mar.
22, 2001) (no slip opinion, on file with author), and supra text accompanying

notes 485-91.
502.

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 6-1260J

(West Supp. 2001)

(prohibiting criminal prosecution of payday loan customers); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 45-17-112(i) (Supp. 2001) (establishing a complete prohibition against

criminal prosecution).
503. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 480F-6(d) (Supp. 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 13-08-12(8) (Supp. 2001) (establishing that a payday loan customer is subject

to criminal prosecution if "the account on which the check was written was
closed on the original date of the transaction").
504.
505.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(18) (Michie 2002).
See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(20)(2) (West Supp.

2002)

(requiring payday loan contracts to include the following: "YOU CANNOT BE
PROSECUTED IN CRIMINAL COURT FOR A CHECK WRITTEN UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT, BUT ALL LEGALLY AVAILABLE CIVIL MEANS TO
ENFORCE THE DEBT MAY BE PURSUED AGAINST YOU."); MONT. CODE

ANN. § 31-1-721(2)(d) (requiring the following statement immediately before
the consumer's signature line: "you cannot be prosecuted in criminal court for
collection of this loan").
506. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3578.2 (West Supp. 2002) ("These loans meet a
legitimate credit need for many consumers .... ).
507. As one scholar observed, "Imprisonment for debt was commonplace in
the colonies and then in the states, until the mid-nineteenth century."

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1

that imprisonment of debtors imposes great costs to society and
prevents debtors from earning wages to repay their debts. 50 8 In
view of the foregoing, state lawmakers should act in accord
with progressive thinking and enact laws that protect payday
loan customers from bad-check prosecution. Payday lenders
will then be on equal footing with other creditors who must
resort to the civil court system to recover damages arising from
a debtor's breach. 50 9
As long as payday lenders have the ability to use the
criminal justice system as a collection agency, they possess a
strong economic incentive to threaten customers with criminal
prosecution. Payday loan customers will do whatever it takes
to keep from going to jail; thus, payday lenders are assured of
getting paid as long as consumers fear imprisonment. 51 0
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12 (1995). See generally PETER J.
COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA (1974) (describing America's

treatment of insolvent debtors during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries). Thereafter, most states amended their constitutions to prohibit
such imprisonments. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 332 n.41 (1991); Becky A.
Vogt, Note, State v. Allison: Imprisonment for Debt in South Dakota, 46 S.D.
L. REV. 334, 335 n.9 (2001) (listing forty-one states with constitutions banning
imprisonments for debt).
508. Gary Klein, Consumer Bankruptcy in the Balance: The National
Bankruptcy Review Commission's Recommendations Tilt Toward Creditors, 5
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 293, 322 n.177 (1997) ("Debtor's prisons would do
little to enhance creditor recoveries since it is hard to earn wages from prison
and imprisonment would have enormous social costs."); Meeting of OASCIDIP-VI DraftingCommittee on Secured TransactionsConference Transcript,
Day One, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 334, 389 (2001) ("[T~he debtor who is
best able to repay a debt is not the one who is in prison but the one who is
gainfully employed.").
509. As the court stated in State v. Sparks, a customer's inability to repay a
payday loan would "constitute, at most, a breach of contract upon which the
victim is entitled to civil remedies." 99 CRB 936-1-2, at *5 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
Aug. 26, 1999) (no slip opinion, on file with author).
510. At Christ the King Parish in Kansas City, church parishioners,
"noticing a 50 percent increase in demand at [the church's] food pantry over
the last four years, learned from interviewing emergency assistance clients
that 80 percent of them owed money to a payday loan company." Kevin Kelly,
Christ the King CCO Targets Payday Loan Industry, THE CATHOLIC KEY
(Kansas City), Mar. 3, 2001, http://www.catholickey.org/index.php3?archive
=1&gif=news.gif&mode=view&issue=20010401&articleid=1306 (last visited
Oct. 18, 2002). Within five blocks of the church are seven payday lenders and
two banks. Id. No doubt many of these consumers are paying rollover fees,
instead of buying food, because some payday lenders in Missouri seek criminal
prosecution of their customers. Bruce, supra note 462 (quoting senior counsel
for Missouri's Division of Finance as stating that a few prosecutors bring badcheck charges against customers who default on payday loans). After hearing
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Therefore, one can expect that in the absence of legislative
measures passed to protect consumers, too many lenders will
not follow the best practice of forbearing criminal prosecution.
They stand to gain too much money to be guided by scruples.
In summary, consumers who take out payday loans may
experience even greater financial stress and a litigative
nightmare. As the Ohio Survey demonstrates, consumers seek
out payday lenders because these lenders promise fast and easy
cash, yet lenders disburse loan proceeds with proportional
measures of duplicity and misinformation by evading loan
disclosure requirements.5 1'
Payday loan customers face
rollovers that turn a two-week loan into a long-term financial
obligation costing hundreds of dollars more than initially
agreed. 5 12 Other borrowers face punitive legal measures in the
5 13
form of treble damage remedies and criminal prosecution.
Payday lenders have managed to engage in egregious practices
that one would expect to evoke the rejection and hostility of the
free market, not to mention the wrath of democratically elected
legislative bodies. Instead, the industry has experienced
phenomenal growth.5 14 Clearly, payday lending presents a case
where market imperfections compel government intervention.
As a means of illuminating the type and manner of regulation
needed, the next section explores why payday lending has
managed to thrive and create the prevailing climate of
consumer exploitation.
III. ECONOMIC REALITIES AND CURRENT LAW PERMIT
CONSUMER EXPLOITATION
The previous sections of this Article highlight the
significant consumer protection concerns arising with the
growth of payday lending. As both the Ohio Survey conducted
specifically for this article and the significant evidence collected
from other jurisdictions amply demonstrate, predatory
practices permeate the payday lending industry. Crafting
confessions from parishioners, the late Monsignor John Egan, a Catholic
priest in Chicago, was shocked to discover that many of them were hopelessly
in debt after borrowing from payday lenders. Foust, supra note 465. He
scraped together $720 to help one working mother with two dependents pay
off two payday lenders. Id.
511. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
512. See supra notes 274-92 and accompanying text.
513. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
514. See supra notes 21, 55, 63.
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effective regulation to resolve these consumer protection issues
requires an understanding of the economic realities faced by
typical payday loan customers.
The demographic data
presented in section A below suggest why the principles of
freedom of contract and free enterprise fail to empower these
consumers in any meaningful way. The data demonstrate why
a largely unregulated free market has led to what is best
characterized in the payday lending context as economic
exploitation rather than efficiency. As the data suggest,
sharply limited personal financial resources leave a large
proportion of payday loan customers with few consumer credit
options but, nonetheless, with a substantial and frequent need
for short-term credit.5 15 Accordingly, they find themselves at
the mercy of payday lenders.5 16 Presented with a captive
customer base, payday lenders have had little trouble evading
the regulation currently on the books. They have done so by
exploiting a variety of legal loopholes and regulatory gaps, as
5 17
described in section B.
A. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA ABOUT PAYDAY LOAN CUSTOMERS

Payday lenders market their loan product to cash-strapped
5 18
consumers lacking access to traditional forms of credit.
Discerning the correct image of the average payday loan
customer depends on whether one finds persuasive selfreported information from payday lenders or demographic data
from regulatory agencies and consumer advocates. According

515. Melissa Allison, PoorerAreas Also Poor in Bank Branches, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 25, 2001, § 5, at 1 (explaining that a shortage of banks creates few
alternatives in poor neighborhoods forcing consumers to either pay higher
rates at a check-cashing store to cash payroll checks even though a direct
deposit option at a local bank is free or pay a higher interest rate on a loan
with a payday lender even though a loan from the bank is available at a more
reasonable rate), available at 2001 WL 30795327; Allison, supra note 30
("[M]any minority and low-income neighborhoods have fewer bank branches
than they have payday loan shops and currency exchanges, which typically
cost less to operate and charge higher fees.").
516. Barbara A. Rehm, Payday Lenders Try Standard Approach to
Respectability, AM. BANKER, Jan. 24, 2000, at 3 (stating that according to the
CFSA's executive director, James Zaniello, payday lenders "stepped into a
market that banks abandoned [given that] banks rarely make loans for less
than $1000"), availableat 2000 WL 3359121.
517. See also discussion supra Part I.B.2 (explaining the payday lending
industry's use of "sham transactions" to avoid making TILA disclosures).
518. See infra notes 537-47 and accompanying text.
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to the industry, the median annual income of a payday loan
borrower is $35,000. 519 In a recent study funded in part by the
payday loan industry,5 20 Georgetown University professors,
using data supplied by payday lenders, conducted telephone
interviews of the customers and reported that 51.5% have

moderate

incomes

ranging

from $25,000

to

$49,999.521

Compare this finding with a 2001 study by the Wisconsin
Department of Financial Institutions that reported an average
gross income of $24,673,522 a 1999 study of data collected by the
Illinois Department of Financial Institutions that found an
average income of $25,131,523 and a study by the California
office of Consumers' Union that calculated an average annual
income of $25,417.524 In the six states where over half of the
nation's payday lenders are located, the median incomes are
below the national median, and in four of them, the poverty
rates are above average. 525 Based on the foregoing, one may
conclude that payday loan customers are primarily low-tomoderate income consumers who have personal checking
accounts.5 26 This group of consumers 527
comprises America's
largest and fastest growing income group.
Although the Georgetown study asked questions about the
gender and racial background of the customers, 528 the study

519. Miller, supra note 20, at 120.
520. GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD
CTR.,

C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH
PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER

DEMAND, at iii (2001), at http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/order/Mono35.pdf (last
visited Aug. 28, 2002) (reporting the results of a study funded by the CFSA,
the payday loan industry's national trade association). The authors of the
Georgetown study admit that it is not "necessarily representative of all payday
customers." Id. at 19.
521. Id. at iv, 19, 28-29. Of the 2196 customers, only 427 completed
telephone interviews and 726 (or 33.1%) quit the interviews after denying
using payday loans. Id. at 21.
522. REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN WISCONSIN, supra note 291, at 5,
http://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/site/newsroompress/payday-joan-may
_2001.pdf.
523. Keest, supra note 44, at 1111 n.2 (indicating that the $25,131 salary is
only 60% of Illinois's median income).
524. Id.
525. Id. at 1112 (indicating that more than half of the nation's payday
lenders are in Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi, Tennessee, South Carolina,
and North Carolina).
526. Miller, supra note 20, at 119.
527. Id.
528.

ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at 84.
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reports no data about the gender or racial makeup of the
customers surveyed. 529 Both the Wisconsin and Illinois studies
found that the majority of payday loan customers were
female. 530 Lenders, in fact, target welfare recipients, the
overwhelming majority of whom are women. 531 The American
Association of Retired People (AARP) analyzed locations of
check-cashing outlets, over half of which offer payday loan
services, and found that "low-income and minority households
are significantly more likely to have [check-cashing outlets]
located within one mile of their homes than higher-income and
nonminority households." 532 A recent study on participants in
the Illinois study found payday lending in areas with a high
minority population while the Consumers' Union's study found
the highest concentration of payday lenders near military bases
in California. 533 Both Illinois and Consumers' Union discovered

529. Id. at 32-33 (stating that the majority have some college education).
530. REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN WISCONSIN, supra note 291, at 5
(indicating that 54% were female), http://www.wdfi.org/_resources/indexed/
site/newsroom/press/paday loan may_2001.pdf; Fox & Mierzwinski, supra
note 63, at 6 (indicating that 62% were female).
531. At least 95% of welfare households are headed by women. See
ANTHONY CARNEVALE & DONNA DESROCHERS, EDUC. TESTING SERV.,
GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS: MATCHING WELFARE RECIPIENTS' SKILLS TO
JOBS THAT TRAIN 3 (1999). One payday lender has identified employed
welfare recipients as a ripe market for the payday lending business. Fox &
Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 6. While most welfare recipients do not have
bank accounts, a recent report on consumers in North Carolina shows that
14% of employed welfare recipients used payday loans during the past two
years. MICHAEL A. STEGMAN & ROBERT FARIS, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITALISM,
N.C. DIV. OF SOC. SERVS., WELFARE, WORK, AND BANKING: THE NORTH
CAROLINA
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
SURVEY
2,
62-63
(2001),
http://www.kenaninstitute. unc.edu/Centers/CCC/NCFSS-finalreport.pdf (last
visited Aug. 25, 2002).
532. SHARON HERMANSON & GEORGE GABERLAVAGE, PUB. POLICY INST.,
AARP, THE ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 1, 4 & fig.4 (2001),
available at http://research.aarp.org/consume/ib51_finance.pdf.
533. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 6 ("The zip code in California
with the greatest number of payday lenders is 92054 which is directly south of
Camp Pendleton Marine Base which has approximately 37,000 active duty
personnel."). America's armed forces have a high percentage of minorities in
comparison to the general population. Kif Augustine-Adams, GenderedStates:
A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 93,
112-13 (2000) (stating that "minorities of color are represented in the U.S.
military at a greater percentage than in the U.S. population"). Consequently,
minorities, although indirectly, are targeted by payday lenders. Additionally,
payday lenders, as part of the subprime market, are more likely to exist in
black neighborhoods.
Carole B. Weatherford, Editorial, Payday Lenders
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that payday lenders target people on fixed incomes. 534 A
business plan for one payday lender describes its customers as
disproportionately minority, females who are the heads of
household and who have dependent children, earn less than
$25,000, and possess a high school diploma or less. 535 Clearly,
a comprehensive study about who uses payday loans would be
helpful, but as will be discussed later, such a study is not
necessary to conclude that the industry is in need of
536
regulation.
Despite the dispute over the demographic makeup of
payday loan customers, the Georgetown study contributes to
the debate because it shows that the majority of such
individuals believe, for logical reasons, that they do not qualify
for traditional forms of credit.5 37 The Georgetown study
revealed that 41.7% of the customers surveyed owned their
homes, 538 but Wisconsin and Illinois regulators found lower
levels of home ownership (22% in Wisconsin and less than 32%
in Illinois).539 Therefore, many could not get home equity loans
to cover their financial crises. In comparison to 3.7% of the
general population, the Georgetown study found that 15.4% of
54 0
payday loan customers had previously filed for bankruptcy.
Making Living Off Working Class, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (Greensboro,
N.C.), July 16, 2001, at A7, available at 2001 WL 5193114. Weatherford
noted,
Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparitiesin Subprime Lending
in America, a study by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, found that subprime loans are five times more likely in
black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods.
In addition,
homeowners in high-income black areas are twice as likely as
homeowners in low-income white areas to have subprime loans.
Id.
534. Keest, supra note 44, at 1111 n.2.
535. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 6.
536. See infra notes 627-718 and accompanying text.
537. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at 46. The industry
emphasizes loan issuance speed as a major factor in the appeal of payday
loans to consumers. CREDIT UNION NAT'L ASS'N STATE ISSUES SUBCOMM.,
COMPENDIUM OF STATE ISSUE PAPERS 17 (2000) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM OF
STATE ISSUE PAPERS]. Professor John Caskey, a national expert on fringe
banking issues, states that lack of access to traditional credit is the primary
reason why most payday customers obtain payday loans. Id.
538. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at 42.
539. REVIEW OF PAYDAY LENDING IN WISCONSIN, supra note 291, at 5
(indicating that 64% were renters and 22% were homeowners); Fox &
Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 6.
540. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at 46. A 2000 report by
the Credit Union National Association (CUNA) concludes that "credit union
members make up 1/3 of payday lender users" and asserts a link between
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A prior bankruptcy filing would negatively impact a consumer's
credit scoring and ability to obtain traditional credit. 54'
Furthermore, 23.4% of the customers borrowed cash from a
pawnshop by pawning personal property. 542 This subset, along
with the rest of the payday loan customers, may not have
owned a nonessential item of sufficient value to use as
collateral. 54 3 Pawn brokers, typically, only lend a fraction of
the value of the property to be borrowed against. 544 Over half
of the 56.5% of customers who possess a credit card, choose not
to use them because, in the last year, they had exceeded the
credit card limit.545 Moreover, in comparison to 21.8% of adults
in the general population, traditional creditors refused or
limited credit to 73% of the payday loan customers in the last
five years.5 46 Thus, the data demonstrate a lack of access to
traditional credit and provide a rational explanation as to why
these consumers
resort to using extremely high-interest
7
loans.

54

consumers' obtaining payday loans and the increasing number of consumer
bankruptcies. COMPENDIUM OF STATE ISSUE PAPERS, supra note 537, at 19.
CUNA is the nation's largest trade association for credit unions and
"condemns the practice of predatory lending." Id. at 34.
541. Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own
Informed Choices-A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 165, 188 (1997) (stating that a consumer may have increased
credit costs and restrictions "[a]fter a serious history of default or after any
bankruptcy filing"). But see Note, A Reformed Economic Model of Consumer
Bankruptcy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1338, 1343 (1996) (indicating that debtors
tend to "overestimate the negative consequences of bankruptcy"); Sheri
Graves, Buying A Home After Bankruptcy, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa,
Cal.), Nov. 17, 2001, at R1,2001 WL 25863825.
542. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at 46.
543. The Georgetown study shows that 45.4% of the customers' most recent
payday loans were between $201 and $300 and 20.3% most recently borrowed
in excess of $300. Id. at 48.
544. See, e.g., Brad Mackay, 'FillingNiche' CarriesPrice: Third-Generation
Pawnbroker Endeavors to Dispel Stereotypes that Go with the Trade, NAT'L
POST, Aug. 3, 2000, at A23 (indicating that pawn brokers, after valuing a
customer's property, typically lend approximately 5% to 20% of the property's
actual value), 2000 WL 24930019; Maureen Wallenfang, Appleton, Wis., Pawn
Shops Fight Against Misconceptions About Businesses, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB.
Bus. NEWS, Oct. 2, 2000, 2000 WL 27470256.
545. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at v.
546. Id. at 46. In comparison to 14.3% of adults in the general population,
67.7% of the payday loan customers considered applying for credit but decided
against it because they thought they would be denied. Id.
547. Their predicament indicates they are high-risk borrowers, but the risk
should not lead one to conclude they deserve to be subject to the predatory
lending practices described in this Article.
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Besides lacking access to traditional credit, the majority
(65.7%) of the payday loan customers in the Georgetown study
needed a loan to take care of financial emergencies arising from
unplanned expenses or from an income reduction. 548 As for
those who obtained loans to cover expected expenses, some may
have needed loans because they do not earn living wages, that
is, income sufficient to cover reasonable expenditures for daily
living. 549 In summary, although the image of the typical
payday loan customer remains incomplete, one should at least
envision a consumer drawn to the payday loan industry
because she lacks money to pay for financial emergencies,
suffers from a recent income reduction (e.g., work hours
reduced), earns nonliving wages, or a combination thereof, and
because she lacks access to a moderately priced alternative
form of credit. Few choices remain, then, for these consumers,
but to turn to payday loan providers. Recognizing the profit
potential of a customer base with an overwhelming need but
few options, the payday lending industry has demonstrated
remarkable ingenuity in navigating or evading state usury
laws to fully exploit the financial vulnerability of their
borrowers.5 50
B. PACKAGING PAYDAY LOANS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF GAPS IN
APPLICABLE LAW

In some jurisdictions, payday lenders, instead of disguising

548. ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 520, at 47. In the study, a
planned expense such as rent is classified as a discretionary expense item. Id.
at 47 n.38. The authors assumed that consumers choose to spend their income
rather than saving sufficient funds to pay for planned expenses. Id. With this
simplified assumption, the authors overlooked the fact that many Americans
simply do not earn living wages.
549. CMTY. REINVESTMENT ASS'N. OF N.C., CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITALISM,
TOo MUCH MONTH AT THE END OF THE PAYCHECK: PAYDAY LENDING IN

NORTH CAROLINA 25 (Marcy Lowe ed.,
unc.edu/Centers/CCC/paycheck.pdf (last
OF STATE ISSUE PAPERS, supra note 537,
borrowers are 'financially pressed'-have

2001), at http://www.kenaninstitute.
visited Aug. 25, 2002); COMPENDIUM
at 17 (indicating that "90% of payday
heavy debt or payment obligations");

Miller, supra note 20, at 119 (quoting U.S. Census data for July 1999 as

finding that forty-nine million Americans "had difficulty making payments for
basic needs"); Consumer Finance: Pay Dirt, ECONOMIST, June 5, 1999, at 28

(indicating that "[a] recent consumer survey found that 55% of Americans
occasionally lack the funds to pay all their bills"), available at 1999 WL
7363382.
550.

See discussion infra Part III.B.
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the payday transactions to evade usury law, rely on omissions
in statutory provisions to charge triple-digit interest rates in
excess of usury limits. 55' Unlike the previous group of lenders,
these payday lenders admit that they are issuing loans but
assert that some statutory language allows them to charge
interest rates in excess of the law of the state where the
customer resides.5 52 This practice exposes the payday lender as
a predator: the greater interest rate is not being sought because
the customer poses a great risk, but because legal loopholes
afford the lender an opportunity to maximize its profits
through crafty lawyering. The next section discusses two
examples of the use of loopholes, one under state law, the
Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code, and one under federal
law, the National Bank Act.
1. Exploiting Ambiguities in State Law
In Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc.,553 several payday
lenders, relying on Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code
section 24-4.5-3-508(7), claimed that they could charge up to
$33 on a $200 loan. 554 The plaintiffs, a putative class of
borrowers, pointed out that the APR of 402% on this loan
exceeded the maximum APR of 36% set forth in section 24-4.53-508(2), another subsection of the same code provision. 555 The
court rejected the defendants' contention that the subsection
allowing the $33 finance charge was an exception to the
subsection setting the maximum interest rate at 36% per year
for small loans. 556 The court noted that absent the allowance of
a $33 charge under section 24-4.5-3-508(7), a $200 two-week
557
loan would generate a small interest payment of only $2.77.
After analyzing several code provisions and the legislative
history the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs:
To interpret the statute as Lenders suggest-allowing a minimum

551. See infra notes 554-612 and accompanying text (discussing the
practices of payday lenders in Indiana and other states).
552. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the practices of payday
lenders in partnership with traditional banks).
553. 753 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 2001).
554. See id. at 574-75 (citing IND. CODE § 24-4.5-3-508(7) (1996)).
555. See id.
556. See id. at 575 (citing Indiana Code, section 24-4.5-3-508(2), which caps
APRs on loans of $300 or less at 36%).
557. See id. at 576-77.
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finance charge of $33 for a loan that otherwise would generate what
amounts to pennies in interest-is inconsistent with the purposes and
policies of the IUCCC and creates an absurd result which the
legislature could not have intended when the statute was enacted or
5
when the various amendments were adopted.:

Therefore, in Fast Cash, the court held that the maximum 36%
APR allowed for loans of $300 or less limits payday loan APRs
and that the lenders were also limited by the provisions of an
Indiana statute prohibiting loansharking-loans with APRs
559
exceeding 72%.
2. Rent-A-Bank: Evasive Partnerships with Traditional Banks
The Fast Cash case represents a victory for consumer
advocates and consumers living in Indiana, but the victory is a
temporary one due to the recent practice of "rent-a-bank."56 °
Leticia Ortega's case shows how rent-a-bank practices affect
consumers. 56 1 Introduced at the beginning of this Article,
Ortega is the Texas resident who paid National Money Service
$1800 in interest charges on a $300 payday loan. 562 In
defending against a lawsuit filed by her, National Money
Service claimed that, due to its partnership with a Delaware
bank, Delaware rather than Texas law applied, thus exempting
the loan from Texas's usury law. 563 Under Delaware law, the
fees paid by Ortega were legitimate interest charges.5 64 Rent-abank or charter renting is an arrangement between payday
lenders and national banks or federally insured depositories
(collectively, hereinafter "banks") located in states with no

558. See id. at 577.
559. See id. Indiana law defines loansharking as follows:
A person who, in exchange for the loan of any property, knowingly or
intentionally receives or contracts to receive from another person any
consideration, at a rate greater than two (2) times the rate specified
in IC § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(i), commits loansharking, a Class D felony.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-7-2 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2002).
560. See infra notes 565-67 and accompanying text.
561. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text (describing Ortega's
experience with National Money Service).
562. See Geller, supra note 2.
563. See id. (discussing the practices of payday lenders in partnership with
traditional banks).
564. See id.; see also SKILLERN, supra note 304 (discussing the ability of
payday lenders to charge higher fees than state laws would otherwise permit
by using local agents).
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usury limits for consumer loans. 565 In theory, the banks
underwrite the loans, while the payday lenders act as loan
originators and collection agents. 566 Profits made on the deals
are shared between the banks and the payday lenders, similar
to an average brokered loan transaction. 567 Some doubt exists
as to whether the banks are the actual lenders 568 partly
because many payday lenders immediately repurchase the

loans. 569 Rent-a-bank is the latest and most promising
subterfuge used by payday lenders nationwide to avoid state
usury limits.

570

Black's Law Dictionary defines subterfuge as a

"clever plan or idea used to escape, avoid, or conceal
something."57 1 This section advances the proposition that
payday lenders are engaged in subterfuge to the extent that
they have the primary economic interest and role in the
partnership arrangements with traditional banks but claim to
be the "agents" of the banks. 572 A court should rule that the
preemption doctrine affords no protection to payday lenders
having the primary economic interest in rent-a-bank

565. See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 605. Charter renting is
defined as "allowing a lender in another state to use a bank's authority to
circumvent state caps on interest rates in exchange for a fee." Adam Wasch,
Tanoue Attacks Bank Charter 'Renting'; Seeks End to Unscrupulous Payday
Loans, 74 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1087 (June 19, 2000). Over 90% of
all banks are federally insured. See James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'oeil,
51 S.C. L. REV. 445, 451 (2000).

566. Schaaf, supra note 268, at 357; see NORTH CAROLINA PAYDAY
LENDING REPORT, supra note 290, at 6 tbl.III(F) (displaying data regarding
customer usage of rent-a-banks), http://www.banking.state.nc.us/reports/
ccfinal.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2002).
567. Schaaf, supra note 268, at 357.
568. See Chris O'Mallery, Indiana Payday Lenders Adjust to State Court
Ruling, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Aug. 21, 2001 (indicating that the

director of the Indiana Department of Financial Institutions questions the
true nature of the arrangement between banks and payday lenders), 2001 WL
26626647. Professor Gary Peller recently filed a class-action complaint
against ACE, the largest payday lender in the United States, alleging that, in
its brokerage arrangement with Goleta National Bank, ACE is the actual
lender, not the broker, and therefore subject to Maryland usury law. E-mail
from Gary Peller, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, to
Creola Johnson, Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law (Aug. 28, 2002, 11:16:00 EST) (on file with author).
569. Geller, supra note 2.
570. See Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 14-23 (discussing the
growing number of rent-a-bank partnerships).
571.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (7th ed. 1999).

572. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.
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partnerships.
a. Scope of Preemption of State Law Under the NationalBank
Act
The alleged legality of the practice of charter renting
depends upon a provision in the National Bank Act that
authorizes the creation of national banks573 and establishes
their powers. 574 Under section 85 of the National Bank Act, a
nationally chartered bank "may take, receive, reserve, and
charge, on any loan or discount made, or upon any notes, bills
of exchange, or other evidences of debt, interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the bank is
located."575 To decide whether a federal law preempts state
law, the Supreme Court of the United States first determines
whether Congress has included an express provision for
preemption in the relevant federal law or has evinced an intent
that federal law "occupy the field." 576 In the absence of an
express preemption provision or an occupation of the field, the
Court finds preemption of the state law to the extent it conflicts
with a federal statute. 577 The National Bank Act does not
include an express preemption provision or evince
congressional intent to occupy the field of banking law;
consequently, the "[Supreme] Court has often pointed out that
national banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws
infringe the national banking laws or impose an undue burden
on the performance of the banks' functions."57 8

573. See 12 U.S.C. § 21 (2000); see also Carol Conjura, Independent
Bankers Association v. Conover: Nonbank Banks Are Not in the Business of
Banking, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 429, 437 n.32 (1986) (providing a brief history of

the National Bank Act).
574.

See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2000).

575. Id. § 85.
576. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
577. Id.
578. Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944); see also
Alan S. Kaplinsky, Exportation Litigation: Analysis and Implications of
United States Supreme Court Opinion on Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),

N.A., in CONSUMER FINANcIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 1997, at 313, 334 (PLI
Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 989, 1997) (citing
Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 287 (1896) and McClellan v.
Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1896)). The Office of the Comptroller of
Currency, which is responsible for chartering, regulating, and supervising

national banks, is in accord with the Supreme Court: "It is obvious that
Congress has not occupied the field of banking so as to preclude state
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In Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service
Corp., the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the
preemption doctrine would permit The First National Bank of
Omaha (Omaha Bank), a national bank chartered in Nebraska,
to charge its.credit card customers in Minnesota an interest
rate that was allowed under Nebraska law but that exceeded
the rate allowed by Minnesota's usury law. 579 A wholly owned
subsidiary of Omaha Bank solicited customers in Minnesota for
Omaha Bank's credit card program. 58 0 As stated previously,
section 85 authorizes a national bank to "charge on any loan"
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the state "where the
bank is located." 581 Under the plain language of section 85, the
Court held that a national bank could charge the rate of
interest allowed by the state in which it was located5 82 and that
Omaha Bank's extension of credit to residents of another state
did not change the bank's location. 583 After reviewing the
legislative history and historical context of the Act, the Court
found that section 85 was intended not merely to place national
and state banks on an equal footing, but to
give national banks
58 4
advantages over their state competitors.
After Marquette, national banks began increasing their
interest rates, but state lending institutions, constrained by
legislation, because the United States has a dual state-federal banking
system." Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No.
789, at 5 (July 1997); see also Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and
Branching Under the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183, 18998 (1996) (discussing the dual banking system).
579. 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978).
580. Id. at 302.
581. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
582. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 313 ("Since Omaha Bank and its
BankAmericard program are 'located' in Nebraska, the plain language of
section 85 provides that the bank may charge 'on any loan' the rate 'allowed'
by the State of Nebraska."). This is also known as the "Most Favored Lender
Doctrine." See White, supra note 565, at 464-65 (providing a full explanation
of the doctrine and stating that the doctrine also means that where "the bank
comes from a state like Delaware whose laws permit consumer loans without
rate or other restrictions, the out-of-state bank can ignore not only the local
rates, but also the local market segmentation"); see also STATE OF N.M.,
HOUSE MEMORIAL 36 STUDY COMMITTEE RESOURCES AND MATERIALS 10

(2000), at http://www.rld.state.nm.us/fid/news/hm36part2.pdf (last visited
Sept. 2, 2002).
583. See Marquette, 439 U.S. at 312 ("The mere fact that Omaha Bank has
enrolled Minnesota residents, merchants, and banks in its BankAmericard
program thus does not suffice to 'locate' that bank in Minnesota for purposes
of 12 U.S.C. § 85.").
584. See id. at 314.
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state usury laws, "were at an almost insuperable competitive
disadvantage." 585 Two years after Marquette, Congress enacted
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) 586 "to prevent discrimination against
State-chartered insured depository institutions."587 Section 521
of DIDMCA contains language nearly identical to that found in
section 85588 and expressly preempts any state constitution or
statute that inhibits a state-chartered bank's ability to charge
the highest interest rate allowed by law in the state where the
lender is located. 589 By incorporating section 85 in DIDMCA,
Congress established "competitive equality . . . between
national banks and State[-]chartered depository institutions on
lending limits." 590 Consequently, like a national bank, a statechartered lending institution may "use the favorable interest
laws of its home state in certain transactions with out-of-state

585. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826 (1st Cir.
1992).
586. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of Title 12
and Title 15 of the United States Code); see Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 826.
587. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000) ("Congress tried to level the playing field
between federally chartered and state-chartered banks when it enacted
[DIDMCAI.").

588. See Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 827 ("Congress made a conscious
choice to incorporate the [National] Bank Act standard into [DIDMCA].").
589. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a). Section 521 of the DIDMCA provides, in
pertinent part,
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured
depository institutions, including insured savings banks, or insured
branches of foreign banks with respect to interest rates, if the
applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the rate such
State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted to
charge in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or such
insured branch of a foreign bank may, notwithstanding any State
constitution or statute which is hereby preempted for the purposes of
this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount
made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt,
interest at a rate of not more than 1 per centum in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal
Reserve bank in the Federal Reserve district where such State bank
or such insured branch of a foreign bank is located or at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where the bank
is located, whichever may be greater.
Id.
590. Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 826 (quoting 126 CONG. REc. 6,900
(1980) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (alteration in original)).
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borrowers."59 1
b. FederalBanking Law Protects Only Banks Qua Banks
592 and DIDMCA 593
Just because the National Bank Act
clearly state that a nationally- or state-chartered bank may
export the favorable interest rates of its home state does not
mean that its purported agent may use banking law to
circumvent state usury law. 594 In recently decided cases
involving ACE and Goleta National Bank, the majority of
courts have sided with state regulators and have held that the
National Bank Act595does not preempt state law claims filed
against ACE alone.
ACE, based in Irving, Texas, is America's largest checkcashing company 596 and is the target of litigation in several
states. 597 After partnering with Goleta, ACE dropped some of
its state lending licenses and claimed the ability to charge fees
in excess of state laws. 598 For example, the Ohio Department of
Commerce's Division of Financial Institutions (Ohio DFI),
served on ACE a Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist
Order, alleging that ACE, as the actual lender under its
contract with Goleta National Bank, violated Ohio's payday

591. Id. at 827.
592. 12 U.S.C. § 85.
593. Id. § 1831d(a).
594. See infra notes 605-08 and accompanying text.
595. See Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 718
(E.D.N.C. 2002); Colorado, ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 188 F.
Supp. 2d 1282, 1284-85 (D. Colo. 2002); Long v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No.
3:00-CV-1306-J-25TJC, slip. op. at 2 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2001). But see
Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 WL 1205060
(S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (granting ACE's motion to dismiss because Goleta,
the national bank, made the loan, and thus plaintiffs claims were precluded
by the National Banking Act).
596. Teresa Dixon Murray, Payday Lender Wants No Limits: Texas-Based
Firm Sues to Operate Without License in Ohio, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Nov. 15, 2001, 2001 WL 20555829.
597. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 18-19.
598. Colorado Challenges "Rent-A-Bank," BANK NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, at 40,
40-41, available at 2001 WL 12616184. Prior to Colorado's lawsuit, "ACE was
warned against acting as an unlicensed supervised lender and was ordered to
cease and desist from such lending and to refund to consumers all excessive
and improper finance and other charges collected in renewing the loans more
than once and assessing fees in violation of Colorado law." Id.
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loan statute, which prohibits lending without a license. 599 Prior
to this notice, ACE was charging fees as much as 50% above
the maximum rate allowed by Ohio law. 60 0 Evidently, ACE was
not content with its profit margin in Ohio even though the
legalized effective APR for payday loans in Ohio is 391%.601
Although Goleta was not a party to the cease-and-desist action,
Goleta filed an action in federal court against the Ohio DFI,
alleging that, because Ohio's law interferes with Goleta's right
to lend under conditions authorized by the National Bank Act,
the Act preempts the Ohio DFI's authority to take
administrative action against ACE.602

599. Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order, Notice of
Opportunity for Hr'g, In re ACE Cash Express, Inc., (Ohio Dep't of Commerce,
Div. of Fin. Insts. July 16, 2001) (No. 01-SL-01) (on file with author). The
Ohio Department of Commerce determined that ACE was the actual lender
under its contract with Goleta because of the following:
The Agreement requires [ACE] to: (i) purchase a [95%] participation
in each and every loan made by the bank; (ii) bear [95%] of the loss on
a defaulted loan; (iii) receive the loan payments; (iv) pay the expenses
related to the collection or enforcement of a defaulted loan; and (v)
keep the loan records.
National advertisements also indicate that, in at least some
Id. at 1.
brokerage arrangements between payday lenders and national banks, the
interest rates charged for payday loans are not protected by the National Bank
Act because payday lenders have a preponderant economic interest. A payday
lender's advertisement in a recent issue of the American Banker stated,
LOOKING FOR A BANK
TO PARTNER WITH, TO BE A LENDER IN
THE PAYDAY LOAN BUSINESS.
Instant, Large Client Base
Strong Fee-Based Income
Minimal Financial Commitment
Classified Resource Directory, AM. BANKER, Mar. 27, 2001, at 17. Of course,
one would need to look at the details of the contract between the payday
lender and the bank, but this advertisement-especially the words "minimal
financial commitment"-suggests that the payday company will have the
preponderant role in this lending partnership.
600. Murray, supra note 596 (indicating that ACE is accused of charging
442% interest); Mike Pramik, Payday Lenders Bypass Laws, Group Charges,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 14, 2001 (indicating that ACE has charged an
interest rate 13% greater than allowed by Ohio law), 2001 WL 29755196.
601. In Ohio, lenders may charge interest at a rate of 5% per month plus
an origination fee of $5 per $50 lent; these fees equal $7.50 per $50. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1315.39-.40 (Anderson 2002). As a result of these fees, the
effective APR is 391% on a two-week loan.
602. Compl., Goleta Nat'l Bank v. O'Donnell, (S.D. Ohio filed Oct. 9, 2001)
(No. C2-01-971). The Ohio litigation is still pending. The Ohio DFI is trying
to persuade the district court to follow the majority of courts, which have held

112
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ACE raised the same argument in response to a complaint
filed in a Colorado state court against ACE alone by Colorado's
Attorney General on behalf of the state.60 3 Subsequently, ACE
removed the case to federal court. 60 4 In addition to claiming
that the National Bank Act protected the initial loan fee, ACE
claimed that it could ignore Colorado's one-rollover limitation
because its rollover fees, like the original loan fees, constituted
interest and are therefore protected by the National Bank
5
Act. 60
In deciding whether ACE could legitimately seek refuge
under the National Bank Act, the district court found that ACE
was not protected by the federal preemption argument based on
its purported agency relationship with Goleta. 60 6 Citing the
Supreme Court's decision in Marquette, ACE argued that, like
the wholly owned subsidiary in Marquette, it was entitled to
the protection under the National Bank Act. 60 7 The district
court responded,
To the contrary, in this case [ACE] and the national bank are separate
entities and their relationship does not give rise to complete
preemption under the [National Bank Act]. I agree with Plaintiffs'
argument that [ACE] "confuses what this case is and is not about.
The Complaint strictly is about a non-bank's violations of state law. It
alleges no claims against a national bank under the [National Bank
Act]." My careful review of the Complaint indicates no allegations
directed at Goleta or a national bank. Plaintiffs cite nine district
court cases supporting their argument that the [National Bank Act]
does not provide federal question removal jurisdiction in actions
against entities which are not banks. I find the reasoning of these
Goleta
cases persuasive and conclude that [ACE]'s relationship 6with
08
does not elevate [ACE]'s status to that of a national bank.
that claims against ACE are not preempted by federal banking law. See, e.g.,
Def.'s Notice of Supplemental Authority, Goleta Nat'l Bank v. O'Donnell, (S.D.
Ohio filed May 28, 2002) (No. C2-01-971) (providing the court with a copy of a
North Carolina opinion rendered against Goleta); Def's Notice of
Supllemental Authority, Goleta, (S.D. Ohio filed Feb. 6, 2002) (No. C2-01-971)
(providing the court with a copy of a Colorado opinion rendered against
Goleta); Def.'s Mot. To Dismiss, Goleta, (S.D. Ohio filed Nov. 23, 2001) (No.
C2-01-971) (providing the court with copies of Florida and Maryland opinions
rendered against Goleta).
603. Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d
1282, 1283 (D. Colo. 2002).
604. Id.
605. Id. at 1284. ACE claimed that its "renewals [or rollovers] were made
in partnership with Goleta National Bank of California and that they were
permitted by the National Bank Act." OCC Weighs In, supra note 341.
606. Salazar, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 1285 (citations omitted). The court also granted Colorado's
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As a result, the court granted Colorado's motion to remand the
case to state court. 60 9 Likewise, in a removal action filed by
ACE, a district court in North Carolina ruled that ACE could
not rely on the National Bank
Act to preempt state law claims
6 10
asserted against ACE alone.
Only one court has ruled in favor of ACE. 6 11 In Hudson v.
Ace Cash Express, Inc., a payday loan customer filed various
claims, including a state usury claim, against ACE and Goleta
in federal court. 6 12 The court held that the usury claim was
613
preempted by the National Bank Act and dismissed the case.
The Indiana Department of Financial Institutions (Indiana
DFI) was neither consulted nor involved in the Hudson
litigation. 61 4 Because of the long standing precedent that
national banks can export their home-state interest rates under
the National Bank Act, the Indiana DFI, had it been consulted,
would have advised against naming Goleta as a defendant and
against filing the complaint in federal court. 6 15 The Indiana
DFI contends that if Hudson had filed the complaint against
ACE alone, the district court would likely have ruled in favor of
Hudson because "[t]he opinion does not establish in any way
that ACE is entitled to the same preemptive effect where the
bank itself is not a party to the case. "6 16 Others have criticized
Hudson for refusing to look beyond the form of the loan
documents and for allowing the plaintiff to proceed against
6 17
ACE alone.
motion to remand on the grounds of collateral estoppel. Id. Because a Florida
district court had previously held that the National Bank Act did not preempt
state law claims against ACE, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded
ACE from relitigating the same removal issue. Id.

609. Id. at 1287.
610.

See Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 713

(E.D.N.C. 2002) (citing a previous remand order in a separate action
originating in state court).
611. Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C HIS, 2002 WL

1205060 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002).
612. Id. at*1.
613. Id. at *5-6.
614. Indiana Department of Financial Institutions,Indiana Department of
FinancialInstitutions Response to Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, http://www.

dfi.state.in.us/conscredit/hudsonVsAce.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
615.

Id.

616. Id.
617.

E-mail

from

Jean Ann Fox, Director

of Consumer Protection,

Consumer Federation of America, to Creola Johnson, Assistant Professor of
Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (June 4, 2002, 12:06:00
EST) (stating that the "Hudson court refused to look at the substance of the
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The Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), the
federal agency responsible for chartering and regulating
national banks, 6 18 has taken the position that ACE is not
entitled to preemption. 6 19 In the Colorado lawsuit, the OCC
filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief, which stated,
The standard for finding complete preemption is not met in this case.
While the Defendants Notice of Removal repeatedly refers to Goleta
National Bank using Ace Cash Express, Inc. ("ACE") as its agent to
solicit loans ... , ACE is the only defendant in this action, and ACE is
not a national bank. Nor do the [attorney general's] claims against
ACE arise under the National Bank Act, or other federal law.
Although Defendant [ACE] apparently attempts to appropriate
attributes of the legal status of a national bank for its own operations
as a defense to certain of [the attorney general's] claims, such a
hypothetical conflict between federal and state law does not give this
court federal
question jurisdiction under the doctrine of complete
620
preemption.

Thus, the OCC and the majority of district courts concur that
ACE is not protected under the National Bank Act simply
62
because it claims to be an agent of a national bank. '
The OCC's recent action against a bank demonstrates that
it will not shy away from exerting its regulatory powers to stop
a bank from partnering with payday loan companies that have
the preponderant economic interest. 622 Citing the following
reasons, the OCC entered into a consent decree that orders
Eagle National Bank to cease issuing payday loans through
Dollar Financial:
The Bank had risked its financial viability by concentrating in one
line of business-payday lending;
The Bank relinquished supervision of the program to a single third
party originator of payday loans; and
case, but took the documents at face value") (on file with author).
618. See 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
619. Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. 01-D-1576 (D.
Colo. 2001) (Mot. for Leave to File Amicus Brief) (on file with author).
620. Id. (emphasis added).
621. See supra note 595. State courts must now decide the merits of the
claims against ACE. However, the rights of national banks to charge homestate interest rates to payday loan customers in other states will not be
affected by the state court rulings. See Goleta Nat'l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 711, 719 (E.D.N.C. 2002) ("Goleta is not a party to the state action.
Accordingly, its rights to make loans to North Carolina residents and charge
California interest rates will not be adjudicated, and the disposition of any
issues touching upon those rights will not be binding upon Goleta in future
actions.").
622. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
FACT SHEET: EAGLE NATIONAL BANK CONSENT ORDER (Jan. 3, 2002), at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2002-Ola.doc (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
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The payday lending program was conducted on an unsafe and
unsound basis, in violation of a multitude of standards of safe
623 and
sound banking, compliance requirements, and OCC guidance.

Like Eagle National Bank, a growing number of banks are
abandoning their traditional lending responsibilities to
companies that offer payday loans. 624 While the OCC actions
are commendable, it should not have to devote enormous time
and resources to investigate these banks one-by-one. Congress
needs to amend banking laws to prohibit rent-a-bank.
Thus far, the discussion has focused on sham transactions
or subterfuge employed by payday lenders in the making of
loans in order to circumvent federal and state laws,
particularly usury laws. Their conduct ranges from claiming to
sell services or products to partnering with banks while
retaining the primary economic interest. Because section 85
only preempts a conflicting state usury statute, payday loans
are therefore subject to credit disclosure requirements such as
TILA, 625 irrespective of whether the payday lender is acting
alone or in concert with a bank. Clearly, when the payday
lender is acting alone, its payday loans are subject to state
usury limits. Even if the payday lender is acting in concert
with a bank, the National Bank Act only preempts civil usury
that the payday loans are being offered
statutes to the extent
626
by banks qua banks.
As more fully explained in Part IV, federal legislation
amending the National Bank Act should be passed to prohibit
rent-a-bank because, inter alia, lenders charge interest rates
greater than existing state payday lending statutes that
authorize triple-digit interest rates and lenders violate rollover
statutes enacted to protect consumers from perpetual
indebtedness. Part IV further advocates for and describes a
comprehensive system of payday lending regulations for
enactment at the federal level. As Part IV demonstrates, a
continued state-based approach to payday lending abuses will

623. Id.
624. See Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 19-20.
625. See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (discussing payday lenders' attempts
to avoid compliance with TILA).
626. The National Bank Act does not preempt criminal usury statutes. See
Creola Johnson, Rent-A-Bank: Payday Lenders Circumvent Usury Law
Through Partnerships with Traditional Banks (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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not sufficiently protect consumers-it is time for the federal
government to act.
IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL REGULATION
As discussed in depth in previous sections of this Article,
the Ohio Survey and other reports show that payday lenders
across the country make no assessment of a customer's ability
to repay loans, demand fees that amount to triple-digit interest
rates for payday loans, charge fees that exceed usury and
payday loan statutes, give customers false or misleading
information about the cost of credit, disguise payday loan
transactions to evade state and federal law, refuse to supply
customers with written disclosures prior to contract
consummation, partner with banks to circumvent stateimposed interest-rate limitations, lead customers to believe
that they can rescind loans at no cost, trap customers in a cycle
of indebtedness through the practice of rolling over payday
loans, seek improper treble damages in collection actions
against customers, and pursue criminal prosecution of
customers where no criminal culpability properly lies. 627 The
628
response of state lawmakers to these practices varies greatly.
As explained below, due to the lack of competition among
payday lenders and due to the industry's intentional distortion
of consumer credit information, economic theory suggests that
federal and state lawmakers need to act to regulate the
industry.629 Moreover, federal regulation of the payday loan
industry represents the best way to provide consumers with a
base level of protection and to prevent payday lenders from
using rent-a-bank and other practices to evade the laws in
630
states that have attempted to provide consumer protection.
For federal legislation to be effective, it should, at a minimum,
do the following: cap fees for payday loans, prohibit rent-abank, prohibit rollovers, prohibit criminal prosecution, and
require certain notices in the contract.
Section A establishes how sound economic principles
justify federal regulation to accomplish these purposes. Section
B demonstrates that although states have begun addressing

627. See discussion supra Parts I.B, II, and III.B.
628.

See infra notes 690-716 and accompanying text.

629. See infra notes 631-62 and accompanying text.
630. See infra notes 663-18 and accompanying text.
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the payday loan problem to some extent, regulations at the
state level will likely continue to be, at best, a largely
ineffective patch-work approach. Finally, section C describes
the bare minimum protections federal law should afford payday
loan borrowers.
A. ECONOMIC THEORY JUSTIFIES REGULATION OF THE PAYDAY
LOAN INDUSTRY

Economic theory provides a justification for regulation of
the payday loan industry because the industry lacks
competition. In the Ohio Survey, research assistants obtained
payday loans at one store location of each lender located in
Franklin County.63 1 Franklin County had twenty-two lenders
6 32
with eighty-three store locations at the time of the survey.
All twenty-two payday lenders surveyed charged the maximum
fee allowed on a $50 or $100 loan. 633 Other reports indicate
that, despite the industry's rapid growth, the prices charged by
634
the majority of lenders are at maximum legal rates or higher.
In the Ohio Survey, a few lenders offered discounts or coupons
but most were available only to repeat customers. 635 No one
accuses the lenders of being in collusion; yet, payday lending
has been legal in Ohio since 1996,636 and the industry's finance
charges have not decreased despite the passage of time and an
increase in the number of lenders. Based on the foregoing, a
market failure appears to exist in the payday loan industry due

631. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (explaining the
author's methodology).
632. FIN. INSTS. Div., OHIO DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CONSUMER FINANCE
LICENSE INFORMATION (listing the eighty-three stores licensed to issue loans
in Franklin County, Ohio), https://www.com.state.oh.us/odoc/dfi/scripts/
cnfnrs.asp (last visited June 5, 2001) (information subsequently updated, on
file with author).
633. See infra App., tbl.2.
634. See HOOPES, supra note 271, at 8 (indicating that 53% of the payday
lenders surveyed in a Colorado survey charged the highest allowable fee of $20
per $100, resulting in an APR of 520%); Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at
11-12 (indicating that 15% of the payday lenders surveyed in the twenty-six
states that authorized payday lending quoted rates higher than allowed by
law, and 38% quoted rates at the highest allowable fee).
635. See supra note 167 (explaining that surveyors were not wired with any
audio or video recording equipment, and, therefore, no direct evidence exists
that these statements were made).
636. S.B. 293, 121st Gen. Assem., 1996 Sess. (Ohio 1996), 1996 Ohio Laws
183.
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to the lack of competition regarding price. Such a failure may
637
therefore justify regulation of the industry.
While lack of competition alone may not justify regulatory
action, the industry's distortion of pertinent information clearly
provides justification because it prevents consumers from freely
638
making informed choices about obtaining payday loans.
Payday lenders contend that they provide a service to people
who otherwise could not qualify for short-term, unsecured
loans, and therefore any proposed regulation of the industry
639
should give way to the consumer's freedom of choice.
Freedom of contract rests at the foundation of contract law and
is premised upon the notion that parties should be able to
negotiate the terms of their bargain. 64 0 Contracting parties may

637. See Andre Hampton, Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding
and Abetting America's Flight from Health Insurance, 52 RUTGERS L. REV.
987, 989-90 (2000) (arguing that a lack of governmental regulation
exacerbates the externalities, or the benefits and costs imposed on society that
a private actor does not need to take into account). But see Ted Schneyer,
Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers' Contingent Fee
Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 373 (1998) (arguing that "[r]egulatory
intervention is not justified in every instance in which consumer ignorance,
third-party effects, or lack of competition produce market imperfections").
638. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (analyzing payday lenders' failure to
provide disclosures required by law).
639. See, e.g., Lynn Bonner, Payday-Loan Industry States Case to North
Carolina House Committee, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, July 26, 2001
(quoting a representative of Advance America, one of the largest lenders, as
stating, "frequent use is not always bad"), 2001 WL 25351635; Kevin
Corcoran, IndianaCourt to Issue Ruling on State's 'Payday Lending' Industry,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, May 29, 2001 (indicating that a lawyer for
a payday lender argued before the Supreme Court of Indiana that it would be
wrong for the court to substitute its decision for the choices of payday loan
consumers, 2001 WL 21908572; Carolyn Said, Long Way from Payday: Some
Say Short-Term Loan Stores Are a Needed Service, Others Say They're Not
Much More than Legalized Loan-Sharking, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 2001
(indicating that the owner of twenty-two check-cashing and payday loan stores
contended that the proposed California bill to regulate payday lending was
"paternalistic" because it removed consumer choice and assumed that
consumers are not sufficiently intelligent), 2001 WL 3406626; Amber Veverka,
North Carolina Legislators Seek New Limits on Payday Loans, KNIGHTRIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 22, 2001 (noting that the president of the
North Carolina Check Cashing Association argued against a bill limiting
rollovers because it interfered with consumer choice), 2001 WL 13625235.
640. Blake D. Morant, ContractualRules and Terms and the Maintenance
of Bargains: The Case of the Fledgling Writer, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 453, 468-69 (1996); see also Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46
HARV. L. REV. 553, 558-59, 575 (1933) (explaining the historical foundation of
individual freedom in contract law).
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then rely on judicial enforcement of the bargain reached unless
invalidating doctrines such as fraud or unconscionability
demonstrate that the contract was not truly a product of
mutual assent. 64 1 Economic theory provides an alternative
642
justification for judicial enforcement of contractual intent.
Under an economic analysis, contracts arise from the process of
self-interested parties bargaining to achieve individual wealth
maximization. 643 Economic theory assumes that contracting
parties are fully informed, rational actors who possess the
ability to bargain over terms. 644 The theory then assumes that
the bargain struck represents an efficient contract that leads to
wealth maximization not only for the contracting parties, but
for society at large as well. 645 Accordingly, economic theory
produces efficient outcomes only when its "simplifie[d]
64 6
assumptions" approximate reality.
The results of the Ohio Survey and other surveys
contradict any assumption that consumers in payday lending
contracts act as informed parties. Even though payday lenders

641. Larry A. Dimatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty:Eliminatingthe Law
of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 641 (2001).
642. Id. at 641-42 (noting that economic theory supports judicial
enforcement of contracts because wealth maximization is best enhanced
through private bargaining).
643. See id. at 642; Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form
Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 58586 (1990) (arguing that it is not rational for contracting parties to agree to
terms that are contrary to their self interest in increasing personal wealth).
644. Dimatteo, supra note 641, at 642.
645. Meyerson, supra note 643, at 593; see also Cohen, supra note 640, at
562-63 ("[A] regime in which contracts are freely made and generally enforced
gives greater scope to individual initiative and thus promotes the greatest
wealth of a nation.").
646. Meyerson, supra note 643, at 593. As one scholar noted,
In order to facilitate mathematical formulation and exposition,
neoclassical economic theory routinely adopts what appear to be, and
often are, from both a physical and a psychological standpoint, highly
unrealistic assumptions: that individuals and firms are rational
maximizers, that information is costless, that the demand curves of
individual firms are infinitely elastic, that inputs and outputs are
infinitely divisible, that cost and revenue schedules are
mathematically regular, and so forth.
George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How
Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 806 n.5 (2001)
(quoting A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
4 (2d ed. 1989)).
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are marketing a new product, 64 7 as previously discussed, 73% of
the payday lenders in the Ohio Survey did not have pamphlets
or brochures about payday loans available for a potential
customer to peruse, 68% of the payday lenders surveyed
refused to allow the customer to have a copy of the application
to take home and review, and even after contractconsummation, only 18% of the payday lenders gave the
customer a copy of his or her signed application. 64 8 Moreover,
when payday lenders were asked during the informationgathering stage to state the APR for a $100 loan, 68% violated
TILA by denying the existence of an APR, claiming lack of
knowledge about the APR, stating the APR equaled the finance
charge, or avoiding giving a clear answer. 649 In violation of
TILA's advertising requirements, a whopping 84% of the
lenders used fee schedules that did not state an APR for each
loan amount. 650 Likewise, in violation of TILA's timing of
disclosure requirement, 77% of the lenders did not allow the
surveyors to leave the store with a copy of the contract for
review prior to consummating the deal. 65 1 Remember that the
CFSA is purportedly committed to the best practice of allowing
cost-free rescissions; 652 yet, 50% of the CFSA members in the
Ohio Survey did not allow such rescissions when the customer
tried to do so. 653 Finally, recall the numerous examples of
payday lenders threatening bad-check prosecution in
jurisdictions where the payday loan customer's conduct did not
654
constitute a crime.

647. See George F. Magera, Closed-End Disclosures Under the Truth in
Lending Act: An Update at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 54 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 79, 79 (2000) (describing payday loans as "newly popular"); cf.

Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 619-20 (stating that today's short-term
lenders get their roots from "salary lenders" who loaned money to members of
the working-class during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
648. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
649. See infra App., tbl.2; see also supra Part II.A.2.a.ii. For a discussion of
TILA's requirements, see supra note 173 and accompanying text.
650. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. For-a discussion of TILA's
advertising requirements, see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
651. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text; infra App., tbl.3. For
a discussion of TILA's disclosure requirement, see supra note 209 and
accompanying text.
652. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
653. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
654. See supra notes 460-71 and accompanying text.
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These violations show that payday lenders distort
information in order to take advantage of the customer's
ignorance. Usually, an asymmetry of information exists
between merchants and consumers, and merchants maintain a
better position from which to distort the information. 655 Such
asymmetry is arguably unfair. 656 Yet, merchants, like payday
lenders, exacerbate this unfairness when they distort
information out of an economic incentive. 657 "When one party
interferes with the 'objectivity' of another's choice, the moral
reverberations swell, especially when the interferer gains from
it."658 Payday lenders are undoubtedly profiting from their
exacerbation of asymmetrical information.
As shrewd
businesspersons, they entice customers with advertisements
that promise a convenient way for cash-strapped consumers to
quickly get a loan without undergoing a credit check. 659 As
predators in violation of numerous laws, payday lenders earn
lucrative profits by using a host of tactics such as hiding the
triple-digit APRs until after contract consummation, charging
fees in excess of state law, and misrepresenting their ability to
have defaulting customers thrown in jail.660 Consequently, a
market failure exists in the payday loan industry. 661 Because

655. Bailey Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in
the Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 896 (1990).
656. See id. at 1004-05 (noting the moral concerns associated with a
market that systematically benefits the merchants at the consumers' expense).
For an example of unfairness in another context, see Jill S. Kingsbury, "Must
We Talk About that Reasonable Accommodation?": The Eighth Circuit Says
Yes, but Is the Answer Reasonable?, 65 Mo. L. REV. 967, 1001-02 (2000)
("[Wihen information asymmetries exist between the employer and employee
[in a case under the Americans with Disabilities Act], the court's decision
leaves employees with an unfair burden of proof, employers with an incentive
to derail employees' claims, and society footing the bill.").
657. Kuklin, supra note 655, at 1005 (arguing that moral concerns over
fairness in the marketplace heighten when merchants capitalize on inherent
distortions for personal gain).
658. Id.
659. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
660. See supra notes 156-271 and accompanying text (analyzing payday
lenders' failure to provide disclosures required by law), supra notes 130-54 and
accompanying text (describing the interest rates charged for payday loans),
supra notes 457-71 and acompanying text (discussing payday lenders that
seek prosecution of customers who default on payday loans).
661. See M. Neil Browne & Nancy H. Kubasek, A Communitarian Green
Space Between Market and Political Rhetoric About Environmental Law, 37
AM. Bus. L.J. 127, 141-43 (1999) ("Market failures include ...asymmetrical
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the market works unfairly and inefficiently, governmental
regulation is justified. 662 To be most effective, as will be shown,
this regulation should stem from federal rather than state
government action.
B.

WHY STATE-BY-STATE REGULATION WOULD BE INADEQUATE

Each state, of course, can and should act to regulate the
payday loan industry, but Congress is the only legislative body
that can regulate it adequately and effectively. State-by-state
efforts at regulation are inadequate and inefficient because, as
explained below, the rent-a-bank practice circumvents state
laws designed to protect consumers, and many states do not
afford consumers a base level of necessary protections. 663 The
information ....
When market failures exist, the government has a potential
role to step in to resolve the situation." (footnotes omitted)).
662. See Kuklin, supra note 655, at 896 ("The net result [of distortions
made by the advantaged party] is that the marketplace works neither
efficiently nor fairly. Insofar as this is true, there is prima facie justification
for intervention."); cf. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes:
The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
1163, 1181-86 (1998) (arguing for regulation of the cigarette industry due to
information-based market failures); J. Christopher Kojima, Product-Based
Solutions to Financial Innovation: The Promise and Danger of Applying the
Federal Securities Law to OTC Derivatives, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 259, 279-82
(1995) (arguing for possible regulation in the over-the-counter derivatives
markets due to a market failure arising from asymmetrical information);
Loretta M. Kopelman & Michael G. Palumbo, The U.S. Health Delivery
System: Inefficient and Unfair to Children, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 319, 333-37
(1997) (arguing that incomplete information in health care, especially for
children, leads to inefficiency in the market). Professors Kopelman and
Palumbo concluded that "reliance on market forces to solve current health
allocation problems will tend to worsen this inequity and inefficiency." Id. at
337.
663. While it is true that states can pass laws to deal with matters
traditionally reserved to the states, only Congress can effectively address the
rent-a-bank problem. Currently, there is a gross disparity in state law
protections available to payday loan customers.
Congress should enact
legislation affording every consumer basic protections from payday loan
abuses because state action has failed to redress consumer concerns. The
failure of the states to adequately address unfair consumer debt collection
practices led to the enactment of the FDCPA. See John Tavormina, The Fair
Debt Collection PracticesAct-The Consumer's Answer to Abusive Collection
Practices, 52 TUL. L. REV. 584, 587 (1978). Similarly, the FTC has ensured
consumers will not fall victim to the Uniform Commercial Code's holder in due
course doctrine after entering into a consumer credit contract. FTC rules
require consumer credit contracts to include a notice informing any holder of
the note that payment is subject to any claims or defenses of the debtor
against the contracting creditor. FTC Reservation of Consumers' Claims Rule,
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2002). The holder in due course doctrine serves to exempt
subsequent transferees of promissory notes or other negotiable instruments

2002]

PAYDAY LOANS

123

of
rapidly spreading rent-a-bank practice thwarts the efforts 664
state lawmakers to provide the barest consumer protection.
"Usury laws are, at core, the earliest form of consumer
protection law." 665 As stated previously, in nineteen states,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, payday loans are
technically illegal because these loans carry triple-digit interest
rates that exceed the double-digit interest rates permitted by
law. 666 Payday lenders use rent-a-bank primarily to charge
fees in excess of these usury limits. 667 Moreover, payday
lenders are not content to simply evade usury laws where
payday loans are illegal. Rather, payday lenders have begun,
and will continue, to use bank charters to extract from
668
consumers fees in excess of the triple-digit interest rates 669
already allowed in states where the loans are legal.
Amazingly, some payday lenders appear dissatisfied with
receiving fees carrying legalized interest rates ranging from

from defenses to payment otherwise held by the holder. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE § 1303.35(A-B) (Anderson 2002). Absent the FTC rule, consumers could
not exert a contractual right to withhold payment once the original creditor
transferred the note to a person qualifying as a holder in due course. See id. §
1303.32.
664. For a discussion about payday lenders circumventing state laws, see
supra notes 560-626 and accompanying text.
665. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 16, at 657
666. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. In Virginia, ACE and
Advance America were issuing loans at an APR of 442% even though
Virginia's small loan cap is 36%. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 12.
667. See Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 12. The CFA's 2001 survey
found an average APR of 606% in six states that prohibited payday loans
through their usury limits. Id. at 3. See, e.g., Jeff Gelles, The Philadelphia
Inquirer Consumer Watch Column, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Nov.
14, 2001 (describing the partnership between National Cash Advance in
Pennsylvania and People's National Bank in Paris, Texas where payday loan
customers were charged $17 per $100 for a two-week loan-an annual rate of
442%, which is more than eighteen times the legal limit in Pennsylvania),
2001 WL 30265902.
668. As stated previously, currently twenty-three states and the District of
Columbia have statutes that authorize payday lending. See supra note 120
and accompanying text. The majority of these states set a maximum fee for
payday loans, but the maximum fee for each state carries a triple-digit APR
ranging from 240% in Oklahoma to 780% in Wyoming. Fox & Mierzwinski,
supra note 63, app. B at 27-29.
669. See, e.g., Nicole Duran, Colo. Sues Payday Lender over Bank Deal, AM.
BANKER, July 25, 2001, at 4 (indicating that the Colorado Attorney General
filed a lawsuit against ACE, accusing ACE of attempting to circumvent
Colorado payday loan laws by partnering with Goleta National Bank and
"making or arranging more than one renewal of a payday loan at the
maximum payday loan finance rate"), available at 2001 WL 3913025.
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240% to 780%.670 As one exasperated state senator exclaimed,
67 1
"Ten times the prime ought to be enough for anybody."
Although urged by state and federal regulators to comply
with interest rate ceilings, many payday lenders cross the lines
drawn by state lawmakers on how much profit they can derive
from desperate consumers. Last year, the Ohio Department of
Commerce issued a Notice of Intent To Issue a Cease and
Desist Order against ACE. 672 After partnering with Goleta
National Bank, ACE dropped its payday lending license and
charged fees 13% above Ohio's legalized effective APR of
391%.673 ACE's defiance of state laws has led it to defend
against state regulators in Ohio, Colorado, Florida, Indiana,
Maryland, and Texas. 674
In addition to being under
investigation in North Carolina for violating state law, the
North Carolina Commissioner of Banks ordered payday lenders
to "make no further payday loans after August 31, 2001, either
directly or as agent for another, since they are without legal
authority to enter such transactions." 675 Approximately three

670. Supra note 668 (stating that although the majority of these states set
a maximum fee for payday loans, the maximum fees equate to triple-digit
APRs ranging from 240% in Oklahoma to 780% in Wyoming).
671. Scott Dyer, Senator Plans Assault on Payday Loan Rates, BATON
ROUGE ADvoc., Jan. 3, 2001, at B9 (quoting Sen. Foster Campbell, D-Elm
Grove), 2001 WL 3848132.
672. In re ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 01-SL-01 (Dep't of Commerce, Div.
of Fin. Insts. July 16, 2001) (on file with author); see supra note 599 and
accompanying text.
673. Pramik, supra note 600; see also Murray, supra note 596 (indicating
that ACE charged 442% interest).
674. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 18-19 nn.33-35; see also
Colorado Challenges "Rent-A-Bank", supra note 598, at 40 (indicating that
prior to Colorado's lawsuit, ACE had been "warned against acting as an
unlicensed supervised lender and was ordered to cease and desist from such
lending and to refund to consumers all excessive and improper finance and
other charges collected in renewing the loans . . . and assessing fees in
violation of Colorado law"). As a result of the rent-a-bank practice, state
regulators sometimes feel powerless to protect consumers from exorbitantly
priced payday loans. See generally Geller, supra note 2 (discussing the
frustration felt by state regulators who feel that "if the practice known as
'charter-renting' continues, they may be powerless to rein in payday lending").
675. Urgent Memorandum from Hal D. Lingerfelt, N.C. Commissioner of
Banks, to All Check-Cashing Business Licensees Now Engaged in "Payday
Lending,"
(Aug.
30,
2001),
http://www.banking.state.nc.us/reports/
payday3l.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2002). Other states have also addressed
the payday loan issue. See, e.g., Patrick Morrison, Loophole Reshuffles Payday
Biz, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., Sept. 17, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL
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months later, state Attorney General Roy Cooper began
investigating payday lenders.67 6
In response to the
investigation, the legal counsel for the CFSA, said, "If it's a
national or a state bank making the loan, then there are no
limits .... We trust the [North Carolina] Attorney General's
677
Office has lawyers who are smart enough to know that."
This legal posture contradicts the CFSA's second best practice
standard: "A member will not charge a fee or rate for a payday
678
advance that is not authorized by State or Federal law."
Like many payday lenders, some banks ignore warnings
from banking regulators.6 7 9 As explained in Part III of this
Article, some payday lenders and banks rely on federal
preemption available to national and state-charted banks
under the National Bank Act and DIDMCA to excuse their
noncompliance with state-law interest limitations. 680 The
California Department of Financial Institutions warned
traditional lending institutions not to partner with payday
lenders because "an institution's reputation may be associated
and potentially damaged by the lending practices of some of the
more unscrupulous payday lenders."68 1 The OCC and the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) warned national banks and federal
thrifts about consumer protection concerns arising from banks
and thrifts entering into contractual arrangements with third
parties to fund payday loans. 68 2 The OCC also notes that the
third-parties should not "automatically assume that the
benefits of the bank or thrift charter will accrue to them by

27820323.
676.

Chris Serres, Lenders' Paydays Get Bigger, NEWS & OBSERVER

(Raleigh), Dec. 4, 2001, at Al, 2001 WL 30098171.
677. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
678. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154 (emphasis added).
679. See infra notes 681-89 and accompanying text.
680. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
681. Mary Fricker, Any Day Can Be Payday As Check-Cashing Stores
Proliferate, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Aug. 26, 2001, at El, 2001

WL 25859433; see, e.g., Notice of Intent to Issue Cease and Desist Order,
Notice of Opportunity for Hr'g, In re ACE Cash Express, Inc., (Ohio Dep't of
Commerce, Div. of Fin. Insts. July 16, 2001) (No. 01-SL-01) (on file with

author).
682.

6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) $ 63-790 (Nov. 27, 2000) (OCC Advisory

Letter on Payday Lending No. 2000-10), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
ftp/advisory/2000-10.doc (last visited Sept. 3, 2002); 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 63-791 (Nov. 27, 2000) (OCC Advisory Letter on Title Loan Programs
No. 2000-11), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2000-11.doc

(last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
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virtue of such relationships." 683 Yet, many traditional lending
lenders seem undeterred in their quest
institutions and payday
684
to form partnerships.
Because federal banking law clearly authorizes banks to
export their interest rates, only Congress, not banking
regulators, state lawmakers, or the courts, can successfully
prevent rent-a-bank. As stated by the United States Supreme
Court in Marquette, "[T]he protection of state usury laws is an
issue of legislative policy, and any plea to alter [Section] 85 [of
the National Bank Act] to further that end is better addressed
to the wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of this
Court."685 On March 15, 2001, Representative John LaFalce,
senior Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee,
introduced a bill that would prohibit federally insured banks
from making "any payday loan, either directly or indirectly" or
from making a loan to another lender for purposes of financing
or refinancing payday loans. 686 Congress has failed to act on
this bill; therefore, the preemption doctrine effectively prevents
state lawmakers from deciding what double- or triple-digit
interest rate is fair for the industry to charge risky

683. Richard Cowden, New OCC Proposal Would Charge Banks for Exams
of Third Party Service Providers,75 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 710, (Dec.
4, 2000).
684. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 19-20 (showing that several
banks have partnered with dozens of payday lenders). Currently, Crusader
Savings Bank of Philadelphia is perhaps the only bank that has terminated its
partnership with a payday lender after being investigated by banking
regulators. It did so after being purchased by another bank. Id. at 19 n.36
(indicating that Crusader was in partnership with National Cash Advance).
See generally Joseph N. DiStefano, The PhiladelphiaInquirer Loose Change
Column, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Aug. 28, 2001 (indicating that
Crusader was purchased by Royal Bank), 2001 WL 26628374. OTS was
concerned about Crusader's "reliance on risky income sources, such as the
payday loans, and a lack of internal accounting controls." Andy Gotlieb, Bank
Abandons Loans Questioned by OTS, PHILA. BUS. J., Jan. 19, 2001 (indicating
that payday loans were profitable for Crusader but the bank ceased payday
loan operations after OTS charged it with being engaged in unsafe or unsound
Advance),
Cash
with
National
to
its
business
due
practices
http://philadelphia.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2001/01/22/focus2.ht
ml (last visited Aug. 26, 2002).
685. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299,
319 (1978).
686. Federal Payday Loan Consumer Protection Amendments of 2001, H.R.
1055, 107th Cong. § 3 (2001); Marcy Gordon, Payday Loans Targeted in
Report, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 13, 2001 ("Only fifteen lawmakers, all
Democrats, have signed on to the bill."), 2001 WL 30244640.
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borrowers. 6 87 Congress should amend banking law to prevent
banks from being a tool for payday lenders to ignore state law
and exploit consumers. 688 In amending federal banking law,
Congress should be guided by the words of North Carolina
Attorney General Roy Cooper: "We don't believe bank charters
were created to enable companies to circumvent laws that are
68 9
designed to protect consumers."
Congress needs to act not only to preclude the rent-a-bank
practice but to afford consumers basic protections from treble
damages, rollover fees, and criminal prosecution. A state-tostate comparison of payday lending statutes reveals a lack of
uniformity, with the majority of states providing little
protection to consumers. 690 The paucity of protection stems
from the fact that many states have enacted industrysponsored legislation. 69 1 Only a few states expressly prohibit
payday lenders from collecting treble damages. 692 Fairness
dictates that payday loan debtors should not be liable for treble
damages for defaulting on a payday loan. 693

If a consumer

687. United States Bill Tracking, 2001 United States House Bill No. 1055,
2001 U.S. H.B. 1055 (SN) (Westlaw) (showing no action since the bill was
referred to the Committee on Financial Services upon introduction) (last
visited Sept. 16, 2002).
688. If Congress can give $15 billion in corporate welfare to bail out the
airline industry (after the September 11 terrorist attack), it should be able to
address the payday lending abuses. See William M. Welch, Experts Predict
Deficits Will Last Years, USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 2001, at A8 (discussing
economic problems that arose from Congress's response to the terrorist
attack), available at 2001 WL 5476802.
689. Serres, supra note 676.
690. See generally ELIZABETH RENUART, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., PAYDAY
LOANS: A MODEL STATE STATUTE (2000) (describing the law in each state
applicable to small, short-term loans and making the case for a model payday
loan statute).
691. Fox, supra note 12, at 993. After losing court battles over the nature
of payday loan transactions, the industry lobbied for legislation authorizing
payday lending and exempting payday loans from usury statutes. See Keest,
supra note 44, at 1117 ("[A]t the outset, the post-dated check lenders took the
position they were not lending money, and so no credit laws were implicated.
As the case law rejected this position, the industry sought enabling
legislation.").
692. See supra note 443.
693. Apparently, a few states believe it is unfair for payday lenders to
collect under statutes designed to compensate victims of bad-check fraud
because they expressly make those statutes unavailable to payday lenders in
collection actions. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1-12 (2000) (stating that
"the lender shall have the right to exercise all civil means authorized by law to
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defaults on his car loan, credit card, or residential mortgage, a
lender cannot collect treble damages. 694 Why should payday
loan debtors be subject to this collection practice simply
because the medium used to receive the loan happens to be a
check? Congress should close loopholes in states that allow
lenders to collect treble damages.
Like the collection of treble damages, the rollover practice
deserves Congress's attention. States that merely permit
payday lending due to a lack of usury limits, ignore the practice
of rollovers. 695 In states that expressly authorize payday
lending, some statutes prohibit rollovers while others limit
them and/or require a notice to consumers. 696 As explained
extensively in Part II of this Article, the rollover data
demonstrate that a significant minority, and in some states, a
majority, of payday loan customers roll over payday loans. The
rollover practice reveals a host of consumers running on the
debt treadmill seemingly unable to get out of debt, and no one
697
knows how many of them have had to file bankruptcy.
collect the face value of the instrument; except that the provisions and
remedies of section 13-21-109," which includes remedies for victims of badcheck fraud, are not available to the lender); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(i)
(Supp. 2000) (stating that payday lenders cannot collect, inter alia, treble
damages or attorney's fees); 2002 Va. Acts ch. 897 (stating that a payday
lender "shall not be entitled to collect or recover from a borrower any sum
otherwise permitted pursuant to § 8.01-27.2," which provides civil remedies,
including treble damages, in bad-check lawsuits). Consequently, lenders
cannot use these statutes to collect treble damages or attorney's fees.
694. Montana recognizes that some payday lenders try to use bad-check
statutes to exact remedies not generally available to other creditors suing
borrowers who have defaulted on consumer loans. Therefore, in Montana,
payday lenders applying for a lending license must provide a sworn statement
that they "will not in the future, directly or indirectly, use a criminal process
to collect the payment of deferred deposit loans or any civil process to collect
the payment of deferred deposit loans not generally available to creditors to
collect on loans in default." MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-705(3)(c) (2001)
(emphasis added); id. § 31-1-723(2) (prohibiting such collection practices).
695. See generally RENUART, supra note 690 (describing the law in each
state and demonstrating that states lacking usury laws have not passed any
laws to provide protections to payday loan customers).
696. For example, Colorado allows one rollover, COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1108, and requires the following notice to be placed in the payday loan contract:
"RENEWING THE DEFERRED DEPOSIT LOAN RATHER THAN PAYING
THE DEBT IN FULL WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGES."
Id. § 5-3.1-104.
697. Steven Gardner, Choosing Bankruptcy: Personal Bankruptcy Filings
in Clark County Are up 29.3 Percent over Last Year, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver,
Wash.), Dec. 9, 2001 (describing a rollover payday borrower, Roger, who filed
for bankruptcy), 2001 WL 27877664, at *6.
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Notions of fairness dictate a congressional limitation on or
prohibition against rollovers. Numerous stories exist detailing
how payday lenders use rollover fees to collect more than
double the original loan, yet leave some consumers still owing
the original loans. 698 These stories demonstrate that a host of
payday lenders lack a commitment to fair lending practices;
the
these lenders, driven by a desire for profits, will not limit699
number of rollovers in the absence of a legislative mandate.
Moreover, the payday lenders' use of rent-a-bank to exceed
rollover limits further serves as a testament to their lack of
commitment to fair lending practices. These lenders ignore
laws limiting rollovers and contend that the rollover fees, like
the original loan fees, are protected by the preemption doctrine
in federal banking law. 70 0 Consequently, state law regulation
cannot effectively address rollovers as well as usury limits. By
preventing rent-a-bank and prohibiting or limiting rollovers,
Congress can play a vital role in bringing protection to
consumers nationwide and keep thousands of consumers off the
debt treadmill and hopefully out of bankruptcy.
Like the response of states to the rollover practice, some
states remain silent about bad-check prosecution of payday
loan customers while other states either ban it outright or ban
it unless, prior to the loan's due date, the customer closed her
bank account or stopped payment on the check. 70 1 As

698. See, e.g., Geller, supra note 2 (indicating that Leticia Ortega, who had
her bank account debited by National Money Service $90 every two weeks for
almost a year to roll over a $300 loan, paid $1800 in fees); Wayne Heilman,
"Payday"Loans Draw Interest/Quick Lenders Charge451 Percent in Colorado,
GAZETTE (Montreal), Nov. 25, 2001 (indicating that a consumer obtained a

$300 loan from Colorado Pay Day Loans, Inc., and eventually paid $540 in
interest by "paying back the loan and immediately taking out a new loan for
the same amount-eight times"), 2001 WL 27140868; NPR Broadcast, supra
note 275 (describing a woman who borrowed $800 from a payday lender to pay
for car repairs and ultimately wound up paying more than $10,000 in loan fees
to multiple lenders), 2001 WL 9328000.

699. There are several laws in America that strike a proper balance
between offering individuals basic protections and giving businesses the
opportunity to earn profits. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act's stated purpose is "to assure .. .every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000).
700. OCC Weighs In, supra note 341, available at 2001 WL 26574239. ACE

claims that its "renewals [or rollovers] were made in partnership with Goleta
National Bank of California and that they were permitted by the National
Bank Act." Id.
701.

See e.g., sources cited supra notes 502-03.
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additional consumer protection, a few states require a notice in
the contract informing the consumer of his or her rights
regarding bad-check prosecution. 7 2 Because only a few states
expressly preclude payday loan debtors from being criminally
prosecuted for writing bad checks, many payday loan customers
still are subject to prosecution. Long ago, America did away
with debtors' prison, 70 3 a system founded on the erroneous
assumption "that all creditors were honest, and all debtors
dishonest."70 4 Most state constitutions contain provisions
prohibiting imprisonment for debt. 70 5 These provisions "were
adopted to protect the 'poor but honest' debtor who is unable to
pay his or her debts."70 6 South Dakota's constitution provides
wisdom on the issue of prosecution of payday loan debtors
because it provides that "[n]o person shall be imprisoned for
debt arising out of or founded upon a contract." 70 7 Payday loan
prosecutions concern the breach of a contract to repay a loan,
not the deceptive practice of convincing a creditor that a bad
check was good. 70 8 Consequently, no consumer obtaining a
payday loan should fear incarceration simply because they
obtained a loan by writing a check. Payday loan debtors should
be on equal footing with consumers who obtain cash advance
loans by using their credit cards; credit card borrowers are not
subject to prosecution. 709 Fairness dictates that all Americans

702. See supra note 505 and accompanying text.
703. See supra notes 507-08 and accompanying text.
704. Richard S. Arnold & George C. Freeman, III, Judge Henry Clay
Caldwell, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 317, 331 (2001) (internal

quotations omitted).
705. See supra note 703.
706. Brenda McCune, Get A Job!, 43 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 42, 43 (2001).
707. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 15.
708. See supra Part II.B.2.d (analyzing state law regarding bad-check
prosecution of payday loan customers). Situations do exist where one can
conclude that a customer had an intent to defraud when he or she obtained a
loan. For example, if Bill failed to repay four payday loans, all obtained on the
same day, and the aggregate of those loans exceeded his paycheck, one could
find that he had no intent to repay the loans when he obtained them and
therefore should be convicted of passing bad checks. See State v. Hogrefe, 557
N.W.2d 871, 879 (Iowa 1991) ("[Clriminal liability should attach if at the time
the defendant issued the check, the defendant (1) never had the intention to
pay the check or (2) knew he or she would not be able to pay it.").
709. Because payday lenders use checks as the vehicle for issuing loans,
payday loans are the only type of consumer credit that can subject those who
default to criminal liability and civil liability for treble damages. Dysdale &
Keest, supra note 16, at 611 ("Though default on a normal consumer credit
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should be free from bad-check prosecution if the crime is based
on failure to repay a payday loan. Congress should grant all
Americans this freedom by passing federal legislation
regulating the payday loan industry.
In addition to enacting legislation to address specific
problems such as bad-check prosecution, 710 Congress needs to
act because concerned politicians and consumer advocates have
been largely unsuccessful in convincing state legislators to
enact legislation to protect payday loan customers. Except in
Illinois, lawmakers in states lacking usury limits failed last
year to pass legislation either banning payday loans or
regulating the industry.71 1
Most states that specifically
authorize payday lending failed to amend payday lending
statutes to provide greater consumer protections. 7 12 Evidently,
because the majority of these states passed industry-sponsored
payday loan bills, many lawmakers think the industry offers
consumers a valuable service not otherwise available.
Undoubtedly, payday lenders provide a service, but they have
no right to provide the service on whatever terms they choose;
debt may trigger delinquency fees and collection fees, [payday] check loans are
the only type of consumer debt we know of which conceivably trigger trebledamages penalties upon default-penalties established by the civil bad check
laws of some states.").
710. The reluctance of state prosecutors to proceed against payday lenders
is another reason why Congress should not rely on state lawmakers to protect
their consumers from predatory payday lending practices. Professor lain
Ramsay, who recently conducted a survey of payday lending in Canada,
implies that the authorities are not interested in prosecuting lenders who
violate criminal usury statutes.
David Menzies, Waiting for Payday:
Storefront Money Lenders Offer Loans to People with Credit Troubles, NAT'L
POST, Sept. 22, 2001, at D4, 2001 WL 28022514. According to Professor
Ramsay, "One reason for the hesitancy to prosecute is there is a general sense
that if they prosecuted these companies-which are meeting a need-then
lenders would go underground and there would be more loan sharking." Id.
711. See, e.g., S.B. 203, 141st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2001)
(indicating that the Delaware Senate Committee on Banking took no action on
a bill designed to prohibit lenders from issuing payday and title loans), WL
2001 DE S.B. 203 (SN); H.B. 870, 45th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2001) (indicating
that the New Mexico legislature took no action on bill that would have
regulated the payday loan industry), WL 2001 NM H.B. 870 (SN); S.B. 84,
95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2001) (indicating that the Wisconsin Senate
Committee on Privacy, Electronic Commerce and Financial Institutions took
no action on a bill designed to create rules that apply to payday loans), WL
2001 WI S.B. 84 (SN).
712. See, e.g., Jennifer Coleman, Legislation to Regulate Payday Lending
Industry Stalled, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 2, 2001 (reporting that California
lawmakers failed to act on two bills, one pro-consumer and one pro-industry),
WL, ALLNEWSPLUS; Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 9.
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the payday lending abuses demonstrate that the industry
should be regulated. 713 Perhaps some proponents of payday
lending believe "these people" represent risky borrowers who
should have to pay high interest rates to cover financial crises
and who do not need protection from predatory payday
lenders. 7 14
As an example, consider the comments of
Republican Representative C.L. "Butch" Otter (Idaho) in
response to an article criticizing the payday loan industry:
By allowing people to borrow against future earnings, payday lenders
provide a safety net for those who need cash to meet emergencies, or

who are in control of their finances and are willing to assume debt to
take advantage of an opportunity. No one is forced to go to a payday
lender, yet these businesses serve hundreds of thousands of men and
women every 71year.
Clearly, these lenders are meeting a need in their
5
communities.

Perhaps Representative Otter and other lawmakers have not
seen the rollover data, or maybe they do not believe the
predatory charges lodged against the industry. 7 16 Payday loan
industry lobbyists aggressively work to make sure these
7 17
positive perceptions of the industry persist.

713. For example, the desperate need for medical services in Appalachian
areas should not give unlicensed doctors an unfettered right to provide the
services. A similar argument holds true for payday lending.
714. Tammy Williamson, New Limit Proposed for Payday Lending, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at 45 (stating that because customers have poor
credit histories, payday lenders must charge high rates and will oppose any
bill that limits payday lenders to charging interest rates less than ten times
the prime rate), 2002 WL 6449065.
715. Rep. C.L. "Butch" Otter, Letter to the Editor, Payday Crime Fighters,
NAT'L J., Oct. 6, 2001, at 3047 (emphasis added), available at 2001 WL
25926181.
716. Monetary contributions by payday lenders may have influenced
lawmakers to look favorably on the industry. See, e.g., Anita Weier, Bill Caps
Payday Loan Interest, CAP. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at 4A (presenting a table of
Wisconsin Senate Committee members who have received campaign
contributions from the payday lending industry), 2001 WL 25527100.
717. See, e.g., John Hackett, Ethically Tainted, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 2001, at
48, 54 (quoting a statement from a spokesperson for the Democrats on the
House Financial Services Committee that payday lenders "have a strong lobby
and have worked hard on the state assemblies to pass laws allowing payday
loans"), availableat 2001 WL 4270174; Peter Luke, Payday Loan Centers May
Cash in on State Legislation, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 21, 2001, at B1

(indicating that lobbyists for Check 'n Go have persuaded the Michigan
legislature to consider a bill legalizing payday loans), 2001 WL 29515242; Eric
Stern, Bill Would Limit "Payday"Loans, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 26,
2001, at B1 ("The [payday] loan companies-and their dozen or so lobbyists at
the [Missouri] Capitol-say they're providing a service to people who need a
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In summary, Congress should take on payday lending
because consumers will continue to be subject to many abuses
perpetrated by the industry because state laws cannot
adequately protect them. The payday loan industry's strong
lobby, the apathy of many state lawmakers, and the industry's
rent-a-bank schemes render state efforts inadequate. 7 18 This
Article argues that Congress should afford consumers, at a
minimum, the protections outlined below.
C. MINIMUM CONSUMER PROTECTIONS

Assuming Congress can be persuaded to regulate the
payday loan industry, it should enact legislation that at least
does the following: (1) places a ceiling on the maximum interest
rates and fees that lenders can charge, (2) prohibits banks from
partnering with payday lenders, (3) forbids the collection of
treble damages from customers, (4) bans the criminal
prosecution of customers, and (5) prohibits rollovers using the
same or multiple lenders. The goals of the legislation should be
to provide consistency among the states, to curtail practices
that get consumers trapped in the cycle of indebtedness, and to
prohibit practices that are fundamentally unfair and morally
reprehensible.
As explained below, two lawmakers have
introduced bills to address problems with payday lending.
While neither bill may be politically viable, one more
realistically deals with abuses of the payday lending industry,
yet still lacks essential protections. No state payday lending
statute is a model worthy of emulation. However, Congress
few hundred dollars but can't borrow the money from a traditional bank."),
2001 WL 4469059; Tony J. Taylor, Payday Lenders Effectively Banned in
North Carolina, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Sept. 5, 2001 (quoting a
Republican politician's statement that the industry's "lobby is extremely
strong in the [South Carolina] Legislature and it's difficult to get anything out
of committee to regulate the industry"), 2001 WL 27173691.
718.

The financial community's support for payday lending is waning. For

example, concern that payday lenders are beginning tax preparation has led
H&R Block, among others, to support a pro-consumer payday loan bill in

Missouri. E-mail from Jerry Young, Community Organizer, Kansas City
Church Community Organization, to Creola Johnson, Assistant Professor of
Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Dec. 28, 2001, 13:17:49
EST) (on file with author). CUNA, the nation's largest trade association for
credit unions, see COMPENDIUM OF STATE ISSUE PAPERS, supra note 537, at 34,

opposes payday lending and "will support federal legislation that would
prohibit depository institutions from making any deferred-deposit (payday)
loans, either directly or through any affiliate or agent." Ann Hayes Peterson,
CUNA Reports 1999 Financials, CREDIT UNION MAG., Apr. 2000, at 48, 48,
availableat 2000 WL 11799458.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1

could adopt specific provisions contained in the various state
payday lending statutes to effectively accomplish the goals
identified above.
Convinced that the payday loan industry needs to be
federally regulated, Representative John LaFalce of New York,
senior Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee,
introduced H.R. 1055, entitled the Federal Payday Loan
LaFalce's
Consumer Protection Amendments of 2001.719
proposal would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to
prohibit all federally insured banks from making payday loans
either directly or through an affiliate, or from making a loan to
another lender for purposes of financing or refinancing payday
loans.72 0 LaFalce's bill would also restrict non-banks from
issuing payday loans. 72' While LaFalce has strong support
from other Democrats, a bill that completely bans payday
lending in the hands of a Republican-controlled committee is
not politically viable. 722 This lack of viability may explain why
no action has been taken on the bill.
Representative Bobby Rush of Illinois introduced the other
payday loan bill, H.R. 1319, entitled the Payday Borrower
Protection Act, which if passed would protect payday loan
customers from various payday lending practices by setting
standards for state payday loan laws. 723 The maximum loan
amount is $300, which is a substantially greater limitation in
comparison to the twenty states that have maximum loan rates
of $350 or more and seven states that place no limits on
consumer loans. 724 Chief among the consumer protections
contained in H.R. 1319 is a provision capping payday loan fees

719. H.R. 1055, 107th Cong. (2001). Although introduced and referred to
the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit during the
first session of the 107th Congress in March of 2001, no further action has
been taken well into the second session. Gordon, supra note 686 ("Only fifteen
lawmakers, all Democrats, have signed on to the bill.").
720. See H.R. 1055 § 3.
721. See id. § 4(e).
722. See Gordon, supra note 686 (noting that only Democrats have signed
on to the bill); Chris Di Edoardo, Payday Loans: Interesting Business, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 28, 2001, at F1 (reciting comments by a Democrat that a
payday loan bill would not likely be given any attention in a Republicancontrolled Congress), 2001 WL 9529145.
723. Payday Borrower Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 1319, 107th Cong. § 2(a)
(2001).
724. Fox & Mierzwinski, supra note 63, at 27-29.
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at a 36% interest rate. 725 Because H.R. 1319 sets minimum
standards for states to follow, states would be at liberty to
lower the interest rate, and thereby decrease the profitability of
payday lending. The bill brings a modicum of fairness to the
industry because consumers across the nation would not have
to pay more than the federal APR for payday loans. The 36%
APR limitation would drastically reduce the triple-digit APRs
normally associated with payday loans, but payday lenders
claim they cannot make a profit if they are limited to charging
double-digit interest rates. 726 Consequently, this bill may never
receive attention unless Democrats are willing to increase the
36% interest rate to triple-digits.
Related to the 36% interest rate limitation is a provision
that removes the incentive for payday lenders to use rent-abank partnerships. Section 3 of H.R. 1319 would amend the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act 727 by allowing an insured
depository institution to issue payday loans directly, or
indirectly through an agent, only if the loan complies with its
state's payday lending law, particularly the interest rate
limitation of 36%.728 By subjecting banks to the same 36%
interest rate cap, this provision would destroy the profitable
rent-a-bank union because payday lenders could no longer
circumvent state-imposed interest rate caps by partnering with
banks. Moreover, section 3 would make banks in rent-a-bank
arrangements responsible for determining whether the payday
729
lender is complying with state and federal laws.

725. See H.R. 1319, § 4 (b)(7)(D) ("The annual interest applicable to any
deferred deposit loan may not exceed the lesser of 36 percent or the maximum
annual percentage rate allowable in such state for comparable small loans.").
726. See Indiana Court Limits Payday Lenders, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug.
16, 2001 (quoting an attorney for the payday lending industry who claimed

that "it wouldn't be feasible for many payday lenders to continue offering
small loans because they could only collect pennies on them"), 2001 WL
26180436.
727. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2000).
728. See H.R. 1319 § 3(t)(1)(A).
729. See id. § 3(t)(1)(B). Section 3(t)(1)(B) provides as follows:
[An insured depository institution may not make any loan to any
payday lender for purposes of financing deferred deposit loans unless
the depository institution ascertains that such lender is in full
compliance with the Truth in Lending Act, the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, and the law of the state in which any borrower from
such payday lender will receive the proceeds of any such deferred
deposit loan.
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In addition to curtailing rent-a-bank, H.R. 1319 seeks to
protect consumers from payday lending practices that arise
because a check, or an electronic fund transfer, is used to
obtain a payday loan.
Section 4(b)(6)(A) precludes the
initiation or threat of criminal and civil prosecution of a payday
loan debtor other than the initiation of "a proceeding directly
related to the collection of [payday loan] debt and actual
damages." 730 The bill also requires the payday loan contract to
contain a "clear and conspicuous" notice that the consumer is
free from the initiation or threat of such prosecutions and that
the lender is limited to collecting the debt and actual
damages.7 3' By limiting the lender in this fashion, the bill
proscribes the collection of treble or double damages under
state civil statutes designed to compensate victims of bad-check
crimes. 732 In addition, it prohibits the prosecution of customers
for bad-check crimes. 733 H.R. 1319 also prohibits lenders from
doing anything that is prohibited for a debt collector under
section 808 of the FDCPA.73 4 For example, under the FDCPA,
it is illegal for a debt collector to threaten or institute criminal
prosecution for defaulting on a loan unless such an action is
735
lawful and the debt collector intends to take such action.
Under this bill, it would also be illegal for a payday lender to
736
threaten the same.
Id.
730.
731.
732.

See id. § 4(b)(6)(A).
See id. § 4(b)(8)(C).
See supra note 730 and accompanying text.

733. Id.
734.

See id. § 4(b)(6)(B) (proscribing "any practice which is prohibited

under section 808 of the [FDCPAI for a debt collector (as defined in such
Act)"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (listing the prohibited practices).
735.

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4); see West v. Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 578 (W.D.

Va. 1983) (granting partial summary judgment against a debt collector for
violating 15 U.S.C. sections 1692e(4) and (5) by making empty threats of

arrest against a debtor).
736. This bill further focuses on limiting exorbitant fees for payday loans.
Under the H.R. 1319, collection fees for a returned check (NSF) are limited to
$15 or to the charges imposed by the financial institution returning the check
for insufficient funds. See H.R. 1319 § 4(b)(7)(G). Section 4(b)(7)(G) provides
as follows:

The amount of any fee imposed for any check made or any electronic
fund transfer authorized by a borrower in connection with any
deferred deposit loan which is returned unpaid to the payday lender
due to insufficient funds in an account of such borrower may not

exceed the lesser of $15 or the charges imposed by the financial
institution returning the check for insufficient funds.

Id. This limitation is fairer than most state statutes that allow the collection
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H.R. 1319 contains provisions designed to prohibit certain
practices that lead to perpetual indebtedness. 737 For example,
it requires a two-week period of maturity for every $50 amount
borrowed. 738 This provision extends the traditional loan period
of two weeks, so that if, for instance, a customer borrows $150,
he would have six weeks to repay that loan. This provision
would put consumers in the best position to avoid perpetual
indebtedness, if it is coupled with a provision similar to Indiana
law, which allows customers to make partial payments to
reduce the principal prior to the loan's due date. 739 H.R. 1319
further protects payday loan customers from perpetual
indebtedness by forbidding a lender from refinancing or rolling
over payday loans, and from issuing a new loan between that
lender and its customer within thirty days after payment of a
previous loan. 740 The bill also prohibits a lender from accepting
repayment of a payday loan if the lender knows, or has reason
to believe, that the funds submitted for repayment are the
proceeds from a previous payday loan. 74 1 Because the lender
may elect to be willfully blind, this provision will not prevent a
borrower from getting a second loan from a second payday
lender within thirty days of the first loan and, subsequently,
does not eliminate rollovers using multiple lenders (the rollover

of NSF charges. For example, Ohio payday lenders collect both a $20 fee for
returned checks and any fees that are passed on to the lender from a financial
institution. H.R. 1319 limits Ohio lenders to collecting either the $15 fee or
the fees passed on from the bank. Consequently, the payday lenders may have
cake or ice cream, but not both.
737. See H.R. 1319 § 4(b)(6).
738. See id. § 4(b)(7)(A) (stating that "the period to maturity of any
deferred deposit loan may not be less than 2 weeks for each $50 of loan
principal").
739.

Under Indiana law,

[a] consumer may make partial payments in any amount on the small
loan without charge at any time before the due date of the small loan.
After each payment is made on a small loan, whether the payment is
in part or in full, the lender shall give a signed and dated receipt to
the consumer making a payment showing the amount paid and the
balance due on the small loan.
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-402(3) (Michie 2002). In Louisiana, payday lenders
cannot refuse partial payments of $50 or more. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3578.6(A)(3) (West 2002).
740. See H.R. 1319 § 4(b)(6)(F).
741.

See id. § 4(b)(6)(E).

Other prohibited practices include charging

additional fees or premiums for credit insurance in conjunction with a deferred
deposit loan, and engaging in unfair or deceptive practices.

4(b)(6)(D), (G).

See id.

§
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variation known as "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul").7 42
In summary, the enactment of H.R. 1319 would provide
basic legal protections to payday loan customers. H.R. 1319
contains two additional protections not discussed heretofore.
First, many consider the inclusion of arbitration clauses in
consumer contracts to be improper or predatory. 743 H.R. 1319
prohibits arbitration clauses in consumer loan contracts or any
document in connection with the loan. 744 The wording of this

742. Some jurisdictions address the "lender knowledge" issue by holding
the borrower partially responsible for avoiding the debt treadmill. For
example, Kentucky law requires borrowers to attest to not having any loans.
See supra note 321 and accompanying text. Florida law goes further to protect
the borrower by requiring lenders to verify the existence of outstanding loans
through a central database. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. In
addition, the borrower must sign an attestation statement. See id. §
560.404(20). Florida's attestation statement is as follows: "I DO NOT HAVE
AN OUTSTANDING DEFERRED PRESENTMENT AGREEMENT WITH
ANY DEFERRED PRESENTMENT PROVIDER AT THIS TIME. I HAVE
NOT TERMINATED A DEFERRED PRESENTMENT AGREEMENT
WITHIN THE PAST 24 HOURS." Id. For the language that mandates the
maintenance and consultation of the database, see supra note 324. By
following Florida's approach to payday lending, Congress would prohibit single
and multiple lender rollovers, renewals, and payday loan consolidations. This
would greatly reduce the number of people trapped in the rollover cycle.
743. See, e.g., Hossam M. Fahmy, Arbitration: Wiping Out Consumers
Rights?, 64 TEX. BUS. J. 917, 918 (2001) ("Mandatory arbitration clauses are
designed to protect companies from suits and high juridical awards and
minimize compensation a consumer can receive."); Margaret M. Harding, The
Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of
Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 491-93
(1998) (calling for the regulation of arbitration clauses); Alan S. Kaplinsky &
Mark J. Levin, Anatomy of an Arbitration Clause: Drafting and
Implementation Issues Which Should Be Considered by a Consumer Lender,
SF81 ALI-ABA 215, 217-18 (2001) (describing negative attitudes toward
arbitration clauses); Margot Saunders, The Increasein PredatoryLending and
Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 138 (2002) (stating
that "any comprehensive law addressing predatory mortgage lending must
include a prohibition against mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses");
Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can't Sue Us,' WASH. POST,
May 22, 1999, at Al. The Mayer piece reported,
"There's no question that arbitration is an excellent, wonderful
dispute-resolution device." . . . But if it's so good for consumers ...
then why don't companies make such provisions "very clear and
explain everything to consumers," and not try to hide the terms in bill
stuffers or a pile of documents?
Id. (quoting and paraphrasing Professor Mark Budnitz, an ardent critic of
mandatory arbitration clauses).
744. H.R. 1319 § 4(b)(6)(H) (prohibiting the inclusion of arbitration clauses
in documents related to payday loans).
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provision prohibits arbitration clauses that may be hidden in
the application form and not contained anywhere in the loan
contract signed by the borrower. Finally, H.R. 1319 sets
licensing and regulation standards for payday lenders to
follow. 745
H.R. 1319, however, will not be effective because, even
though it mandates that states enact its minimum standards, it
does not penalize states that fail to do so. As with other federal
to
statutes, Congress will need to create financial incentives
746
statute.
loan
payday
federal
the
enact
to
states
persuade
Thus far, minimum protections have been analyzed, but
Congress can provide additional protections if it embraces the
goal of freeing millions of Americans from "financial
servitude"--the state of only qualifying for exorbitant sources
of credit like payday lending. 747 Payday lenders seem to
inculcate a sense of financial irresponsibility, and they will not
help consumers repair their credit histories. 748 As previously
explained, an industry-sponsored survey shows that most
payday loan customers lack access to traditional forms of
749
credit.
Congress should follow the approaches of various states
regulating payday lending by enacting legislation that helps
consumers establish habits to prudently manage a financial
crisis and help them to eventually rebuild their credit histories.
For instance, Congress could follow Indiana's approach in
dealing with the fact that payday lenders make no real
assessment of a customer's ability to repay the loan. Under

745. See id. § 4 (outlining a general prohibition on payday loans unless
authorized under state law that licenses and regulates such lending).
746. For example, states that use race to deny prospective parents the
ability to adopt a child risked losing millions in funding from the federal
government. See 42 U.S.C. § 674(d)(1) (2000). Relevant agencies in these
states may be forced to forfeit up to 5% of their funding for each quarter they
are in violation of the Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1996. Id.
747. GALLAGLY & DERNOVSEK, supra note 295, at 84 (stating that fringe
financial providers, which includes payday lenders, "strip away their
customers hope by creating a cycle of 'financial servitude").
748. See supra note 322 and accompanying text (noting that payday
lenders make no real assessment of a customer's ability to repay a loan); see
also discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing rollover data and lenders' lack of
commitment to fostering consumer responsibility).
749. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining why customers lack access
to traditional forms of credit).

140

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1

Indiana law, a payday lender cannot issue a loan that exceeds
20% of a consumer's monthly net income. 7 50 This income-based
limitation would constrain the practice of encouraging
consumers to take out the maximum loan amount for which
they are approved.7 5 1 If Ohio had a similar income-based loan
limitation, the surveyors in the Ohio Survey would have only
been eligible for loans up to $160.752

Ideally, in addition to

requiring lenders to limit loans based on income, a payday loan
statute should require lenders to inquire about, and limit loans
based on, large expenses such as housing and car payments.
This ideal may, however, impose undue additional burdens
on lenders by requiring them to revise applications to include
more information and purchase software to analyze when a
loan should be given. The result may be that consumers are
denied loans because payday lenders begin to act too much like
traditional lenders in assessing ability to repay. Ultimately,
Congress, like Indiana, may conclude that the proper balance
may be to require lenders to limit loans based on a consumer's
753
net income.
Florida is another state that provides consumer protections
to payday loan customers that are worthy of implementing on a
federal level. 754 As previously discussed, Congress should

750. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-402 (Michie 2002). Chapter seven further
defines "monthly net income" as "the income received by the consumer in the
four (4) week period preceding the consumer's application for a small loan
under this chapter and exclusive of any income other than regular net pay
received, or as otherwise determined by the department." Id. § 24-4.5-7-110.
751. Recall that, in the Ohio Survey, lenders tried to persuade the research
assistants to get $300 loans even though they requested only $50 loans. See
supra note 167 (explaining that surveyors were not wired with any audio or
video recording equipment and therefore no direct evidence exists that these
statements were made).
752. The surveyors earned $8.65 per hour and most worked only part-time
hours.
753. Perhaps, the income limit should be lower than 20% given that most
traditional mortgage lenders will not finance a mortgage payment exceeding
30% of a borrower's income. Ruth Simon, Lenders Tout Interest-Only
Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2002, at D3 (stating that although the norm
is between 25% and 30%, some lenders are currently financing mortgages with
monthly payments up to 42% of a borrower's income).
754. Florida's legislative intent is to prohibit rollovers and to "prevent
fraud, abuse, and other unlawful activity associated with" payday loans. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 560.408(1) (West 2002); see also Juana Jordan, FloridaFinancial
Agency to Implement Law Controlling Payday Loans, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB.
Bus. NEWS, Sept. 6, 2001 (quoting a lobbyist with Florida Legal Services
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adopt Florida's requirement that the state maintain an
electronic database to prevent lenders and customers from
75 5
rolling over loans using the same or multiple lenders.
Congress should also follow Florida's requirement that lenders
give a customer who cannot repay a loan by its due date a 60day grace period with no additional charges to repay the
loan. 756 This grace period should be combined with the
previously discussed requirements that customers receive a
two-week period of maturity for every $50 amount borrowed,
and that customers be allowed to make partial payments to
757
reduce the principal prior to its original due date.
As a condition to receiving the 60-day grace period, Florida
requires the customer seek credit counseling from an approved
list of credit counseling agencies. 758 Credit counselors help
consumers learn to budget their money and to readjust
spending and buying habits to realistically deal with their
debts. 759 By requiring payday loan customers in need of the
stating that the purpose of the legislation was to curtail the cycle of debt that
payday loan customers experience), 2001 WL 27173608.
755. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
756. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(22)(a) (West 2002). Additionally, Florida
requires that the following notice of the grace period appear in the payday
loan contract:
IF YOU INFORM THE PROVIDER IN PERSON THAT YOU
CANNOT COVER THE CHECK OR PAY IN FULL THE AMOUNT
OWING AT THE END OF THE TERM OF THIS AGREEMENT,
YOU WILL RECEIVE A GRACE PERIOD EXTENDING THE TERM
OF THE AGREEMENT FOR AN ADDITIONAL 60 DAYS AFTER
THE ORIGINAL TERMINATION
DATE, WITHOUT ANY
ADDITIONAL CHARGE.
THE DEFERRED PRESENTMENT
PROVIDER SHALL REQUIRE THAT YOU, AS A CONDITION OF
OBTAINING THE GRACE PERIOD, COMPLETE CONSUMER
CREDIT COUNSELING PROVIDED BY AN AGENCY INCLUDED
ON THE LIST THAT WILL BE PROVIDED TO YOU BY THIS
PROVIDER. YOU MAY ALSO AGREE TO COMPLY WITH AND
ADHERE TO A REPAYMENT PLAN APPROVED BY THAT
AGENCY. IF YOU DO NOT COMPLY WITH AND ADHERE TO A
REPAYMENT PLAN APPROVED BY THAT AGENCY, WE MAY
DEPOSIT OR PRESENT YOUR CHECK FOR PAYMENT AND
PURSUE ALL LEGALLY AVAILABLE CIVIL MEANS TO
ENFORCE THE DEBT AT THE END OF THE 60-DAY GRACE
PERIOD.
Id. § 560.0404(20).
757. See supra notes 738-39 and accompanying text.
758.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(20) (West 2002).

759. See, e.g., In re Fitzgerald, 155 B.R. 711, 716 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993)
(indicating that credit counseling agencies "will help debtors put together a
budget, negotiate stand-still agreements with their creditors, and devise a
repayment program within the debtor's ability to perform"); Teresa A. Sullivan
et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from
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grace period to receive credit counseling, Florida puts payday
loan customers in a position to repair their credit by learning
how to pay off all creditors, not just payday lenders, and by
consistently paying their bills on time. 760 Improved credit
histories empower these persons to obtain loans at prime rates,
rather than subprime rates. 76' Accordingly, Congress should
enact a statute like Florida's statute by requiring a grace
period and credit counseling for payday loan customers who are
unable to repay loans.
Assuming that Congress allows payday lenders to charge
triple-digit interest rates, the foregoing restrictions should
allow the payday loan industry to remain profitable and yet
afford consumers some minimum protections. 762 While this
Article cannot discuss in detail additional important
restrictions on payday lending, it urges Congress to adopt the
following key provisions of state payday lending statutes.
the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801, 855 (1994)
(stating that credit counselors help people to "deal realistically with their
outstanding debts"); Veryl Victoria Miles, Raising Issues of Property, Wealth
and Inequality in the Law School: Contracts & Commercial Law School
Courses, 34 IND. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (2001) (explaining how credit counselors
help individuals to "make much needed financial rehabilitations"). But see
generally Richard L. Stehl, The Failingsof the Credit Counseling and Debtor
Education Requirements of the Proposed Consumer Bankruptcy Reform
Legislation of 1998, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 146-58 (1999)
(contending that credit counseling agencies do not have the capability to
provide sufficient financial assistance).
760. Joe Catalano, Tips for Buyers: Getting over the Credit Hurdle,
NEWSDAY, May 26, 2000 (quoting the director of Fannie Mae's New York
Partnership Office as stating that paying bills on time for a substantial period
of time was the only way to repair damaged credit), 2000 WL 10015964.
761. See Hank Ezell, 10 Steps to a Debt-Free Life: FinancialHealth Takes
Planning and Willpower, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 16, 2000, at H3 ("If you
have been paying on time, you may be able to negotiate a lower rate with the
creditor."), available at 2000 WL 5435852; Jack Sirard, Keeping a Solid Credit
Rating Is Key to Getting Loans, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Oct. 30,
2001 (explaining that a consumer's ability to get a good credit score to obtain a
loan at the lowest possible rate depends on "paying all your bills on time"),
2001 WL 29431098.
762. Jeff Ostrowski, of the Palm Beach Post, reported as follows:
A state crackdown last year on car title loans made that business
unprofitable .... But payday loans will remain profitable . . . . "This
new statute makes everything very black and white and very easy for
the state to regulate, which is what we all want ......
Jeff Ostrowski, New Law Puts Curbs on Pricey 'Payday'Loans, PALM BEACH
POST, Oct. 4, 2001 (paraphrasing an unnamed credit counselor, and quoting
and paraphrasing Joseph Doyle, chairman of the trade group, Financial
Service Centers of Florida, and owner of Check Cashing USA in Miami), 2001
WL 27071004.
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First, to prevent disguised payday loan transactions, Congress
should prohibit the conditioning of loans on the consumer's
purchase of additional goods or services. 763 Second, rather than
relying on general UDAP statutes, 764 Congress should follow a
few states that expressly prohibit payday lenders from
engaging in fraudulent and/or unfair and deceptive acts,
practices, or advertisements. 765 Third, like two statesColorado and North Dakota-Congress should require payday
lenders to permit cost-free rescissions. 766 Because the industry
has already adopted this as a best practice, 767 mandating costfree rescissions should not pose a problem for the industry.
Fourth, Congress should adopt Montana's prohibition against

763. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1259(B)(12) (West 2001) (stating that
lenders cannot "[t]ie or otherwise condition the offering of deferred
presentment services to the sale of any good or service"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:3578.6(A)(6) (West 2002) (stating that lenders cannot "[s]tructure the
repayment of a loan in such a manner as to attempt to circumvent the
provisions of this Chapter"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-723(6) (2001)
(prohibiting lenders from "using any device or agreement that would have the
effect of charging or collecting more fees, charges, or interest than those
allowed by this part, including but not limited to entering into a different type
of transaction"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(r) (2000) (banning lenders from
using "any device or agreement ... with the intent to obtain greater charges
than otherwise" allowed by law). A sample of the proposed statutory language
is found in Indiana's recently amended Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which
bans,
[ulsing a device or agreement that would have the effect of charging
or collecting more fees, charges, or interest than allowed by this
chapter, including, but not limited to:
(i) entering a different type of transaction with the consumer;
(ii) entering into a sales/leaseback arrangement;
(iii) catalog sales; or
(iv) entering any other transaction with the consumer that is designed
to evade the applicability of this chapter.
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-410(f) (Michie 2002).
764. UDAP refers to state statutes regulating unfair or deceptive acts and
practices. A. Brooke Overby, An InstitutionalAnalysis of Consumer Law, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1219, 1251 (2001) ("Every state also regulates
deceptive advertising under what are generally called unfair and deceptive
acts and practices statutes (UDAPS).").
765. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1259(B)(4), (6); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-3.1121; IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-410(c), (g); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368.100(8)
(Michie 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-723(5), (7); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-0812(9) (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1315.44 (Anderson 2002) (deeming
violations of section 1315.41 unfair and deceptive acts).
766. See sources cited supra note 269.
767. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 154.
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adhesionary contractual terms 6 8 such as confession of
judgment and mandatory arbitration clauses.7 69 Prohibiting
such clauses seems fair because consumers have no real ability
to bargain around them. 770 Fifth, to prevent the exploitation of
consumers who desperately need cash, Congress should follow
several states that prohibit lenders from conditioning the
issuance of a loan on the provision of collateral or a co-

768. Montana prohibits the following provisions in payday loan
agreements:
(a) a hold harmless clause;
(b) a confession of judgment clause;
(c)a waiver of the right to a jury trial, if applicable, in any action
brought by or against a consumer;
(d)a mandatory arbitration clause;
(e) any assignment of or order for payment of wages or other
compensation for services;
(f) a provision in which the consumer agrees not to assert any claim
or defense arising out of the contract; or
(g) a waiver of any provision of this part.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-723(20)(a)-(g). Indiana bans clauses similar to
Montana but also bans lenders from "[slelling insurance of any kind in
connection with the making or collecting of a small loans." IND. CODE ANN. §
24-4.5-7-410(j)-(k). Florida has a shorter list of prohibited clauses. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 560.404(10) (West 2002).
769. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text; supra note 239
(showing that courts are upholding such clauses, and describing the
unfortunate consequences to payday loan customers).
770. An adhesion contract is offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis without
offering the consumer a "realistic opportunity to bargain and under such
conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services
except by acquiescing in the form contract." Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133
Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (1977); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory
Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237,
1247 (2001) ("These [arbitration] contracts of adhesion bear little resemblance
to the voluntary agreement envisioned when one thinks of 'consent."' (footnote
omitted)).
David S. Schwartz, of the American Civil Liberties Union,
commented as follows:
Routine enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses raises
problems about consent that arise in adhesion contracts generally.
Courts repeatedly pay lip service to the idea that arbitration "is a
matter of consent, not coercion" and that what the courts are
"rigorously" enforcing are "agreements" or "bargain[s]" to arbitrate.
But if an arbitration clause has been inserted in a contract of
adhesion on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis, it is difficult to characterize it
as the product of "consent," "agreement" or "bargaining."
David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 58 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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signatory. 77 1 Finally, Congress should follow a few states that
afford consumers a private right of action with remedies
intended to motivate payday lenders to comply with the payday
772
lending statute.

CONCLUSION
In various jurisdictions, lawmakers and state regulators,
increasingly aware of the need to further regulate the payday
loan industry, rely on state laws that antedate payday loans.
These same persons enact, or attempt to enact, state laws to
deal with abusive payday lending practices. While payday
lending is expressly authorized in twenty-seven jurisdictions, it
is illegal in twenty-one jurisdictions as a result of usury laws.
In states that authorize, or merely permit payday lending due
to the absence of usury laws, payday lenders may legally
charge fees tantamount to triple-digit interest rates. Most of
the states that authorize payday lending set limits on the size
of the loan, the length of the loan period, and the interest
rate/fee for the loan. The laws in these states, however,

771. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1259(B)(9) (West 2001) (stating that a
lender cannot "[riequire a customer to provide security for the transaction,
other than the presented check, or require the customer to provide a guaranty
from another person"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 560.404(9); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480F4(b), (f) (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-7-403 ("A small loan may not be
secured by personal property other than a check or electronic debit."); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 368.100(9) (Michie 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3578.6(B)

(West 2002) (stating that lenders cannot "require for use as security any check
issued pursuant to the federal Social Security Act"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1723(11), (16) (prohibiting a lender from "using or attempting to use the check
provided by the consumer in a deferred deposit loan as security for purposes of
any state or federal law" or from "accepting any collateral for a deferred
deposit loan"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-08-12(1)(f) (2001) ("No property, titles to
any property, or mortgages may be received or held directly or indirectly by
the licensee as a condition of a deferred presentment service transaction or as
a method of collection on a defaulted deferred presentment service transaction
without proper civil process."); R.I. GEN. LAwS § 19-14.4-5.1(b) (2001) ("The
written agreement shall not permit the check casher to accept collateral.");
TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(l) (2000) ("[N]o licensee shall require a
customer to provide security for the transaction or require the customer to
provide a guaranty from another person.").
772. For instance, in Montana, payday lenders who violate the payday
lending statute are "liable to the consumer for actual and consequential
damages, plus statutory damages of $1,000 for each violation, plus costs and
attorney fees." MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-1-724(3). Injured customers can also
bring class actions and may seek injunctive relief plus any other available
legal or equitable remedies. Id. § 31-1-724(4)-(5).
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amount to a poor patchwork solution due to the gross disparity
between the highest and lowest permissible APRs. Moreover,
while many payday loan statutes prohibit or limit rollovers,
most statutes remain silent about many abusive payday
lending practices, including the collection of treble damages
from debtors, the prosecution of debtors for passing bad checks,
and the issuance of serial loans by multiple lenders. Due to the
legislative silence about these practices in states, the civil and
criminal justice systems' interpretation of general laws provide
the primary method foi determining whether payday lenders
violate state law and whether punitive or criminal sanctions
apply to their actions. Such reliance results in appalling
consequences for many defaulting debtors because some judges,
prosecutors, and litigators erroneously conclude that these
consumers deserve punitive and criminal sanctions.
State payday loan statutes, and laws that pre-date the
statutes, have, thus far, proven largely inadequate to fully
protect consumers. Payday lenders devise, and continue to
employ, sham transactions to circumvent usury and other
consumer protection laws. Usury statutes should provide the
first layer of protection against unconscionable payday loans,
but payday lenders skirt these laws by fabricating transactions
that purport to sell services or products and by drafting
transactions that remove the loan from the purview of the state
law.
Although the abuses of the payday lending industry are
sufficient in themselves to compel state regulation, they extend
beyond the bare terms of each loan transaction. As the Ohio
Survey disturbingly reveals, these abuses begin with denying
consumers access to information essential to informed decisionmaking-an abuse extending even to the deliberate
concealment of payday loan terms-and extend to falsely
representing to the consumer that he or she may rescind a
payday loan at no cost.
Payday lenders also employ
disreputable, and sometimes illegal, practices such as obtaining
treble damages from debtors in default, pursuing bad-check
prosecution against them, and using rent-a-bank to charge fees
in excess of usury laws and payday loan statutes. In fact,
unscrupulous payday lenders have filed criminal complaints
against their customers, and successfully persuaded district
attorneys to prosecute them for writing bad checks. In almost
every case, these prosecutions represent an inappropriate
perversion of the check fraud statutes. Despite this perversion,
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the prosecutions frequently serve as a viable collection tool for
payday lenders. Accordingly, state-based regulations against
the industry have proven as effective as sealing a leak on a
rotten garden hose: Every time one leak is plugged, another
appears!
The inability or unwillingness of the various states to
effectively deal with payday loan abuses and the increasing use
of rent-a-bank to circumvent state laws, demonstrates that the
federal government must act now to enact comprehensive
regulations dealing with the payday lending industry. First, to
fully protect the consumer, new federal laws need to mandate
that payday lenders include full disclosure of all loan terms
with each transaction. These laws must also grant consumers
the right to rescind the loan within three days of
consummation.
A three-day rescission period will ensure
consumers a fair opportunity to make an informed decision.
Second, the regulations should establish a national usury law
preventing the exorbitant APRs currently garnered by payday
lenders. Third, since payday loan customers are among the
most financially vulnerable members of our society, Congress
should require payday lenders to make a fair inquiry into each
borrower's capacity to repay the loan before extending credit.
Fourth, federal law should place a strict limitation on the
ability of payday lenders to extend, renew, or refinance a
payday loan, and mandate further that a portion of every
renewal fee be used to reduce the borrower's principle
obligation.
Finally, payday lenders must be prohibited from taking
any punitive action against their customers. The purpose of
treble damage remedies is to deter willful or wanton
misconduct; a payday loan customer's inability to repay a debt
is seldom willful, and in any event is no more egregious than
the failure of other consumers to pay a credit card or auto loan
on time. Many states already preclude the criminal conviction
of payday loan borrowers. Federal regulation must work to
ensure that this rule prevails in all jurisdictions, not only to
ensure due process for all, but to prevent payday lenders from
coercing payment through the idle threat of criminal
prosecution.
Admittedly, payday loans frequently involve
conduct that should be considered criminal, but it is the
conduct of the lender, not the consumer, that warrants this
conclusion. Accordingly, federal law should impose strict
penalties on those lenders that refuse to comply with the
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proposed regulations.
It may be, as payday lenders claim, that deferred deposit
transactions constitute a necessary and desired form of
consumer credit. Current laws, however, provide far too many
opportunities for abuse by lenders, and do not afford payday
loan customers the same consumer protections enjoyed by
customers of traditional credit services. Consumers forced into
these transactions
already suffer financial distress
disproportionate to the rest of the general public. These
borrowers should not be forced to resort to credit sources that
compound their economic hardship. Accordingly, Congress
should act to stringently regulate the payday lending industry
as an important step in equalizing consumer protection laws for
all consumers, even if true equal credit opportunity remains
elusive.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Initial Loan Information
AVAILABILITY OF LOAN INFORMATION
Payday
Lender

Clerk
Refused to
Provide

Loan TermsFes
Brochures/
Fees Posted Conspicuously Pamphlets

ApplicationDicoue____
1

x

2

x

3

x

4

x

5

x

Posted
Fees
Lacked
AP

APR
Program*
iDisclosure

Posted

x

x

no poster

APR

x

posted
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

8

x

x

9

x

x

10

x

x

x

x

11

x

x

x

x

12

x

x

x

13

x

x

x

14

x

x

15

x

16

x

6
7

17

x

18

x

20

x

x

APR posted
x

x
x
no poster

x

x
x

22

x
68%

_

no poster

21

Percentage

x

APR posted

x

x

x

19

Repeat
Ctor
Customer
Reward
Prga

86%

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
14%

27%

73%

18%

* Surveyors could not confirm the use of reward programs by other lenders
because the Ohio Survey did not involve multiple loans with each lender.
Therefore, information relating to repeat customer incentive programs was not
independently verified.
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Table 2: Information-Gathering Payday Loan Disclosures

1

DEFAULT ACTIONS
ORAL APR DISCLOSURES
Fee Denied
Clerk
Finance Clerk
Report to
Per Existence Claimed Charges Evaded
NSF
Credit
$50 of APR
No
Equal Question Disclosed Fee*
Bureau
ce
e
$50_ _
ofAPRKnowledge APR Qsn
$7.50
x
$25.00
x

2

$7.50

3

$7.50

4

$7.50

5

$7.50

6

$7.50

x

$22.25

7

$7.50

x

$25.00

8

$7.50

x

-

Loan
Payday
Lender

9

$7.50

10

$7.50

11

$7.50

12

$7.50

13

$7.50

14

$7.50

15

$7.50

16

$7.50

17

$7.50

18

$7.50

19

$7.50

20

$7.50

21

$7.50

22

$7.50

Percentage 100%

x

$30.00
x

$22.40

x

$27.00

x

$30.00

x

x
_

x

$25.00

x

$25.00

x

x

$25.00

x

x

$30.00

x

x

x

$25.00
x

$25.00

x

$26.00
x

x

$25.00

x

$30.00
x
x

$25.00
$26.00

x

#

$22.40

x

$28.00
x

32%

x

18%

$16.00
14%

5%

32%

41%

* NSF-Not Sufficient Funds
# Payday lender indicated that while it would not report a loan default to a
credit bureau, it would harass borrower.
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